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Space and Asymmetric Difference in 
Historical Perspective : An Introduction
Axel Körner
In 1851 the Italian philosopher and statesman Vincenzo Gioberti, argu-
ably Italy’s most influential political thinker at the time and a former 
Prime Minister of Piedmont-Sardinia, self-confidently described England 
as ‘the Sicily of Europe’: an oceanic island in the continent’s northern 
periphery, whose connection to Europe was allegedly on a par with Sici-
ly’s relationship to the Italian peninsula.1 While from an economic point 
of view, or within a global perspective, Gioberti’s description certainly 
did not correspond to the ways in which the British people perceived 
their own position in the world, the Italian thinker used the comparison 
to explain Europe’s political and cultural heterogeneity, including dif-
ferences between institutions and constitutional developments. For the 
famous philosopher, there was not only one way of representing Europe’s 
core, not only one way of being modern.2 Convinced of Italy’s primacy in 
Europe, an argument based on the country’s cultural and religious legacy 
as a Mediterranean civilization, Gioberti rejected the idea that Italy had 
to be taught lessons by seemingly more developed countries. Instead, for 
Gioberti, political, constitutional or economic institutions had to reflect 
local and historical conditions.3
While Gioberti used England’s alleged marginality as a relational 
description to speak about the Italian states prior to their political uni-
fication, from today’s perspective recent political developments seem to 
confirm Gioberti’s assessment of Britain’s position in Europe. Also today, 
this position depends less on objective facts than on discursive strate-
gies, in this case on developments of Britain’s own making. During the 
campaign leading to the referendum on Britain’s membership of the 
European Union in June 2016, the country’s position within the EU was 
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instrumentalized to negotiate and contest a broad range of social, polit-
ical and cultural conflicts at home, many of which were only indirectly 
affected by EU policies. Both examples – Gioberti’s idea of Italy’s primacy 
as well as Britain’s marginality within Europe – show how discursive con-
structions of spatial differences between centre and periphery depend on 
subjective viewpoints that then serve as instruments in politics. As rela-
tional terms these differences construct selves as well as others, based on 
constantly shifting economic, political or cultural contexts. The semantic 
content of such notions is determined by transnational exchanges, where 
a range of different parameters is amalgamated to suit subjective discur-
sive interests.
This book examines cultural, intellectual and economic exchanges 
in order to assess how these contribute to the construction of spatial 
hierarchies. While goods are usually exchanged in two directions, with 
regard to knowledge historians often assume a one-directional transmis-
sion, which is then used to establish an intellectual or political order that 
assigns particular spaces to positions of either core or periphery. We can 
identify a typical example of this approach in the field of transatlantic con-
stitutional history, where, for instance, the global impact of the American 
constitution – and consequently the United States’ primacy in the world – 
is discussed without taking into consideration how republican or federal 
concepts that originated in European political thought related to the 
emergence of the United States’ political institutions.4 Taking a different, 
more critical approach, David Armitage and Sanjay Subrahmanyam have 
underlined how the cultural and political experiences of many different 
peoples and nations have contributed to the American constitution’s 
emancipatory potential.5 One-directional examinations of constitutional 
flows tend to undermine the creative force associated with the amalga-
mation of ideas into local knowledge and practices. At times this process 
of amalgamation might turn into what the semiotician Umberto Eco has 
called ‘aberrant decoding’, where interpretations share close to nothing 
with the original author’s intentions.6
Providing an example for spatial hierarchies from another context 
of historical analysis, the musicologist Anselm Gerhard has demon-
strated the relative insignificance of geographical and/or political crite-
ria for notions of centre and periphery in the development of European 
art music.7 For the long period from the fourteenth to the first half of 
the nineteenth century, Italy, and Southern Italy in particular, occupied 
a prime position in European music, largely a consequence of its institu-
tions of cultural representation related to the life of its numerous splen-
did courts. Meanwhile, a city like Prague, in the geographical centre of 
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Europe, and since the Middle Ages a major imperial residence of the 
Luxemburgs and then the Habsburgs, created a significant international 
reputation as a centre of musical activity from the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury only, symbolized by the original productions of two of Mozart’s 
great late operas, Don Giovanni (1787) and La clemenza di Tito (1791). 
It was on the basis of this reputation that the city was subsequently able 
to attract young conductors and composers like Carl Maria von Weber 
(from 1813) and Gustav Mahler (from 1885) to lead its orchestras.
In recent decades, transnational and global history have con-
tributed to a more inclusive understanding of intellectual and cultural 
exchanges, challenging the ways in which we tend to assign positions of 
centre and periphery on our mental maps. For instance, Christopher A. 
Bayly has demonstrated how India’s liberal tradition helped to transform 
ideas received from progressive Western thinkers in order to challenge 
imperial relationships.8 During the nineteenth century the number of 
people affected by similar examples of global exchanges increased, as did 
the speed at which such connections were established. Meanwhile, chal-
lenges arising from globalization that subsequently impacted on existing 
spatial hierarchies were not a new experience in the nineteenth century.9 
As Michael North has argued, during the Middle Ages, from the twelfth 
century onwards, new commercial connections transformed a vast space 
from the Mediterranean via the Arabian Sea to the Indian Ocean into a 
single maritime network.10 This development had dramatic consequences 
for the ways in which Europeans, as well as particular countries within 
Europe, positioned themselves within global space and historical time. 
Following a more specific geographical and historiographical empha-
sis, Akira Iriye has demonstrated how in the case of nineteenth-century 
Japan the wider world suddenly became ‘the mental universe, in which 
Japanese people and their leaders have sought to understand their place 
and their role in the international community’.11 Based on a different 
epistemological approach, postcolonial theory has helped us to under-
stand how empires constructed spatially specific hierarchies between 
notions of citizenship, gender, class, religion and race, in the colonial 
periphery as well as at home in the metropole.12 Rethinking exchanges 
between colonizers and colonized therefore challenged preconceived 
ideas about the flow of ideas and related cultural practices, emphasizing 
instead the hybrid nature of colonial relationships. Following their own 
political and economic rationale, empires also changed the world order 
by forming new transnational connections between themselves.13 These 
processes constantly defined, shifted and transformed the parameters of 
spatial hierarchies.
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While global and transnational history, as well as a wider bibliogra-
phy that responds to the recent spatial turn in the social sciences, provide 
the backdrop to our book’s approach to spatial hierarchies, this introduc-
tory chapter cannot offer a complete overview of those different fields of 
scholarship.14 Instead, a few references will serve to map out the origins 
of the multi-disciplinary debate on the interconnectedness of centres and 
peripheries, an issue further explored in the following chapter by Marta 
Petrusewicz. That historians have adopted a critical approach to concepts 
of core and periphery owes much to development debates among econo-
mists and geographers of the late 1960s and 1970s. Here Marx’s theory 
of surplus value and Lenin’s writings on imperialism presented an impor-
tant starting point in trying to identify the causes of persisting global ine-
qualities. A broad range of less ideologically driven economic theories 
that had emerged since the 1930s fostered empirical enquiries into those 
questions. For instance, Samir Amin and André Gunder Frank, based on 
different sets of data, analysed the relationship between advanced and 
less developed economies as a necessary condition for the rise of capital-
ism as a whole.15 Many of the concepts first discussed during those early 
years still remain influential in the most recent works on the geography 
of the world economy.16
The most influential historian to critically adopt the ‘core’/‘periph-
ery’ paradigm in the 1970s was Immanuel Wallerstein. At the centre of 
his world-system analysis was a critique of the ideological foundations of 
modernization theory, through emphasis on the exploitative relationship 
between ‘advanced’ economies and the allegedly less developed parts of 
the world.17 Wallerstein insists on the existence of a single capitalist world 
economy that defines the tensions between various ‘national’ and ‘colo-
nial’ economies, and a single system of ‘international’ trade. The fact that 
particular states expanded their jurisdiction and administrative struc-
tures into foreign territories played an important part in fostering the 
system’s internal hierarchies. Wallerstein’s theoretical framework also 
impacted on economic studies of a smaller geographical scale, although 
often producing different outcomes. For instance, in her influential book 
Latifundium (1989), Marta Petrusewicz challenged conventional notions 
of centre and periphery by describing the Southern Italian economy as 
a rational system of production that after 1800 secured the livelihood 
of a society that efficiently combined feudal with capitalist elements of 
production.18
These debates have subsequently been reflected in the various 
approaches to global and transnational history, and in particular in new 
economic and imperial history. Here a global focus on transnational 
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economic connections has helped to challenge conventional hierarchies 
by putting more recent world economic developments into a historically 
informed perspective. Kirti Chaudhuri pioneered the tracing of cul-
tural and economic interactions in the Indian Ocean between 700 and 
1750, demonstrating that the Islamic civilization entered this system of 
trade several centuries before the Europeans.19 Other historians, adopt-
ing a different geographical perspective, pointed out that between the 
so-called Middle Ages (in itself a Eurocentric concept) and the beginning 
of the nineteenth century, China was the world’s most powerful centre 
of commercial and cultural exchange.20 These very different studies have 
in common that they show how the rise of Europe as a global power is 
a relatively recent phenomenon. Contrary to many traditional accounts, 
written within a ‘Western’ or Atlantic perspective, Europe’s rise does not 
coincide with the ‘discovery’ of the New World several centuries earlier.21 
While it is correct that around 1900 Britain led worldwide manufactur-
ing output, followed closely by the United States, as late as 1800 China 
was still producing more manufactured goods than any other country in 
the world, which helps to explain China’s long history as a global power 
and its related ambition in contemporary politics. As Christopher Bayly 
has argued, it was between the late eighteenth and the early twentieth 
century that uniformities in state administration, trade and political ide-
ologies placed the European imperial system at the centre of new transna-
tional connections, in particular with the Islamic world and South Asia.22 
These new hierarchies were reflected in concepts of race, in the economic 
and ecological degradation of entire world regions, and in the use of vio-
lence as a basis of defining global power. As a direct consequence of these 
forms of imperial exploitation, a historical lack of state structures in the 
world’s postcolonial regions still determines the peripheral status of, for 
instance, large parts of Africa. According to Andreas Eckert, it was the 
language of Empire that described Africa as a continent without history.23
What makes our book original, and distinguishes it from this wider 
historiographical context, is its emphasis on the asymmetrical nature 
of intellectual and cultural encounters, and on examples where a tradi-
tional understanding of centre and periphery is turned upside down as a 
consequence of a change of focus. In three sections and eleven chapters, 
framed by a conceptual introduction and a summative conclusion, this 
book investigates the multi-directional structure  of cultural and intel-
lectual exchanges between different parts of Europe as well as within a 
global context. What the examples discussed in these chapters share is 
that they oblige us to rethink pre-established mental maps.24 While the 
book as a whole aims to challenge the way we use concepts like centre 
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and periphery as analytical categories, its individual chapters present 
case studies to illustrate how the terminologies of spatial hierarchy are 
constructed and applied, but also how empirical facts challenge estab-
lished relational terms. In our book the asymmetrical and multi-direc-
tional structure of cultural and intellectual exchanges emerges from the 
multitude of empirical examples covering different parts of the globe 
over several centuries. This approach differs from other studies in the 
field, which tend to concentrate on very specific themes within relatively 
well-defined notions of time and space.25 We hope that our book’s change 
of scope allows us to gain a number of more abstract and conceptual 
insights.
In order to channel this debate in the direction of possible theoret-
ical and methodological insights, the volume starts with a section that 
discusses some of the different conceptual approaches our authors have 
used to analyse and rethink the relationship between centre and periph-
ery, as well as the normative value often attached to those terms. All 
three of those chapters take different regions within Europe, or Europe 
in its relationship to the world, as a starting point; but the main aim of 
these chapters is to familiarize readers with different theoretical and con-
ceptional tools (as well as related methodologies) that all serve the pur-
pose of discussing spatial hierarchies. In her opening contribution, Marta 
Petrusewicz provides us with a crucial historiographical background 
to the debates this book attempts to tackle. As already briefly outlined 
above, the relational nature of the terms centre (or core) and periphery 
was first revealed by critical development theorists in the 1960s who were 
keen to challenge the binary use of the terms ‘developed’ and ‘underde-
veloped’. Insights gained from the relationship between these terms were 
then applied to a wider range of historical contexts, initially to explain 
the origins and nature of the capitalist world system, and later to analyse 
different historical examples where spatial hierarchies played a constitu-
tive role. Petrusewicz compares examples from four different geograph-
ical contexts in order to show that before the late nineteenth century, 
and preceding the consolidation of the political economy dogma, there 
existed not one, but several possible paths of economic development, and 
that no particular path was perceived to inherently define a region as core 
or periphery. In particular, there existed land-based models of moderni-
zation that defined themselves as alternatives to the classical economists 
of the Manchester School and that allow us to fundamentally rethink the 
ways in which we apply concepts of core and periphery.
Petrusewicz uses the term ‘reference culture’ to illustrate how mod-
ernizers in the periphery of the economic world system related their ideas 
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to those operating at the core. Several contributors to this volume, most 
of them working within the field of the digital humanities, employ the 
concept of reference culture in order to define the relationship between 
smaller countries and the wider world. Joris van Eijnatten illustrates the 
subjective nature of such asymmetric relations. He starts by reporting 
how recent public debate in the United States created (positive) images 
of America by constructing (negative) images of Europe. In this par-
ticular case Americans discussed racism as a specific European legacy. 
The subjective nature of such a rhetorical device, and the ways it is used 
to create hierarchies between different levels of ‘civilization’, is easily 
revealed by reference to those many generations of Europeans whose 
idea of the United States was formed by what they knew about the United 
States’ slave economy and its persisting consequences for race relations 
once the institution of slavery had been abolished.26 Following a survey 
of literature in critical theory and cultural studies, van Eijnatten suggests 
replacing the concept of identity that directly depends on alterity, with a 
new focus on mentalities, which he considers to be more self-referential 
and less dependent on the construction of an Other. According to van 
Eijnatten, reference cultures can be imitated, adapted and resisted, and 
therefore they remain more amiable than a discourse based on identities. 
Digital humanities allow us to examine a huge amount of information 
on those mentalities, and on the ways they construct what they see as 
central or peripheral.
In the final chapter of the introductory section, Jan Ifversen exam-
ines the construction of asymmetrical differences by taking a conceptual 
history approach, which he exemplifies by analysing different categories 
of marginality within Europe. In Ifversen’s account, marginality presents 
itself as a conceptual alternative to the terminology of periphery. As a 
relational term, marginality positively reflects Europe’s internal diver-
sity, while also presenting the challenge of confronting us with a different 
normative category. His chapter compares different forms of marginality 
within modern Europe, while also introducing the term as an analyti-
cal category to identify new asymmetrical differences in a range of geo-
graphical contexts. As is the case with reference cultures, Ifversen shows 
how digital humanities provide a rich material basis for exploring this 
methodological approach.
The book’s second section introduces a set of empirical case studies, 
while also widening our geographical and chronological scope. ‘Globalizing 
peripheries’ demonstrates how places that are usually categorized on the 
basis of their peripheral location challenge such hierarchies through a focus 
on new or different parameters. Taken together, the chapters of this section 
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raise questions about the definition of spatial hierarchies as well as about 
the origins of global asymmetries. Based on a dense empirical survey of 
Russian colonial and maritime ventures, Michael North explains Russia as 
an empire of many heterogeneous peripheries that connected it with differ-
ent parts of the globe. This scenario led to a situation where the Empire’s 
political centre did not necessarily overlap with its core of imperial power. 
By connecting its outposts in the Baltic Sea with those in the Pacific, the 
Empire attempted to turn geographical peripheries into imperial centres. 
Although a Russian Pacific never materialized, such ideas deeply marked 
Russia’s as well as Europe’s spatial imagination. With Nicola Miller’s chap-
ter on republics of knowledge, we move across the Atlantic in order to gaze 
at the world from Latin America. Evoking a situation that shows clear simi-
larities to the views on agricultural reform discussed in Marta Petrusewicz’s 
chapter, Miller starts with an anecdote about the celebrated Argentine poet 
José Hernández refusing to accept the decision of his government to place 
his home country on the margins of the developed world, pointing instead 
at the excellent conditions of future progress if existing knowledge, on a 
meta-regional level, was pooled together. Once again this example shows 
that the relationship between core and periphery cannot be defined in abso-
lute terms. Miller’s chapter brings into relief the collectivity of knowledge 
and the fight for its social and political recognition, both of which are deter-
mined by spatial hierarchies and attempts to resist them. Her chapter chal-
lenges conventional approaches to the creation of knowledge under colonial 
conditions, showing instead how a peripheral position might invoke par-
ticular forms of authenticity that then reveal great creative potential.
Back in Europe, Harry Stopes argues in a chapter on Lille and 
Manchester around 1900 that global connections do not necessarily pass 
via capital cities. He demonstrates how a secondary or peripheral posi-
tion on the national map might form the basis of a global economic or 
cultural strategy that in turn fosters a strong sense of regional or local 
identity. The example of the two cities presents a modernity and an expe-
rience of globalization that was navigated at a local scale, independent of 
pre-existing national hierarchies. Reversing existing hierarchies between 
core and periphery, Stopes illustrates his findings by exploring different 
forms of cultural representation specific to Manchester and Lille.
The book’s third and final section examines ideas and commod-
ities that move between centres and peripheries. Jens Späth looks at 
the transnational impact of the Revolutions of 1820–3, which turned 
the Mediterranean from the alleged position of a European backwa-
ter into a global centre of constitutional change. Ever since the days of 
Spain’s resistance against Napoleon, the Spanish constitution of 1812 
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had assumed an almost mythical reputation among constitutional mon-
archists around the world. With direct reference to this document, the 
insistence on constitutional government among members of the revolu-
tionary movement of the 1820s gave birth to a first liberal International. 
The centre of action was neither Paris nor Vienna, and there was not one 
centre, but many, including cities such as Madrid, Naples, Palermo and 
Lisbon. The following chapter by Alessandro de Arcangelis stays in the 
Mediterranean, discussing how Italian political thinkers have reconciled 
cosmopolitan with national ideals in order to overcome Italy’s perceived 
marginalization since the early modern period. Their creative intellec-
tual force informed the transnational circulation of European ideas in 
Italy, while at the same time challenging existing discursive asymmetries. 
Read together, the chapters by Späth and de  Arcangelis demonstrate 
how hegemonic constructs produced spatial hierarchies that the alleged 
peripheries could either accept or reject.
Although it examines debates around 1900, Tessa Hauswedell’s 
chapter is directly relevant to contemporary ideas of Britain’s changing 
relationship to Europe and the world, as mentioned at the start of this 
introduction. Combining a conceptual history approach with a digital 
analysis of reference cultures, her chapter surveys different junctures at 
which the British press constructed London as the ‘imperial metropolis of 
the world’. Affecting more countries than just Britain’s immediate neigh-
bours across the Channel, those notions of superiority imposed a structure 
of centre and periphery on the entire world. London, during the second 
half of the nineteenth century, might have been huge and economically 
powerful, and its built environment imposing, but Hauswedell’s docu-
mentation shows that due to Britain’s isolated and insular understanding 
of itself there was little space for the many features that determined spa-
tial hierarchies in the view of Europe’s Mediterranean civilizations. In this 
respect Britain’s self-image contrasts dramatically with views elsewhere 
in the world, with the examples discussed by Späth and de Arcangelis, 
and indeed with the views exposed at the time by Britain’s own second 
cities, as outlined in Stopes’ chapter. Britain’s discursive grandeur was 
at least partly the reflection of an inferiority complex vis-à-vis Europe’s 
old and uncontested capital cities such as Paris and Vienna. In Walter 
Benjamin’s famous words, Paris simply was the ‘capital of the nineteenth 
century’, despite its ever-pertinent political crisis and its own discourse of 
degenerative decline after 1870. Unlike Paris or Vienna, London seemed 
to be in a position where it had constantly to explain its own status in 
the world. In this context it is telling that in the British press none of the 
major cities such as Berlin, Rome or Vienna – or related adjectives such 
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as ‘German’, ‘Austrian’ or ‘Italian’ – are present as collocates for the term 
‘metropolis’.
The final chapter by Hermione Giffard discusses transnational 
patterns of advertising and consumption in a mid-twentieth-century 
global context. Reflecting hierarchies of core and periphery as they were 
established during the age of empire, modern marketing in a postcolo-
nial world finds itself in a position to reverse this spatial order. Directly 
relating to one of the book’s key themes, Giffard shows how the twenti-
eth century reflects and then overturns spatial notions we previously dis-
cussed for the nineteenth century, where local consumers in the global 
periphery determine economic decisions in centres of wealth and politi-
cal power. Global companies are forced to adapt to the reversal of pre-ex-
isting hierarchies. Meanwhile, she presents an example of multinational 
companies located in smaller countries that do not represent the political 
and economic core of the global economy. Showing parallels to some of 
Stopes’ findings for the period around 1900, Giffard’s chapter exempli-
fies how the local and the global interact, and how the global is enacted 
through the local.
Taken together, the chapters of this book discuss a chronological 
range that takes us from the medieval period into the twentieth century, 
covering much of Europe, the Western hemisphere and parts of Asia, 
while also referring to the role of the global South in conceptualizing spa-
tial hierarchies. Examples of economic development and changing struc-
tures of political power stand next to studies of intellectual exchange. 
Religion represented an important and very topical focus of the debate 
at the conference on which this collection of essays is based, but it is less 
clearly reflected in the chapters that follow, leaving an important field for 
future and more specialized investigation. Although all authors write in 
historical perspective, their arguments are based on a range of expertise 
from different disciplines of the humanities and social sciences. The way 
in which they engage with notions of centre and periphery on a global 
scale does not suggest that, as analytical categories, these concepts 
are redundant. Instead, they demonstrate how, as products of human 
agency, centre and periphery are conditioned by mutual dependencies. 
They reveal constantly evolving asymmetries between them. Most impor-
tantly, they show that centre and periphery do not represent absolute 
categories. Instead, they present subjective categories defined by their 
discursive context. This is not to say that they are not real, but that in his-
tory, realities are shaped by the mind. In this sense the book is an invita-
tion to understand each spatial hierarchy not as a fact, but as a preference 
of perspective.
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This book is based on papers and discussions of a conference held 
at University College London in June 2016, a collaboration between the 
UCL Centre for Transnational History and the European research pro-
ject ‘Asymmetrical Encounters’, based at the University of Utrecht, UCL 
and the University of Trier. The organizers of the event are also grateful 
for the financial support they received from the UCL European Institute 
and from UCL’s research programme Grand Challenge Intercultural 
Interaction. The editors of this book would like to thank all speakers 
and chairs for contributing their thoughts to our discussions, especially 
those who participated in the publication of this volume. With its wide 
thematic scope, this book will hopefully be relevant to researchers from 
across the globe, which is why we publish it in Open Access.
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Rethinking Centre and Periphery 
in Historical Analysis : Land-based 
Modernization as an Alternative 
Model from the Peripheries
Marta Petrusewicz
As briefly mentioned in the introduction to this book, the pair set 
‘core’/‘periphery’ was first applied extensively to the operations of the 
world economy in the 1960s by scholars and activists who challenged 
dominant views of development as synonymous with economic growth. 
The main thrust of developmentalist literature, the contestants claimed, 
was to analyse the characteristics of those sovereign states that were 
industrialized and prosperous, in order to establish a model that could 
be copied by less fortunate sovereign states.
The critics pointed out that the fortunate and the less fortunate sov-
ereign states were not separate, independent entities that happened to 
be at different stages of parallel processes of development. They were, 
instead, part of a single ongoing system – a  ‘world-system’ – where 
‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ were simply descriptive terms applied 
to the poles of a unified process of development. Beginning with liberal 
development theorists and reformers, such as Raul Prebisch, and contin-
uing with Marxists like Paul Baran, André Gunder Frank and Immanuel 
Wallerstein, the new terms ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ entered the vocabulary 
of development literature.1 Better than ‘development’ and ‘underdevel-
opment’, they expressed the relational, mutually dependent nature of the 
pair in a zero-sum game: the more one zone became core-like, the more 
another became peripheral. The power aspect of this relationship was 
expressed by André Gunder Frank’s ‘development of underdevelopment’.2
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As ‘core’/‘periphery’ is a relational concept, one should be care-
ful not to associate this shorthand with any permanent list of traits. 
‘Core’/‘periphery’ refers always to an unequal relation, but the ine-
quality may be expressed in changing forms. In fact, the commodities 
involved in the exchange have changed dramatically over time, espe-
cially between industrial and agricultural products: what were core 
products would become peripheral, and vice versa. Most of the time, 
the ‘coreness’/‘peripherality’ had to do with the wage and profit levels of 
each product as well as with degrees of technical sophistication.
The full implications of the ‘core’/‘periphery’ relationship can only 
be observed in an integrated world economy, integration that started 
with the onset of the modern world-system and reached its apex in the 
late nineteenth century.3 Only then, in parallel with the new imperialism, 
was the dogmatic view of development as a unique progressive process 
consolidated. Until then, across the world, different paths of develop-
ment were envisaged, and none of them yet perceived as inherently core 
or peripheral.
The case considered here is that of nineteenth-century Europe 
and its internal peripheries in the period preceding the consolidation 
of the political economy dogma. In that time and place, a peripheral 
alternative model of modernization was elaborated and implemented 
by a transnational cohort of rural modernizers. That nineteenth-cen-
tury Europe had within it vast internal peripheries is a well-known fact, 
though maybe less well known is the extent to which they were rural 
and underdeveloped. Developmental theory views them as having been 
in the process, however slow and contradictory, of catching up and 
transitioning to successive stages of the prescribed road. Instead, I will 
show here how the elites of those peripheries, conscious of the risks of 
dependency, undertook in that period a number of modernizing pro-
jects that were land-based and different from what they referred to as 
‘Manchester civilization’, a paradigm of modernization based on urban 
concentration, class polarization and mass factory production. Even less 
known is the use these elites made of political economy, the hegemonic 
reference culture at that time.
Without providing a systematic comparison, this chapter is based 
on an extensive study of modernizing elites in four countries situated at 
the outskirts of nineteenth-century Europe: Ireland to the west, Norway 
to the north, Poland to the east and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies to 
the south, in the period that runs roughly from the Congress of Vienna 
in 1815 to the 1860s. These areas, integrated into the European world 
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economy in ways in which, for example, Russia or Turkey were not, were 
representative of the peripheral condition for the following reasons:4
•   they were topographically peripheral in that they constituted the 
outermost regions of Europe.
•  they were structurally peripheral: as producers of foodstuffs and 
raw materials, their economic activities commanded only a very 
small share of the total surplus produced within a commodity 
chain.
•  they were politically peripheral in that they were dominated by 
other free states, as colonies or semi-colonies: Ireland had been, 
since the 1800 Act of Union, a fully integrated colony of Great Brit-
ain; Poland was, in 1795, definitively partitioned among Austria, 
Prussia and Russia; Norway had passed, in 1814, from an oppressive 
colonial dominion by Denmark, to a less oppressive but still colonial 
dominion by Sweden. The Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, although an 
independent state, had a relatively low degree of autonomy, being 
treated by both Great Britain and Austria as a dependent territory.
•  their indigenous state machinery, where it existed, was weak. 
State managers did not play the role of coordinators of a complex 
industrial-commercial-agricultural mechanism, but were rather 
simply one set of landlords among others, with little claim to legit-
imate authority over the whole.
• their class system was dominated by the binary ‘lords’/‘peasants’, 
as the urban bourgeoisie was small in number and often composed 
of foreigners.
With the bourgeoisie culturally insecure, and peasants poor and 
mostly illiterate, land-owning elites – though deprived of political power – 
retained an uncontested cultural hegemony. If change were to occur, landed 
elites were its only possible agents.
These elites proposed a model of modernization which was based 
on land, agriculture and, in general, on what was perceived by these 
followers of Smith, Vico and Herder as a vocation of the given territory, 
its natural and historical suitability to a given path of development. 
The choice of an agricultural path was not as backward-looking as it 
might appear from a later perspective. As no path of development was 
taken as inherently peripheral, in the sense of precluding the ascent of 
a given region to core position, a land-based one made sense in Prussia 
as well as in Calabria. In his 1987 ‘Capitalist Development in Hostile 
Environments’, Giovanni Arrighi identifies three pathways to wage labour 
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in late nineteenth-century Calabria, the poorest region in the newly uni-
fied Italy: commercial citrus production in the area of Gioia Tauro, the 
grain-livestock latifundia in the Crotonese, and the subsistence-oriented 
peasant household economy in the Cosentino.5 He names them, respec-
tively, the ‘Swiss road’, the ‘Prussian or Junker road’ and the ‘American or 
farmer road’, to stress analogies with other historical instances in which 
such pathways led countries to ascend to core position.
All these roads were, indeed, possible in the eighteenth-century 
version of the ‘core’/‘periphery’ relation. Adam Smith’s invisible hand of 
the market allowed for multiple pathways to the prosperity of nations: 
agricultural or industrial production, as long as it followed the vocation 
of the territory, could assert itself on equal terms in the benevolent inter-
national market.6
By the early nineteenth century, the onset of the period under 
consideration here, the terms of the ‘core’/‘periphery’ relationship had 
begun to harden, away from Smith’s equalizing market vision. Industrial 
goods were increasingly identified as inherently core products, while pri-
mary products were becoming by definition peripheral, to be exchanged 
on unequal terms in a market dominated by the core areas. Ever more 
often in the public discourse, peripheral areas were marked as unable 
to reap more than very marginal benefits from their participation in the 
world division of labour. The main proof furnished of this inability was 
the fact that at no point since 1815 had these peripheries been the locus 
of the most advanced sectors of world production in terms of technology, 
productive capacity, and focal points of accumulation of capital. This rep-
resentation was both factually accurate and functioned to subalternize 
the agricultural vocation of a territory.
This was happening at a time when Europe, as depicted by 
Jerome Blum, was overwhelmingly rural, noble, traditional and poor.7 
Industrialized areas, on the well-known map drawn by Sidney Pollard, 
appear as small patches among the rural ones, even within the core 
states.8
This was also a time particularly favourable for agriculture and 
for landowning elites. The steady growth of population and its food 
requirements, the long period of rising agricultural prices, import-sub-
stitution production strategies implemented by Napoleon, the reigning 
Romanticism, all this made agriculture attractive, while forcing the pace 
of agricultural change in market- and profit-oriented directions. Major 
efforts were put into improving the productivity of staple foodstuffs 
(grain and other high-starch-content foods) and livestock, and promot-
ing high-yield crops such as buckwheat, potatoes and maize. The slump 
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that followed the Napoleonic Wars  did not break the enthusiasm for 
agriculture; agricultural production entered a growth cycle again in the 
1830s and more than doubled in the next four decades, with intensive 
use of the soil, interest in chemical fertilizers, permanent crop rotation 
and mechanization.
These clear signs of modernization, to which I will return later, coin-
cided with an accelerated effort from the core countries’ governments 
and capitalist interests to expand the amount of unequal exchange in 
which Europe’s traditional societies were involved, aiming resolutely at 
their further peripheralization. This effort took multiple classical forms: 
external investments, comparatively lower wages for salaried work, use 
of peripheries as labour reserve areas, fiscal extraction via indebtedness, 
and technological and ideological dependence. The point, for the core 
areas, was to restructure production processes (or to intensify those 
already begun in previous decades) to keep the peripheries to the role of 
low-cost producers.
All the above was part of a pattern of peripheral modernization. To 
ensure optimal circulation of the factors of production (land, labour and 
capital), modernized structures of bureaucracy were needed, accompa-
nied by weak political superstructures, strong enough to oversee the crea-
tion of a relevant economic infrastructure and a personnel training system 
and to guarantee conditions of order against potential labour unrest, but 
not to have their own foreign or commercial policies. The model container 
for all this was the liberal constitutional state. This was what so passion-
ately attracted to liberalism so many in the peripheral areas who were 
eager to partake in human progress. Many of them, however, also wanted 
to have a say in defining their role in the capitalist world economy.
They  formed a new elite of liberal modernizers, composed mainly 
of the new bureaucratic and cultural intelligentsia and of landowners 
oriented to large-scale or specialized export production. On the con-
servative side, they encountered strong resistance from the cadres of 
the old order who feared, reasonably, that they might be swept away in 
the reconstruction of the political system, and who actually did succeed 
in slowing down the pace of peripheralization. On the bourgeois side, 
with far greater ease, the modernizers established a dialogue and joint 
actions with quite a few capitalists, bankers and entrepreneurs. They also 
envisaged a far more active role for the state, to serve them against the 
interests of the core. To sum up, liberal agrarian modernizers were try-
ing to fit their countries into their ‘peripheral’, i.e. agricultural produc-
ers’, roles in the capitalist world economy, pursuing, however, their own 
alternative model of modernization rather than imitating the core one. 
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With regard to the principal concepts discussed in this volume, their 
strategy undermined the existing spatial hierarchies imposed on them.
As mentioned above, Restoration Europe was not a bad place and 
time for a cautious modernizing action by landed elites. The Congress of 
Vienna restored some of the old prerogatives of the nobility and the landed 
estates, and guaranteed landowners the security of their possessions. Many 
reform projects were promoted together by the governments, the landed 
elites and the intellectuals, including radical transformations in farming, 
legal reforms, and a transition from communalism to  individualism – that 
is, to a clearly defined private property and freedom of action for individu-
als. The cooperation between liberal elites and governments had its strict 
political limits, but some kind of an organic action was possible within 
them. Old ailing universities, such as Naples, were revived, new ones were 
opened in Christiania-Oslo, Vilna and Warsaw, and a Catholic one was 
planned in Dublin. State administration was reformed, railroad construc-
tions initiated, and the development of industry and banking was encour-
aged. Poland and Norway, within their respective unions with Russia and 
Sweden, were granted liberal constitutions. Poland even had her own 
army, until 1830. Ireland obtained the Catholic Emancipation Act in 1829 
and a national primary education system was set up under state auspices. 
The economy flourished, with local textiles, lumber and weapons factories 
in Poland, and steam-powered mechanized spinning in Ireland.
The monarchs were ready for collaboration with local landed elites 
as they were the only indigenous partners possible. The elites were ready 
too, despite political disagreements, because they needed some occupa-
tion, given that their traditional jobs – in the civil service and military  – 
were now closed to them. As the leading Polish modernizer, Count 
Andrzej Zamoyski, put it: ‘la noblesse doit aujourd’hui se mettre à la 
tête d’améliorations intéressantes pour le pays, privée qu’elle est d’autre 
emploi’.9 The new generation of peripheral modernizing landowners in 
Poland, Ireland and the Two Sicilies renounced, for the time being, the 
insurrectional efforts of their fathers – protagonists of the 1790s upris-
ings, of wars and of long periods of exile – and opted for prudence, grad-
ualism and moderation.
Thus, modernization at a pace different from the core became the lib-
eral-conservative elites’ political, economic and educational project. At its 
centre stood the land, in a coherent vision of how land-based moderniza-
tion could bring about moral redemption and eventually become a way of 
achieving national and political sovereignty. In a way, it was an attempt to 
slow down or invert the impact of what the economist Karl Polanyi called 
the ‘great transformation’, i.e. the extension of the market economy at a pace 
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that no ‘traditional’ society could bear without being torn apart.10 Versions 
of such liberal-conservative land-centred visions were widely diffused in 
the Europe of the time by economists, novelists, poets, philosophers and 
preachers, but, as projects accompanied by sets of practices often supported 
by government agencies, they were peculiar to the peripheries.
The process of modernization was to be slow and gradual, with 
land at its centre, and landed elites in charge. It was to start with the 
reorganization of agriculture and radiate from there to a pertinent devel-
opment of local manufacture, and then to the gradual extension of trade. 
Such transformations would trigger, in their turn, a virtual process of 
economic, social and moral advancement of Europe’s backward areas.11
It was to be a ‘harmonious’ modernization. The word ‘harmony’ 
appeared frequently in reformers’ writings, in a variety of applications: 
preserving existing social and family hierarchies; engaging local tradi-
tions and knowhow; achieving social (class) harmony; and maintaining 
harmony between economy and nature, between change and continuity, 
between art and industry. In Adam Smith’s oft-quoted words, this mod-
ernization project was to follow the ‘natural course of things’.
‘Harmonious’ modernization was the proclaimed alternative to the 
‘Manchester civilization’ with its permanent class antagonism and mone-
tization of all relations. Again referring to Smith, peripheral modernizers 
considered the English model as historically ‘inverted’, as well as socially 
disruptive and economically unsound, and opposed it in their economic 
doctrine and geo-historical philosophy as well as in their actions, class 
protagonism and economic and social measures implemented. Of course, 
such critiques of the ‘Manchester civilization’ were widespread even in 
England itself, by Charles Dickens, Friedrich Engels, Matthew Arnold 
and Thomas Carlyle, for example, but in the peripheries they were often 
used in opposition to the interests of the core.
In this sort of dialogue, both sides invoked the same reference cul-
ture of political economy, each to its own advantage.12 In appearance, 
political economy references used by peripheral modernizers were the 
same as those employed by the followers of the Manchester school. Some 
people were schooled in economics, but the whole milieu read political 
economy, which was extremely popular at that time. Thus, in reclaiming 
the agrarian model, they relied upon the authority of Adam Smith, but 
the ‘true Smith’ of the ‘natural order’ and ‘natural course’ of things.
In the ‘natural order’, land and agriculture had priority. In Smith’s 
words, land was ‘the greatest, the most important, and the most durable 
part of the wealth of every … country’ (Smith, IV, 9), and the most pro-
ductive too, as nature assisted labour and capital that were applied to the 
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land. Agriculture was ‘the original destination of man’ and was also ‘by 
far the most advantageous to […] society’ (Smith, II, 5):
Had human institutions … never disturbed the natural course of 
things, the progressive wealth and increase of the towns would … 
be consequential, and in proportion to the improvement and culti-
vation of the territory’ (Smith, III, 1).
Progress would proceed in a gradual and orderly fashion from local 
semi-autarkic realities to larger markets: first well-ordered agriculture, 
followed by the development of local manufacture, followed by the 
growth of domestic trade, and lastly transport and foreign trade. But in 
the England of his time, lamented Smith, ‘this natural order of things [is 
being] … inverted … into [an] unnatural and retrograde order’, domi-
nated by world trade (Smith III, 1).
If in the core areas, in the nineteenth century, Smith’s work was 
increasingly seen as merely an economic doctrine that laid the basis for 
Jean Baptiste Say’s and David Ricardo’s iron laws of economy and the 
ultra-liberal Manchester School, it preserved its centrality in the periph-
eries. Local modernizers emphasized gradualism and the social respon-
sibility of ‘the natural course’: industry, manufacturing and trade would 
follow the modernization of agriculture, which would supply enough 
foodstuffs to satisfy demand. Progress was to be gradual and slow.
If the main tenets of Smith’s teaching, as the peripheral moderniz-
ers saw them, were to be preserved, the concerns of the nineteenth cen-
tury required, however, a modern re-elaboration of Smith. A ‘harmonic 
school’ of political economy was emerging in the peripheries, in connec-
tion with other schools in Europe. In Norway, Anton Martin Schweigaard 
and Torkel Halvorsen Aschehoug elaborated in the 1840s a theory of 
harmoni liberalismen, which gave a sound theoretical grounding to the 
agrarian modernization alternative.13 Like the ‘harmonic school’, derived 
from Frédéric Bastiat, harmoni liberalismen was critical of the ‘English 
theory’ because it was concerned only with economics without regard 
to ‘natural and social laws’ as norms for moral behaviour and productive 
choice.14 The harmonic school and harmoni liberalismen aimed, instead, 
at achieving harmony between population and production. It was from 
these economists that peripheral modernizers adopted the concept of 
‘harmony’.
These peripheral modernizers found, however, their own prophet, 
a nineteenth-century rendition of Adam Smith, in the Italianized 
Genevan Jean-Charles-Léonard Simonde de Sismondi, the so-called 
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‘second Sismondi’. Initially an acclaimed laissez-faire interpreter of 
Smith, Sismondi published in 1819 the Nouveaux principes d’économie 
politique, ou la richesse dans ses rapports avec la population, a stringent 
critique of the ruthless, laissez-faire two-class capitalism and a call for 
agriculture-based progress, an economics for the common good and a 
hierarchical system of social and economic harmony.15 This book was 
virtually ignored in the core of Europe, but found an enthusiastic follow-
ing in the peripheries. ‘Harmonious modernizers’ followed Sismondi’s 
teaching also in the areas of social policy, constitutions, and connections 
among literature, history and economics.
Of course, both Sismondi and the peripheral modernizers were in 
many ways the followers of the physiocrats. But on one important point 
they differed from physiocratic universalism: they advocated ‘localiza-
tion’, and were committed to vocazioni territoriali. Each territory, they 
claimed, had its own local vocation (and its own soul) constituted by 
morphology, history, anthropology and the Zeitgeist, and this was differ-
ent in the plains, the mountains and the hills. The eighteenth-century 
Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico, to whom the Neapolitan 
modernizers often referred, spoke of progress as specific to a place, its 
‘physical’ and human history, its traditions and its cultural context.16 For 
Vico, none of the established systems of knowledge or civil and politi-
cal arrangements could be considered a supreme form of development, 
because each culture and system of knowledge has its own intrinsic his-
toricity and is oriented towards its own ideal model.17 Thus Vico provides 
us with a powerful argument to sustain one of the main arguments of 
this book: that any concept of spatial hierarchy represents a specific and 
subjective point of view.
The modernizers strove to understand the ‘vocations’ of a given ter-
ritory to find out what economic, technological or social choices were 
appropriate for it. Agriculture, of course, was by its nature region-spe-
cific, but so was the small- and medium-scale industry that they pro-
moted, based on raw materials locally available.
The harmonious land-based development project did not prevail, 
and after the agricultural depression hit Europe in the 1870s, the project 
succumbed to the protectionist turn and simply withered away. In post-
World War  I Europe, it survived only under the form of utopian ‘back-
to-the-land’ colonies, so marginal as to make even historians forget that 
such a project had been the economic and political choice of landed elites 
in the midst of the industrious continent and in the central part of the 
industrious century. With the rise of post-industrial ecological aware-
ness since the late twentieth century, however, and with the fundamental 
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switch in the commodities that characterize the core and the periphery, 
nineteenth-century attempts to find an alternative pathway to modern-
ization are now meeting with renewed scholarly interest. The case of 
Europe’s landed elites taking it upon themselves to slow down the pace 
of the extension of the market economy to protect society from being 
torn asunder might be an important part of this as yet untold story.
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Europe and the Concept of Margin
Jan Ifversen
Introduction
‘There are historically different ways of belonging to Europe and 
although the centre of Europe might be difficult to identify, it has 
several peripheries’ – Jacques Rupnik.1
There are many ways to conceptualize Europe. Already in the early 
nineteenth century the French historian and politician François Guizot 
described Europe as a civilization overarching the national civilizations of 
Europe.2 In the mid-twentieth century, another French historian, Lucien 
Febvre, described it as a historical entity and a fatherland in his lectures 
at the Collège de France during 1944 and 1945.3 He also emphasized 
the difficulties of integrating similarities and differences within a concept 
of Europe. Since then, many scholars, intellectuals and politicians have 
had to deal with this challenging logic of combining unity and diversity. 
The political and economic integration of Europe after World War II led 
to a view of the continent as a supranational unity. Political scientists, 
however, have often pointed to the complex nature of government struc-
tures within the European Union and preferred to talk about multi-level 
governance to underline the logic. Whether Europe was understood in 
terms of governance, culture, identity or civilization, differences had to 
be included. Symbolically, the EU resolved the challenge by adopting the 
motto unity in diversity in 2000. Jacques Derrida, the French philosopher, 
proposed a more elegant solution in his plaidoyer for a Europe which will 
be open to that ‘which it is not, never was and never will be’.4 Diversity 
within Europe has been articulated as a paradox or a tension between 
universal and particular values, between patriotism and democracy, 
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between civilization and culture(s), between centres and peripheries. 
Solutions have ranged from promoting a cosmopolitan Europe ‘based on 
a paradigm shift whose principle is that diversity is not the problem, but 
the solution’, as it is stated programmatically,5 to a Europe based on con-
stitutional patriotism, a Europe of the nations, to Europe as simply over-
lapping diversity.6 Diversity itself can appear in many different forms. 
Apart from the nations that traditionally dominate Europe, regions, cul-
tural minorities, or so-called ‘others’ within Europe – such as migrants 
and their descendants – can assume this position. In this chapter, I will 
look at the role of margins within Europe.
The concept of margin belongs to a semantic field which includes 
similar concepts such as edge, boundary, periphery and fringe. Scores 
of academic books and articles carrying headings such as Emotions, 
Language and Identity on the Margins of Europe, The Frontiers of Europe, 
Edge of Europe, The Other Europe, European Peripheries: Poetics and 
Politics of Eastern Europe, Capitalist Diversity on Europe’s Periphery, The 
Boundaries of Europe, and European Borderlands demonstrate the impor-
tance of conceptualizing differences in Europe as marginality. In this 
chapter, I  will take a closer look at the concept of margin, and how it 
relates to the larger and complex concept of Europe. I understand mar-
gin as both an analytical concept that is used to perceive the paradoxes 
or tensions embedded in the concept of Europe, and a political concept 
used to establish positions and map out hegemonies in European politics. 
The main question I want to address here is why the concept of margin 
is so effective for understanding Europe and for doing European politics. 
I will try to answer this question in three steps. The first step is to focus 
on margin as an analytical concept, and without further ado choose this 
word as a header for reflections on marginality. A quick glance at the aca-
demic literature on asymmetrical differences reveals that at some point 
periphery seemed to have been a more popular academic term than mar-
gin when discussing relations to the centre. However, for what it is worth, 
an Ngram in Google books from 1950 to 2010 clearly shows that margin 
always had the upper hand. In a second step, I will investigate further the 
semantic fields and discourses in which margin and related concepts are 
being formed. Margin and marginality are expressed in a variety of dis-
courses ranging from the psychological malfunctioning of individuals to 
geopolitical ordering of international systems. Here we will concentrate 
on discussing the different ways that margins make meaning for (the 
concept of) Europe. In the third and final step, we move into politics and 
reflect on the role of margin as a political concept. When margin becomes 
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political at a European scale, it enters a field of ideological and strategic 
articulations about how to be or not be European.
Margin as an analytical concept
As an analytical concept, margin belongs to a theory of marginality, which 
reflects on how asymmetrical relations are formed and the effects they 
have on the different actors and positions. The theory is built around the 
ontological claim that marginality demands centrality. As Noel Parker suc-
cinctly points out, ‘without margins (edges), centers (metropolises, capi-
tals) could not be centers; without centers, margins’ marginal position(s) 
could not be identified’.7 This structural logic might sound self-evident, 
but it is very important for understanding how these two positions are 
constructed and practised. Logically, centres will have a drive to margin-
alize in order to establish and stabilize their centrality. In his theory of 
how spaces are produced, Henri Lefebvre speaks of contradictory spaces 
characterized by a tension between a ‘centrality [that] strives to fulfil its 
‘‘totalizing” mission’ and peripheries.8 What characterizes a centre in Lefe-
bvre’s view is simply its will to power. This can take the symbolic form of 
sovereignty, which can be defined in different ways, from the dynastical 
linking of territories, to the nation state based on a claim of cultural simi-
larity, to the federation grounded in constitutional principles. Or it can be 
grounded in the ordering capacity – the governmentality – of the institu-
tions. Centres are hegemonic, homogenizing and fracturing at the same 
time. While we can certainly accept the claim that centres are working 
under the illusion of eliminating differences, this is not all they do. In more 
traditional discussions of marginality, margin is not only a social construc-
tion following the logic outlined by Lefebvre. It is also a condition that can 
be measured through a series of indicators.9 To be marginal is to be below 
average on these indicators (for instance GDP, unemployment, level of 
education, growth rate, income). These mainly economic indicators do 
not in any way, however, explain why groups or regions have become mar-
ginal. Marginalization, which is the process through which marginality 
takes effect, must rely on a systemic logic of a kind. An economic system 
can build on exploitation, which produces inequalities. Grand theories 
of world-systems, of underdevelopment or of capitalism for that matter 
derive from the assumption that the underdeveloped areas, the periph-
eries, and the pre-capitalist order were a condition for and a result of the 
centres’ expansion (Lefebvre’s totalizing mission). A cultural community 
can marginalize people that are culturally different. A society functions 
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through norms, rituals and value systems that decide on acceptable and 
less than acceptable behaviour. Whether we choose to explain marginali-
zation as an effect of a system that produces inequality, difference, exclu-
sion or abnormality, we need to include a processual dimension. Until 
now the analytical concept of margin could be condensed in the following 
claim: it describes an asymmetrical relation deriving from a logic of central-
ity, which is linked to a system that produces marginality as a negative con-
dition to be measured.
But marginalization is not simply a systemic process: it must be 
performed; it involves actors and institutions. Marginalization can be a 
strategy performed by the centre in order to demonstrate its centrality. 
Decisions are made that have marginalizing effects. They can be directly 
political, as in the case of the EU’s neighbourhood policy, which is based 
on a differentiation between countries that are or can become members, 
and countries that are treated as neighbours of the union;10 they can 
be the result of an economic system which is supported politically; or 
they can be caused by spatial strategies ‘that [make] it possible simul-
taneously to force worrisome groups … out towards the periphery’.11 In 
either case, the effect will be to produce or uphold margins. The strategy 
from the centre perspective is thus always balanced between the totaliz-
ing mission of eliminating or downplaying differences and the need for 
margins in order to symbolically uphold centrality. A kind of pluralism 
– a unity in diversity – is thus established, which links diversity to mar-
ginality. The strategy is not simply to exclude, in which case the margin 
would be completely external, but to create negative marginalization. If 
we return to the example of the European neighbourhood policy, we can 
say that neighbours are not just excluded; they are less than members, 
but more than strangers. I will return to the function of this in-between-
ness in a moment.
Positive marginality
But we can also change perspective and look at marginalization as a strat-
egy performed by the margin. The margin can respond or even resist. 
Examples of resistance are well known. So-called ghettos in urban areas 
can respond to marginalization by establishing alternative systems of 
ordering; at the symbolic level, margins can challenge the identity pol-
itics of the centre, as in the case of ethnic minorities demanding recog-
nition of their language and more broadly their culture. Resistances are 
active strategies to counter the centre’s strategies. We must not forget, 
 EURoPE AnD THE ConCEPT of MARGIn 31
however, Noel Parker’s conceptualization of margins as places ‘where the 
centre’s ordering capacity begins to ebb out’.12 In pre-modern geopolitics, 
such places were often defined as marches, that is, areas where the cen-
tre was not in control, and where sovereignty was less clear.13 This lack of 
control is a precondition for imagining marginality as a performative act, 
or what Noel Parker calls a theory of positive marginality.14 I will draw on 
his theory to add an extra dimension to the concept of margin. Positive 
marginality combines the structural challenge embedded in the margin 
(the centre needs it to establish its centrality), the waning power of the 
centre in the marches (there are limits to what the centre can do) and the 
potentials of the margin to act. To study positive marginality is thus also 
to study how the centre performs its centrality.
How the margin can act in various ways obviously depends on the 
force of the centre, and of how the margin more specifically is being 
constructed. Some margins are primarily constructed within a cultural 
discourse; other margins are defined politically or economically. At this 
stage, I will, however, not consider the discursive variable when discuss-
ing positive marginality. Following Parker, we can observe two general 
dimensions of positive marginality. One is concerned with the tactics 
that actors in the margin use to gain benefits from the centre. The other 
is of a more existential nature and concerns the articulation of identity 
at the margins. Tactics directly relate to margins trying to get benefits 
from the centre, for instance in terms of economic redistribution, or of 
being granted privileges, for instance in the form of special rights. If we 
stay within the realm of geopolitics and focus solely on the articulation 
of geostrategies, as Parker does, we can observe how regions will try to 
navigate in a geopolitical ‘geometry’ with positions already fixed. In this 
perspective, regions can try to gain something from repositioning them-
selves. In cases where there are other centres in the geometry, a region 
can try to ‘play one centre off another’.15 One such case could be Scandia 
in Southern Sweden, which over recent years has been strongly engaged 
in setting up the Øresund region in cooperation with Copenhagen, with 
the goal of gaining more freedom from Stockholm.
Regions can also strengthen their bargaining power by claiming 
to possess a privileged access to the outside. Turkey has a long tradition 
of using the bridge metaphor to emphasize its links to a world beyond 
Europe. When preparing for a rapprochement with the EU, the Turkish 
government positioned Turkey as a mediator between Europe and the 
Middle East. More recently the Erdogan government has used this posi-
tion to gain economic benefits from Europe by stopping refugees travel-
ling to Europe through Turkey. Both the tactics of playing off centres and 
32 RE-MAPPInG CEnTRE AnD PERIPHERY
of placing oneself in the role of mediator demand a capacity to manoeu-
vre around similarities and differences. Actors performing marginal tac-
tics in Malmö can choose to highlight the similarities with Denmark and 
construct a new common region, which might even become a new eco-
nomic powerhouse. In Turkey, people have long experience of using the 
bridge metaphor to emphasize not only being connected to other parts of 
the world, but also representing more worlds and more cultures.16 Apart 
from navigating between two centres inside a specific geometry, or navi-
gating between an inside and an outside, there is at least one more tacti-
cal move to be performed by a margin, namely, to imitate the centre and 
thus eliminate differences. This imitation can be made in order to appear 
‘familiar, reliable, and easy to deal with’ as when Central European actors 
have selectively appropriated Western values to become more visible.17 
In this latter case, differences are toned down in order to appear cen-
tre-like. The three tactics are presented in Figure 3.1.
There are doubtlessly more tactics of positive marginality to be con-
sidered. We can for instance imagine a margin emphasizing the differ-
ences from its centre and appealing to an international institution like 
the UN for protection. This tactic has been used by indigenous people 
coming together under the heading of the fourth world and arguing 
against discrimination and exploitation from the centres to which they 
are connected.
Even if tactics might seem more instrumental and interest-oriented, 
they tend to slip over into value-oriented actions. Margins that are not 
embedded in larger identity constructions will appear weaker and less 
robust. The many political debates about the situation of poorer and less 
developed regions within a country have clearly demonstrated how mar-
gins fare badly without identity politics.18 If we look at positive margin-
ality as identity politics, we immediately have to leave out those cases 
where a margin is perceived negatively by those belonging to it. We know 
that young people especially are drawn to cities because they want to live 
what they consider a more modern lifestyle. Rural areas are perceived 
as traditional and backward. Although migration is most often caused 
by economic push factors, the negative perceptions of the region that 
migrants leave certainly play a role.
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When margins act tactically they try to gain benefits and amelio-
rate their bargaining power within a setting, which does not radically 
question the rules and discourses of marginality and centrality. Even if 
positive marginality involves issues of identity, the game really changes 
when we move into identity politics. Following Craig Calhoun, I define 
identity politics as a political practice which evolves around questions 
of identity.19 When political articulations of centrality and marginal-
ity are formed around identity we move into identity politics. Whether 
marginalities can be expressed clearly in identity terms depends on the 
resources and the discursive possibilities available. Some discourses offer 
a more powerful repertoire for performing positive marginality. This is 
the case for identities articulated in discourses of culture and ethnicity. 
Claiming to be culturally or ethnically different tends to build a stronger 
case than claiming to be economically disadvantaged. Adding territori-
ality to the case often makes it even stronger. Regions that are perceived 
as culturally and ethnically different seem to possess a larger toolbox for 
performing positive marginality than marginalized groups that are per-
ceived differently.
Before discussing this toolbox at more length I will outline three 
main scenarios for performing positive marginality as identity politics. 
The first relates to claims of autonomy. Different arguments can be 
brought forward to claim autonomy, which again can be granted at differ-
ent levels. If a margin gains a form of autonomy through special rights or 
self-government, its relations to the centre change. The federal state is an 
example of a centrality that becomes merely constitutional and symbolic. 
The individual states within the federation are only marginal in terms 
of sovereignty. The symbolic centre is typically reduced to a metonymic 
expression such as Berlin or Washington. In the case of the EU, where 
the transfer of sovereignty from the member states is even more limited 
than in federations, the centre, expressed metonymically as Brussels, 
tends simply to become an ideological construct by Eurosceptics. There 
are, however, many examples of margins claiming and sometimes gain-
ing autonomy with reference to identity. These can be national or eth-
nic minorities with special rights in the states where they live, or regions 
that have acquired forms of self-government.20 A second scenario is char-
acterized by margins directly confronting their status as marginal and 
claiming to be centres in their own right. In order to become a centre, 
a  margin needs not only to mobilize resources, but also to rethink an 
entire geometry. If the majority of the citizens of Scotland decide to leave 
the UK, the centrality of the rest of the UK is directly influenced, and so is 
the geometry of the European Union. We have examples of states being 
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divided up in smaller states. In some of these cases, positive marginality 
was definitely performed, as with the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 
1993, where Slovakian politicians rigorously challenged ‘the pragocen-
trism’ of the state.21 By gaining independence, Slovakia could claim its 
own centrality. Both the Scottish and the Slovakian cases involve a high 
degree of identity politics. In the third scenario, the margin directly chal-
lenges the centrality of the centre by imitating it, or by competitive emu-
lation as Parker calls it.22 The margin thus claims centrality not only by 
imitating the centre, but also by arguing that it is more central than the 
centre. This involves two operations at the same time. The margin must 
negate the differences from the centre (imitation) and even claim to be 
expressing the centrality in a better way than the centre. We have seen 
examples of this in articulations of Europeanness. In his famous article 
from 1984, ‘The Tragedy of Central Europe’, Milan Kundera argued that 
Central Europe epitomized the cultural centre of Europe, a role that 
Western Europe had completely discarded. Speaking of Western Europe’s 
acceptance of the Soviet control of Eastern Europe, he stated that ‘Europe 
hasn’t noticed the disappearance of its cultural home because Europe no 
longer perceives its unity as a cultural unity’.23 Although the tone is pes-
simistic, he is arguing that Central Europe – presently marginalized by 
Western Europe due to the Cold War and Soviet hegemony – is in fact the 
centre of Europe. The rest of Europe has not only forgotten about Central 
Europe; it has lost its centrality.
The outside and the in-between
So far I have only discussed marginality within a simple geometry where 
centre and margin define each other. The geometry can, however, be 
made more complex. The centre does not only acquire its centrality from 
the existence of margins, but also by marking out the limits of its reach. 
As mentioned above, there might be other centres with their own mar-
gins. But what is more important here is that the centre also constructs an 
outside as a negation of its centrality. The margin is bound to the centre, 
the outside is out of reach and out of control. Where the function of the 
margin is to establish centrality inside, the role of the outside is to legiti-
mize the totalizing mission.
There are several ways of conceptualizing the outside. Reinhart 
Koselleck has demonstrated how the idea of centrality can be given 
meaning by the use of asymmetrical counterconcepts that add universal-
ity to the centre. As he states, ‘a given group makes an exclusive claim to 
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generality, applying a linguistically universal concept to itself alone and 
rejecting all comparison. This kind of self-definition provokes counter-
concepts which discriminate against those who have been defined as the 
“other”’.24 A  traditional asymmetrical counterconcept is the barbarian, 
who designates both the limits and the negation of civilization. The bar-
barian is always both less than civilized and the opposite of civilization. 
This figure appears in different discourses, from the wild man lingering 
at the fringes of orderly life and the cannibals epitomizing inhumanity to 
geopolitical discourses of limes and fortresses. The Roman Empire estab-
lished its limes to mark the borders between imperial order and exter-
nal disorder. Today the EU is trying to police the Mediterranean to avoid 
pressure at the gates from immigrants and refugees. Analysts have sug-
gested that the EU’s border policies can be viewed as ‘a task of contain-
ment in the face of a world that is viewed as profoundly alien’ comparable 
to the ancient Roman limes.25
The barbarian and the outsider are defined as out of control. They 
are uncontrollable and thus dangerous. Margins can be viewed as areas 
where the control of the centre diminishes, but the barbarian and the 
outsider symbolize the complete loss of control. At times margins can be 
viewed as in-between zones which are closer to the outside. Since the 
Enlightenment, Eastern Europe has been viewed as a region which is 
less civilized than the West.26 In nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
geopolitics, Eastern Europe was crudely conceptualized as a buffer zone. 
This concept is used to designate countries as empty, in-between spaces 
that protect the centre from a chaotic outside. According to William 
Walters’ analysis of the geostrategies performed after the end of the Cold 
War in Europe, the buffer zone reappeared as a way to locate the Central 
and Eastern European countries which would insulate them from ‘cha-
otic spaces of the crumbling Soviet empire to the east’.27 In-betweenness 
is typically understood as a condition of being neither one nor the other. 
In spatial terms you are closer to the limits of Europe. This condition can 
also be formulated in temporal terms as not being fully European yet. 
Some scholars see the enlargement of the EU to the east as a process 
based on a threefold division of Europe into a European core, a Europe to 
the East which is not yet fully European, and an Eastern periphery that 
is excluded from being European.28 The same designation of in-between-
ness has been used to describe the south of Europe in the wake of the 
refugee crisis: ‘The ‘South’, the other Europe, isn’t fully European as it still 
stands with one foot in the Third World or at any rate serves as an entry 
gate for the latter’.29 Some scholars choose to speak of margins as lim-
inal others, borrowing from the anthropologist Victor Turner’s famous 
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analysis of rites of passage as being betwixt and between.30 While Turner 
viewed the liminal as a marginal and secluded phase that members of a 
community had to go through to be fully initiated, Morozov and Rumelili 
reduce it to a hybrid within identity politics characterized by being 
partly self/partly Other.31 They find this position in the different ways 
that Russia and Turkey manage their European identities. Liminality can 
thus broaden our understanding of marginality since it includes a phase 
of transition (in casu not being fully European), a position of hybridity 
(being more than one) and a position of transitory exclusion. The latter 
corresponds to what Turner calls ‘the essentially unstructured’ state of 
having nothing.32
If we look at this in-betweenness from the perspective of performa-
tivity, we can say that both the outsider position and the position of being 
not fully within the geometry tend towards negative marginality. Because 
it is often dressed in harsh essentialism, the position of outsider is diffi-
cult to negotiate. Take for instance the category of immigrant, which 
tends to stick to one’s descendants, generation after generation. Migrants 
are outsiders in a situation of permanent transition. As Fatima El-Tayeb 
succinctly puts it: ‘migration appears as always reversible, coming with 
an expiration date, but at the same time stretching over several genera-
tions’.33 The category of immigrant designates the clearest position of the 
outsider trying to enter a society. Being stripped of an identity – not fully 
something, not simply from somewhere else – the immigrant is reduced to 
the outsider within. This figure is well known in imaginaries of the barbar-
ian intruder. The Roman barbarus could appear in the shape of evil and 
irrationality within the Roman Empire;34 the vampire could migrate from 
a dark uncivilized Europe and contaminate the citizens of London, the 
most modern European metropole. The current refugee crisis in Europe 
has demonstrated how people fleeing to Europe from wars, failing states 
and poverty have become the ultimate image of the outsider, who is kept 
in a permanent state of in-betweenness within detention areas and camps 
created as ‘zones of indistinction between inclusion and exclusion’.35 In 
these ‘non-places’ and ‘nowherevilles’,36 the refugee is reduced to a cate-
gorical barbarian without any characteristics apart from being misplaced 
and dangerous.
At the other end of the scale, in-betweenness can be viewed as a 
position strengthening positive marginality. In a study of Afro-American 
female academics at American universities dominated by white males, 
Mary Alfred notes that marginality becomes a positive attribute, because 
it makes it possible for them ‘to successfully navigate their many cul-
tural worlds’.37 They can thus move in and out of identities and uphold 
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bi-cultural competences and what Alfred calls ‘creative marginality’.38 
In their analysis of Russia and Turkey as Europe-makers, Morozov and 
Rumelili point to the active role of marginalized countries in affecting 
identity politics at the centre. As they state: ‘By projecting their own 
visions of Europe onto the EU, the outsiders impel the insiders to articu-
late the identity of Europe in a slightly different manner compared to what 
would be possible without this discursive intervention’.39 Turkey is thus 
challenging constructions of European identity that exclude Islam from 
Europe, and Russia questions geopolitical imaginaries of an ever-enlarg-
ing Europe. While European politicians are trying to externalize Turkey, 
the answer from the Turkish side could be that the country is actually 
contributing to European identity by supporting multiculturalism. In the 
case of Russia, European politicians might exclude the country based on 
criticism of Putin’s authoritarianism, whereas the Russian government 
will stress Russia’s geopolitical role in Eastern Europe.
Discourse and identity politics
The shaping of marginal tactics and identity politics depends on the dis-
courses in which they are being constructed. Discourses are semantically 
structured around key concepts, basic concepts and semantic relations, 
which together with the specific scenography of positions configure 
nodal points and subject positions.40 Even a superficial view of conceptu-
alizations of margin and marginality reveals a host of concepts, some of 
which we have already mentioned. Concepts such as savage, immigrant, 
outsider, liminal, fringe, edge, neighbour and hybrid are used in differ-
ent discourses to denote marginality. They are linked by specific central 
concepts in chains of equivalences around a nodal point which fix the 
limits of the discourses. The stabilization of nodal points takes place in 
a realm of interdiscursivity where several discourses are connected and 
meaning is contested. Some discourse analysts speak of this process as 
the effort of turning nodal points into empty signifiers, which on the one 
hand reduces semantic complexities, and on the other hand valorizes the 
concept positively.41 Discursive stabilizations are, however, always chal-
lenged by new experiences and interpretations. These challenges can 
be explained structurally as the inherent dynamics of semiotics, or as a 
result of social practice. When nodal points are destabilized they turn 
into floating signifiers that are floating precisely because they are being 
contested. The tension between empty and floating signifiers is captured 
by what Reinhart Koselleck terms ‘basic concepts’ (Grundbegriffe), which 
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are at the same time inescapable within a given political and social lan-
guage and always also contested.42 Part of discursive stabilization is to 
establish a scenography of different positions available for the actors. Of 
most importance is the subject position which determines who can be 
included in the perspective formed within the discourse. By fixing this 
position the discourse sets the condition for identification and legitimate 
action. A discourse where Europe is made the nodal point can thus estab-
lish the condition – the subject position – from where Europeans can be 
designated and others can be marginalized or excluded as not European.
As already demonstrated several times, margin and marginality 
can be expressed in many different ways. The two main sets of coordi-
nates are made up by time/space and identity/resources. Margins are 
typically seen as spaces or even territories that are placed in a larger spa-
tial geometry. Sometimes distance from the centre is directly taken as 
an indicator of marginality in what are termed distance-decay patterns.43 
Marginality can be translated into a temporal scheme and identified with 
being less developed, less modern or less civilized, or it can be seen as a 
liminal period within a temporal continuum. The other set of coordinates 
relates to the character of the margin and the reasons for its marginality. 
A  region can be viewed as marginal because it is constructed as nega-
tively different within a value system of differences, or its marginality can 
be the result of unequal distribution of resources. Quite often identity 
and resources are brought together to explain marginality. This is the 
case when being different leads to forms of exclusion which bar regions 
from access to resources. Before I take a look at specific discourses of 
marginality, I need to add a final set of coordinates. Marginality can also 
be used to characterize specific groups or individuals within a society. 
Being marginalized means being at a distance from the norms and con-
ventions within a society. Again the coordinates often overlap, as when 
ethnic groups are categorized and marginalized through identity mark-
ers (language, religion and culture).
If we now return to the question of marginality in discourses of 
Europe, we will have to identify nodal points and chains of equivalences. 
Even if we can speak of Europe in many ways, the notion of Europe as a 
continent in a discourse that makes Europe as a continent the nodal point 
is incredibly long-lived. The reason is that the concept of continent can 
very easily be connected to concepts which are meta-geographical.44 Ever 
since Herodotus referred to Europe as also a myth and a race, Europe 
has been perceived as more than a continent. This concept certainly also 
influences our understanding of marginality within discourses of Europe. 
Margins are typically placed at the edges of a European centre. With the 
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emergence of states in the sixteenth century, Europe became a geopolit-
ical space configured around the nodal point of power balance, which 
turns margins into smaller states, buffer zones and controlled areas. The 
expansionist drive of larger European states and empires reduced parts 
of Europe to an outsider position under their control. The political space, 
however, merged with perceptions of Europe as a Christian community 
(respublica Christiana) and later with robust ideologies of civilization. 
The expansion of the centre could thus be justified as a civilizing mis-
sion into less civilized lands. Larry Wolff has masterfully demonstrated 
how Enlightenment travellers adventured into the ever more uncivilized 
East.45 This intra-European orientalism turned Eastern Europe into a cul-
tural margin of Europe. The same marginalization took place in the north 
of Europe46 and in the far west.
Europe as a civilization became a dominant discourse and ideol-
ogy in the eighteenth century, but this was soon challenged by the dom-
inant discourse of national culture and the ideology of nationalism. In 
fact, since the eighteenth century, discourses on Europe have to a large 
degree been shaped by the tension between a universalizing European 
civilization and particular national cultures. Even if the discourse of 
European civilization in the nineteenth century began to include percep-
tions of pan-European culture, it was constantly challenged by the cen-
tripetal force of nationalism. In fantasies produced by Europeanists like 
Coudenhove-Kalergi, civilization and pan-European culture were even 
connected to geopolitical dreams of a semi-imperialist Europe nourished 
by African colonies.47 The nationalization of culture within nationalism 
would, however, not exclude perceptions of European margins. The 
overarching force of a civilizational discourse in the centre, whether in 
the form of economic and political liberalism or Europeanism, would 
still leave room for harsh asymmetries between European nations. 
After World War I, large parts of Eastern and Central Europe were still 
marginalized through the forms of orientalism that accompanied the 
civilizational discourse.48 Marginalization of ‘the other Europe’ contin-
ued after World War II and the Cold War division of Europe.49 The con-
secutive enlargements of the European Common Market and later the 
European Union brought the older margins closer to the economic and 
cultural centre of Europe, but did not cancel out forms of marginaliza-
tion. Turkey remained a kind of border zone, defined in cultural terms 
as less European and geopolitically as being in between Europe and the 
Middle East. Southern Europe has been pushed back into a liminal sta-
tus due to the recent euro-crisis, which produced a divide between the 
economically and thus supposedly morally more advanced and the less 
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advanced. The status of Southern Europeans was partly determined by 
stereotypical views of less responsible and less productive southerners.50 
The current refugee crisis in Europe has amply demonstrated that the 
most culturally marginalized are those without lands. Peoples on the 
move inside Europe have traditionally been the most marginalized of all, 
since they find themselves outside the standard national templates of cul-
ture and identity. The Roma people are a case in point here.51 But most 
marginalized of all are the people trying desperately to reach Europe 
from the war-torn Middle East or the dramatically impoverished African 
continent. In some discourses, the whole of Europe becomes a centre – 
a fortress – protecting itself against the invasion at its borders. From a 
different perspective, the outsiders are putting pressure on the political 
centre of Europe and, in fact, enforcing the internal marginalization 
of Southern Europe (Spain, Italy, Greece, Macedonia and Serbia). The 
impossibility within the EU of sharing the responsibility for accommodat-
ing migrants and refugees forced these states to undermine the Dublin 
regulation and let people move further north. This immediately led to 
increased charges of Southern irresponsibility.
Margins speaking back
I have argued that marginality can sometimes be used as a tactic to rock 
the geometry of centre and margin. Tactics will have to be framed within 
discourses oriented by specific nodal points and key concepts. The recent 
crisis scenario in Europe (the euro crisis, the Russian crisis, Brexit, the rise 
of right-wing populism, the refugee crisis) is providing a context for new 
marginal tactics. Centres are being challenged in different ways. When 
tactics move into the sphere of identity politics framed by discourses of 
culture and civilization, they become powerful tools in changing existing 
geometries. Following Brexit, the Scottish Nationalist Party is preparing 
the road for leaving one union to join another, with a forceful rhetoric of 
independence. Pressured by harsh requirements from the EU in order to 
receive loans that would avoid a financial breakup of the Greek state, the 
Greek prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, responded by organizing a referen-
dum and delivering a speech in which he reiterated the claim that Greece 
always has been the historical centre of Europe and took on the subject 
position of speaking in the name of Europe’s future: ‘The crucial choice 
of the Greek people today concerns the future of Europe, as well as the 
future of Greece … They [the Greek people] will seize this moment in 
history and will send a strong message across Europe, a strong message 
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of dignity worldwide’.52 By speaking in the name of European democracy 
against the undemocratic and brutal measures of the centre, Tsipras tried 
to use Greece’s historical aura to portray the policies of the EU – and par-
ticularly Germany – as un-European.
From a rather different political perspective, the Hungarian Prime 
Minister, Viktor Orbán, also spoke in the name of Europe. In a defensive 
reaction against attempts to introduce quotas for refugees among EU 
member states, he argued that Hungary was saving European culture 
from the outsiders: ‘Can we shelter people, many of whom are unwill-
ing to accept European culture, or who come here with the intent of 
destroying European culture? How did we lose and how can we regain 
the common European homeland to which every nation of the Union – 
including the Greeks and the Germans – can say “yes”?’53 By drawing up 
a catastrophic scenario in which Europe as we know it is disappearing, 
Orbán is able – rhetorically – to move Hungary from a more marginal 
position to the centre. As we have seen, this move reminds us of former 
attempts – for instance Kundera’s – to oppose a European culture firmly 
embedded in Central Europe to a more superficial Western civilization. 
Marginal identity politics within Europe are contributing to a changing 
geometry which in the end might challenge existing centres. But we have 
also seen many examples of marginal performances without any effect 
on the centre. Ukraine’s failed efforts to become a margin that matters 
for Europe is a clear-cut example of an outsider that never made it into 
the liminal position of neighbour.54 Neither are ‘the expanded margins of 
Europe’s former colonies’ in the form of the migrants that have come to 
Europe over the last 150 years55 in a position to perform much positive 
marginality, even if they have influenced the everyday life of European 
societies. Some margins are thus able to speak back and play with their 
centres, while others are silenced and trapped in negative marginality.
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After Identity : Mentalities, European 
Asymmetries and the Digital Turn
Joris van Eijnatten
Introduction
‘Send it back to where it came from’, said an American talk show host 
during the 2016 election campaign in the United States. In an episode of 
‘Full Frontal’, Samantha Bee referred to what she called Donald Trump’s 
un-American ‘brand of right-wing, racist, anti-immigrant demagogu-
ery’. The place of origin she had in mind for this unsavoury ethics was 
Europe.1 Whether or not racism was actually part of the American elec-
tion campaign is not of concern in this chapter. Rather, the focus lies on 
Samantha Bee’s suggestion to send racism back to Europe, a proposition 
that is part of a long-standing tradition of American anti-Europeanism.2 
Bee made use of a common trope according to which the good things in 
the United States are American and the bad ones European. In her argu-
ment, ‘Europe’ functions as a discursive construction that serves to make 
a statement about America rather than Europe. Whether or not she was 
convinced that all Europeans are racists is not really relevant. The signif-
icant point is that whatever Samantha Bee may have imagined America 
to be does not necessarily correspond to valid, verifiable truths about 
Europe. Each culture, each group and each individual creates a mirror 
image of its ‘other’, just as Americans create an image of themselves by 
constructing the Europe they like or dislike. We call such self-reflecting 
mirror images ‘identities’.
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The Self and the Other
In theorizing identities, scholars of cultural history commonly employ 
the well-known concept of the ‘Other’, popularized in the wake of, 
among others, cultural studies (Stuart Hall), literary theory (Edward 
Said), postmodern philosophy (Jacques Derrida), postcolonial theory 
(Homi Bhabha) and feminist theory (Judith Butler). On a theoretical 
level, the notion of ‘othering’, or the conceptual pairing of ‘identity’ and 
‘alterity’, assumes that a Self constructs its own identity by identifying 
what it is not in order to identify what it is.3 ‘Whatever is being distin-
guished must be distinguished from something which, in turn, must be 
distinguished from it. Thus all distinguishing also makes visible that 
from which something is distinguished.’4 Gadamer’s logic is compulsive. 
Making distinctions is a hermeneutical and epistemological precondition 
for understanding the world. The claim is predicated on several assump-
tions: that distinctions can be made, that there is an Other, that the Self 
possesses the ability to recognize it, and that eliminating or changing the 
Other alters the Self. America is identifiable as America in part because of 
the presence of Europe; removing Europe from the world-historical equa-
tion will, according to the theory, modify America’s view of itself. Such 
tropes are familiar. They stand in a long tradition that includes Said’s 
well-known interpretation of the Orient as what the Occident is not, that 
is, as the Occident’s negative Other.5 We instinctively sense the plausibil-
ity of these tropes.
Identity, then, is based on discursive distinctions between the Self 
and the Other, leading to their mutual reification (the Self is never the 
Other) or to their confluence in multiple, hybrid, fluctuating identities 
(othered Selves and selved Others exist in all kinds of varieties). In cul-
tural studies, theories of identity have been grounded particularly in the 
conjecture that identities (especially religious, national and other group 
identities) are constantly mutable, or so multifarious that they are prac-
tically impossible to pin down.6 Theoretically speaking, this conjecture 
is not necessarily false. On the other hand, it is difficult to ascertain its 
practical value. Why differentiate ad infinitum? Most theories of identity 
have been put forward by academics and intellectuals living in a cosmo-
politan comfort zone, by theorists who have had little to lose, in terms 
of status and security, from affirming the transience and changeability 
of identities, even while they had much to gain by it in terms of knowl-
edge and inspiration. It is this intellectual elite that, since the 1980s, has 
developed an extensive array of theories and methods that has fostered 
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the fragmentation of perspectives on the world. The postmodern preoc-
cupation with diversity has nurtured the recognition of difference and 
the deconstruction of grand narratives in a period of extreme flux, dur-
ing which both emancipatory movements and the persistent flows of 
migrants have brought identity politics to the fore.
In political practice, on both the left and the right, the role of iden-
tity politics has now become problematic. One of the basic premises of the 
multicultural society since the 1990s has been the claim that  identities 
are under continuous construction. But even if it were true that individu-
als, groups of people or even whole societies derive their self-image from 
the continuous affirmation of distinctions, and that all distinctions vary, 
it is doubtful whether they would find much existential surety in doing 
so. Can and do people actually cope with identities in never-ending flux? 
Developments in the public sphere in today’s world, ranging from the rise 
of populism to the so-called democratic deficit, seem to cast ample doubt 
on the cogency underlying this form of emancipatory multiculturalism. 
The opposite assumption, the idea that identities are fixed, is needless 
to say at least as problematic. The resurgence of nationalism since the 
1990s has been predicated on the questionable supposition that identi-
ties are stable, offering emotional security on the basis of misinforma-
tion. In both cases, identity politics has reached its limits.
This chapter seeks to argue for a revisionist return to a pre-construc-
tivist conception of identity, or rather for a non-constructivist alterna-
tive to identity. The question at stake here is whether we can conceive of 
Selves (such as Europe or America) not as ephemeral constructions that 
exist by beholding others, but as relatively self-determined, semi-per-
manent entities that exist by beholding themselves. Whether the belief 
in ever-changing, multiple identities is warranted or not is not my con-
cern. There is no going back, even if one should want to, and it is not my 
intention to argue that we should avoid doing justice to diversity. The 
question is whether there are other and perhaps better ways of affirming 
group cohesion than by focusing on identities, since this approach has 
not proved very useful in dealing with today’s problems. From a ‘progres-
sive’ perspective identities are fleeting and end up being impractical con-
structions; from a ‘traditionalist’ one they are static and will be discarded 
as unlikely givens. Both options are as shallow as they are unworka-
ble. More importantly, putting identity theory into practice amounts to 
drowning in a morass of subjectivities, since there are as many identities 
as there are subjects, and any subject can claim any identity. Identity has 
become a never-ending, highly politicized story.
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Three or four decades after the cultural turn, identity has run out of 
steam. We need an alternative. Suppose, therefore, that we look at cul-
tures from the inside out, rather than the outside in. Imagine that we 
start out from the Self in relation to itself, rather than the Self in relation 
to an Other. What would such an approach mean for larger territorial 
entities and for the asymmetries they involve?
Collective mentalities
It is clear that the stable entities and imperturbable structures that once 
helped us to organize the past, such as nations and civilizations, are no 
longer credible. We know that even the most robust entity of all, the 
nation state, is unable to control its own political, social, economic and 
cultural functions, let alone its destiny. It has become porous: substantial 
parts of its sovereignty and power have been transferred to supranational 
organs or non-state actors, ranging from international terrorists to mul-
tinational companies, while domestic cultures are influenced to a larger 
extent than ever by lobbyists, religious leaders and politicians abroad. If 
only for the sake of realist politics, supranational entities have become 
the main viable alternative to nation states. The irony is, however, that 
they are extremely fragile and lead a problematic existence. That is not 
true in all cases. If we regard the United States in the spirit of Frederick 
Jackson Turner as a federal conglomeration of nations then it, too, can 
be counted as a supranational entity.7 But ‘America’ appears still to reso-
nate among the vast majority of its population. Europe hardly echoes as 
strongly among Europeans as America does among Americans. Yet there 
is a paradox here that seemingly involves the concept of ‘identity’. Most 
citizens of European countries, insofar as they have internalized the cul-
ture of the societies they live in, sense that they are European rather than 
American or African or Asian. Europe really does exist in the minds of 
people. The Eurobarometer and other surveys of people’s opinions about 
Europe make that clear.8 How can we explain this paradox?
We need not have recourse to the notion of identity to under-
stand why Europeans feel European without being overtly emotionally 
attached to Europe as a cultural or even political entity. In this respect the 
idea of a ‘collective mentality’ may be helpful, a concept developed in the 
twentieth century by the French Annales school of historians.9 Following 
the ideas originally developed by Marc Bloch and Lucien Febvre, the 
founders of that school, I want to posit the existence of nucleate, more 
or less durable conceptions of reality that characterize large groups of 
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people over longer periods of time. These collective mentalities resemble 
an interior monologue of the public mind; they are akin to streams of 
public consciousness that can best be examined through the dominant 
data flows in society. Such flows have a constant impact on people, and 
in the process give rise to a collective mentality as a set of often uncon-
sciously shared ideas. Historically, three such flows have been particu-
larly prominent, at least in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The 
first is religion, which involves participatory rites and rituals that guide 
individuals from the cradle to the grave; the second is teaching, which 
entails a flow of information from educational institutions primarily to 
the youth; and the third is the media, which constitute a data stream 
from semi-independent organizations to the public at large.
To clarify this attempt at theorizing historical mentalities as an 
alternative to mutual othering, I will tweak two concepts that are rel-
atively well known to humanities scholars. The first concept concerns 
the idea of thick description. It is usually attributed to the anthropolo-
gist Clifford Geertz;10 by analogy, I will use the term ‘thin description’. 
For Geertz a thick description was a meaningful, heavily contextualized 
depiction of human behaviour. To achieve this, one needed a hermeneu-
tically schooled observer who was closely involved with the empirical 
material. Just as an anthropologist monitored a ritual, a historian stud-
ied old newspapers. But whereas Geertz viewed a thin description mostly 
negatively as a dry enumeration of facts, I regard a thin description as a 
depiction of the primary characteristics and fundamental contours of a 
cultural pattern – such as a mentality.
A second concept that ties into a revised theory of mentalities is 
that of the ‘imagined community’. In his much-cited book Imagined 
Communities (1983), the anthropologist Benedict Anderson offered an 
explanation for the emergence of nationalism in the nineteenth cen-
tury.11 He argued that thanks to the large-scale ascent of printed media 
in the vernacular (rather than Latin), people no longer needed to know 
each other, let alone physically meet each other, to share a sense of 
mutual belonging. According to Anderson, national communities arose 
in the decades around 1800 as a collective consciousness synchronized in 
particular by periodical media such as newspapers. Because people read 
similar things at the same time, they imagined themselves to be part of 
the same national community.
Anderson’s imagined community is easy to compare to a collective 
mentality. In both cases the multiplication of texts and images serves as the 
source of a sense of community. While an imagined community is based on 
synchronic reproduction, a collective mentality is grounded in diachronic 
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repetition. Whereas the first emerges from ahistorical simultaneity, the sec-
ond arises from historical iteration. Because people in the past continuously 
read similar things, they began to be part of the same linguistic, cultural 
matrix spanning time and space. I  call this matrix a mentality; from the 
point of view of Geertz, such a mentality can be grasped as a thick descrip-
tion. Changes in mentalities occur very slowly; the pace may at times be 
excruciatingly protracted. That makes mentalities a source of cultural stabil-
ity, but also one of cultural conservatism. We should therefore be cautious 
not to ‘reify’ mentalities, to avoid fixing them in space and time. We could 
perhaps say that the moral worth of a mentality, and therefore its chances 
for survival, is determined by the degree to which it is capable of adapting 
to influences from outside. Healthy and robust mentalities, in other words, 
are relatively dynamic and subject to gradual change.
This raises the question of how mentalities are related to identities. 
They are similar in several respects. Both mentalities and identities are 
embedded in, or derive from, culture, and therefore involve difference. 
Both evolve over time. At the same time, a mentality is not an identity. 
As noted above, an identity exists by the grace of the Other. In princi-
ple, however, a mentality does not need the Other. A mentality simply 
is; it is self-sufficient; it is a Self rather than an Other. Yet the fact that 
mentalities and identities are different things does not mean that there is 
no relation between them. An important aspect of any robust mentality 
is the tendency to look beyond itself, not for the sake of ‘constructing’ 
its own identity, but to reaffirm itself, or to reaffirm its own understand-
ing of itself. The example mentioned at the beginning of this chapter 
may suggest that Americans have a distinctive mindset, possibly but not 
necessarily different from that of Europeans. Part of American identity 
may lie in the fact that Americans are consciously not European, and 
in this way their identity is influenced by an Other. But this influence is 
at best indirect and, pace Said, not necessarily very strong. Presumably 
Americans would still be distinctively American even if Europe were fur-
ther outside their purview than it already is. On the other hand, a con-
certed effort in terms of identity politics, if reiterated over time through 
the dominant media, would be able to influence an existing mentality. 
Like identities, mentalities change, but they change much less rapidly. If 
the message that racism is inherently un-American were repeated often 
enough over a longer period of time, that message could well become 
part of an American mentality. There is a link, then, between mentalities 
and identities, but it is in many cases tenuous.
This indirect influence is apparent in the way mentalities – defined 
as cultural matrices spanning time and space – mutually influence each 
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other. They can act as each other’s ‘reference cultures’. Samantha Bee’s 
racist Europe is an example of a culture (‘Europe’) acting as a reference 
to another culture (‘America’). A reference culture is a cultural model that 
for decade after decade, if not century after century, has been imitated, 
adapted or resisted by other cultures. Reference cultures have been defined 
as ‘mental constructs or “cognitive maps” that do not necessarily represent 
geopolitical realities with the internal hierarchies and recognizable bor-
ders that usually accompany them’.12 They are typically established and 
negotiated in public discourse over many generations, and thus depend, 
like mentalities, on iteration. Clearly, a culture will only have the ability to 
act as a reference culture if it is historically, politically, economically and/
or militarily (and in some very rare cases, also morally) powerful. It must 
be a model that other cultures for some reason look up to. For a culture to 
be accepted as a reference culture, it must be recognized as part of public 
discourse, a status which it will only be able to gain if it is iteratively present 
in the public domain. In this sense, the acknowledgement of a culture as 
a reference culture can become part and parcel of a mentality. Americans 
may acknowledge Europe as a negative reference culture (for instance as a 
‘racist’ model) because it has been integrated into their mentality.
To recapitulate the concepts I have discussed thus far: an identity 
is a temporally and spatially transient construction that depends on an 
Other (or on Others); a mentality is a semi-permanent cultural matrix 
spanning time and space; and a reference culture is a cultural model that 
may become part of the mentality it is referenced by. Reference cultures 
are to be found on any level of cultural aggregation but their impact is 
especially striking on the level of national and supranational entities. 
Nations and super-nations are based on power structures – political, 
economic, military or otherwise – which differ in size and strength, so 
that cultural referencing is likely to involve asymmetries. Hence the most 
evident form of reference culture derives from the power and status of 
such formidable nations as the United States and China, or supranational 
entities like the Soviet Union and Europe.
A digital view of Europe
As we saw, both the idea of a collective mentality as an imagined commu-
nity – a sort of Anderson 2.0 – and the process of asymmetrical cultural 
referencing that influences a mentality, are based on repetition. Mental-
ities emerge through repetitive broadcasting. This brings me to the use 
of computers in historical research. The sometimes bombastic language 
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used by ‘big data’ enthusiasts may not be entirely convincing, but no 
practitioner of the humanities will deny that we live in a digital age and 
that this world will not be going away any time soon. Actual practice is 
of course more complicated than pretentious expectations. On the one 
hand we need to beware of reducing reality to the handling of data by a 
mere algorithm. Computers are capable of modelling data in extremely 
sophisticated ways, but at this point in time they cannot in any sense be 
a replacement for people. On the other hand we cannot help but note 
that ‘big data’ is hardly a novelty. Historians have been seeking for pat-
terns in the past since Herodotus, so the call to engage with them is not 
particularly revolutionary. At the very least, computer-assisted research 
can serve to look anew for larger patterns (such as mentalities) in larger 
amounts of data (such as newspaper articles).13
I  have argued above that mentalities arise from the iteration in 
public discourse of ideas, points of view, arguments, conceptions, opin-
ions, beliefs, and so on and so forth, that occur and reoccur as part of the 
dominant data flows in society. For most of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, newspapers comprised a very significant, if not the dominant, 
data flow in society, thereby influencing mentalities on a national level. 
In other words, digitized newspapers likely allow us to examine the con-
tent and development of those mentalities. In the final instance a com-
puter is not much more than a glorified counting machine, and the one 
thing a computer is able to cope with is repetition. It would be logical, 
therefore, to exploit such frequency generators to map mentalities.
I  will offer a simple example of the way computers allow us to 
chart mentalities, based on the periodicity of newspapers. The example 
concerns a particular conception of Europe as an aspect of the Dutch 
national mentality: the idea of rivalry as a common European bond. The 
historical foundation of European power has frequently been attributed 
to the fact that since at least the medieval period but more obviously 
since the sixteenth century, the European continent has functioned as 
a complex of mutually competitive territories. The idea that not just 
Europe’s rise to global economic and military dominance but its very 
unity and coherence are to be found in the fact that it is so fragmented 
may sound a little bizarre, yet it has always been a serious point of view 
for both intellectuals and politicians wrestling with Europe’s ‘identity’.14 
The cycle of war and peace between Habsburg and Hitler, the economic 
struggles in Europe’s history from the Dutch East India Company to the 
scramble for Africa, and the cultural variety among the European nation 
states has often been summarized in the dictum, ‘unity in diversity’. The 
dictum was even chosen as the official rallying cry of the European Union 
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in 2000, with the intention, obviously, of stressing union over disunion. 
Be that as it may, we need not look far for a thin description of Europe: 
the official website of the European Union offers a version of the motto 
‘united in diversity’ in no less than twenty-four languages, ranging from 
the Dutch in verscheidenheid verenigd to the German in Vielfalt geeint.
Almost two decades later the motto sounds a little like an admission 
of weakness. It is doubtful, one suspects, whether diversity can function 
as the basis of a strong polity. But that is not the point. The metaphor 
of Europe as a family of troublesome and often dysfunctional relatives 
has frequently appealed to the European imagination. And despite the 
cynicism it may prompt, there is something to the motto. Friendly com-
petitiveness as a modern, sublimated version of traditional violence was 
strongly encouraged in the twentieth century, when the various nations 
got together under European colours in a joint effort to win palms of 
honour. Some of the earliest examples stem from the period between the 
two World Wars. In the Interbellum, for example, a rather innocuous and 
once popular competition between the most beautiful women of Europe 
began to be organized: the Miss Europe pageant. Newspapers had a field 
day. The public loved stories about European girls who, thanks to their 
election as Miss Europe, were actually invited to America, the high point 
of all pageants. The press lapped up the scandals about winners who 
ended penniless and friendless and ultimately committed suicide.15
The Miss Europe elections were resumed after the Second World 
War, when they often took place in the former European colonies. In 
1952 even Turkey was allowed to supply the loveliest Miss of all. In this 
respect the Miss Europe Competition resembles the Eurovision Song 
Contest, which today includes not just Turkey, but also Russia and even 
Australia. Political and cultural definitions of Europe overlap but they do 
not coincide: it seems that competitive European culture was more inclu-
sive than the regulated market of coal and steel. It is the sheer extent of 
this competitive culture across the western edge of Eurasia that makes 
it constitutive of a twentieth-century thin description. When and how 
were European competitions covered in Dutch newspapers? How pop-
ular were they? Can we assess the impact on the Dutch mentality of the 
idea of Europe as a unity based on amicable rivalry?
Of the many contests held during the twentieth century, sports com-
petitions stand out in terms of the amount of news coverage they attracted. 
Newspaper articles frequently mention the word ‘Europe’ in combination 
with specific sports, and they do so in a very clear pattern. It is evident 
from Figure 4.1 that sporting activities did not manifest themselves as a 
peaceful version of the traditional European melee prior to the Second 
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Figure 4.1 Stacked bar chart of absolute occurrences per year for the 
term ‘Europe(e)s(ch)e kampioenschap(pen)’ in newspaper articles in De 
Telegraaf, Het Vrije Volk, De Waarheid, Leeuwarder Courant, Limburgsch 
Dagblad and Nieuwsblad van het Noorden (1898–1990). Made in Python 
Matplotlib. 
World War. This histogram represents the absolute number of hits for the 
term ‘European Championships’ over the twentieth century for six Dutch 
newspapers. Evidently, Europe became recognizable as a sporting conti-
nent only after 1950. The same pattern manifests itself for all articles that 
mention ‘Europe’ in combination with major or minor sports, whether we 
look at athletics, billiards, skating or football (see Figure 4.2).
For Europeans, of course, the prime sporting activity is football, 
while the key Dutch newspaper is De  Telegraaf, a popular tabloid-style 
daily famous for its sports journalism.16 Interestingly, in light of the 
European Union’s official motto, newspaper accounts had little to offer in 
the way of the Europeanness of football competitions. For example, little 
if nothing was said about a ‘typically European’ football style. In the one 
single instance (out of some 10 million digitized newspaper pages) that 
Dutch journalists used the exact phrase ‘typically European’ in relation to 
football, they quoted a foreigner. The article appeared, rather coinciden-
tally, in De Telegraaf at the very end of what for Dutch football fans would 
prove to be the most memorable year of the century: 1978, the year in 
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Figure 4.2 (a–d). Stacked bar charts of absolute occurrences per 
year for ‘Europa’ in combination with ‘atletiek’, ‘biljart’, ‘schaatsen’ 
and ‘voetbal’ in newspaper articles in De Telegraaf, Het Vrije Volk, De 
Waarheid, Leeuwarder Courant, Limburgsch Dagblad and Nieuwsblad van 
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which the Netherlands lost the World Cup to Argentina. In an interview, 
the Argentinian forward Mario Kempes said:
Dutch football deserves a big compliment. The Dutch play typi-
cally European football, but by fits and starts they bring a South 
American ‘touch’ to their game. That makes them so unpredictable. 
Football needs to be well organized on your side. Otherwise you’ll 
never get that far.17
Kempes seems to have meant that playing in a well-organized fash-
ion is typical for European football, but the fact that a South American 
said so brings us back to the kind of argument made by Samantha Bee 
in repudiating racism as a non-American habit. It is not certain whether 
the Dutch recognized the attribution: the Self does not necessarily rec-
ognize the things ascribed to it by an Other. Presumably the Dutch felt 
as little called upon to regard their football style as typically European in 
1978 as they are inclined to see racism as part of the European identity 
today. More important, however, is the fact that the notion of a typically 
European football style did not resonate among the Dutch themselves.
Clearly, no European frame of reference emerges from the newspa-
pers. The question then arises whether newspapers dealt with post-war 
competitive Europe in relation to its constitutive nations. We could ask 
whether (and if so, how) the various European countries mentioned in 
newspapers functioned as reference cultures for the Dutch. How well did 
the English, the Italians or the Spanish play football? Were their talents – 
solid English stamina, defensive Italian catenaccio or even the Spanish pen-
chant for making sneaky fouls – appreciated as something the Dutch should 
follow? As I have argued, whether or not the presence of such ‘Others’ led to 
the construction of a ‘Dutch identity’ is not the interesting point. Such con-
tentions tend to lead to never-ending and therefore meaningless discussions 
about ‘whose identity?’ and ‘which identity?’ The more significant question 
is whether the mutual bonding of European nations through competitive 
activities led to a sense of Europeanness in the Dutch collective mentality. 
Surprisingly, however, newspaper accounts had little to offer in the way of 
this kind of Europeanness. I have not been able to find any significant iter-
ations over a longer period of time of specific national attributes. Applying 
the phrase ‘typically Italian’ to football gives us three hits in the complete, 
ten million-plus data set. One hit refers to a ‘typically Italian dish such as 
macaroni or spaghetti’ (served while watching a football game on televi-
sion in 1990); a second mentions ‘the typically Italian exuberance’ of the 
Italian president, who apparently kissed everyone on board the plane that 
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was flying him back to Rome after Pisa defeated Ascoli in 1988; only the 
third condemns the ‘typically Italian’, unsportsmanlike style of AC Napoli, 
whose unwilling and uninspiring defensive play ‘killed’ the match against 
Ajax Amsterdam in 1970.18
The lack of cultural references either to Europe or its constitutive 
nations leaves us with the mere mention of those nations. Were some 
sporting countries mentioned more often than others, so that they were 
eventually lodged in the minds of Dutch readers through constant repeti-
tion? The relative frequency with which nationalities occurred over time in 
football news offers an image of the geographical rather than cultural for-
mation of Europe as an aspect of the Dutch twentieth-century mentality. 
To ascertain this, we need to chart European football games and plot the 
historical variants of twentieth-century nationalities mentioned in news-
paper articles. Was the Icelandic football team on the Dutch radar at all? 
How popular were the English? Did sports journalists connect Europe to 
Russians or Turks or even Egyptians, as their colleagues did with respect 
to the Miss Europe Pageant or the Eurovision Song Contest? What did 
this mean for Europe as a geographical framework in the Dutch collective 
mentality?
Directly after the First World War De Telegraaf established an image 
of soccer-playing Europe that would hold its ground until the end of the 
twentieth century. Despite the inevitable variations in charting European 
football competitions, one thing is abundantly clear: from the outset a cen-
tral role was reserved for Germany. Moreover, the image of competitive 
Europe during the 1920s was no different from the image that emerged 
during the 1970s. The five years from 1970 to 1974 offer a division of 
football-playing nationalities that is representative of the whole post-
war period (see Figure 4.3). The Germans are way up in the charts. Next 
come the English and Scots, the Italians, the French and the Spanish. The 
remainder includes substantial parts of Eastern Europe, even during the 
Cold War, especially Poles, Russians and Yugoslavs. However, although 
Eastern Europe and Scandinavia may have been present, from a statistical 
perspective they were quite irrelevant, as were Iceland and Greece.
The result of constant repetition in sports news was an image of 
Europe represented by a Saint Andrew’s Cross of nationalities that had 
its pivot somewhere in the neighbourhood of Luxembourg, connecting 
Real Madrid and the Hamburger Football Association with SSC Napoli 
and the Glasgow Rangers. This Saint Andrew’s Cross was established in 
the minds of Dutch readers as a qualitative, geographical frame of ref-
erence. As such it was a significant aspect of twentieth-century reality, 
internalized in a collective mentality over several decades.
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Figure 4.3 Nationalities in football: Map of Europe displaying average 
relative frequency of articles in De Telegraaf (1970–4) mentioning 
‘Europe’ in combination with nationalities. Most historical countries like 
the USSR and Yugoslavia have been reconstructed (although twenty-first-
century boundaries show through). Germany has been taken as a whole; 
the United Kingdom has been broken down into its constituent parts. 
Frequencies refer to all (rather than unique) hits per article and they are 
compared across space within the given period (i.e. synchronically rather 
than diachronically). Made in Python Basemap and Matplotlib. 
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Conclusion
I have claimed that a Self, such as a national Self, can be examined as a 
structured entity, a cultural matrix or collective mentality that endures 
over a longer period of time. Using a digital humanities approach allows 
for a more objective determination of the content of mentalities by repro-
ducibly counting iterations in the media, thus avoiding the notion of 
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‘identity’. This notion hinges, first, on the selective choice of subjective 
appraisals made by particular historical actors and, second, on the no 
less selective choice of theories that tend to privilege fragmentation and 
temporality over stability and (semi-)permanence. Looking at the Self as 
a mentality in its own right is a more productive approach to the history 
of subjectivities than examining the Self as a fleeting construction based 
on the serial stereotyping of Others.
It is as striking as it is telling that a systematic analysis of tens 
of thousands of sports articles mentioning both ‘Europe’ and ‘football’ 
does not, in fact, reveal much about Europe. The competitive Europe 
that manifested itself in twentieth-century Dutch newspapers was 
very much a thin description, based mostly on the iterative mention of 
football-playing nationalities. From the point of view of the European 
theme ‘united in diversity’, the most significant thing to become part of 
the twentieth-century Dutch collective mentality was a spatial frame 
of reference that excluded substantial parts of the European Union as 
it would become with expansion in 2004. The geographical reach of 
the continent was quite severely circumscribed; Europe as part of the 
Dutch mentality turned out to be mostly Western, with a clear accent 
on the northern part of the continent. At the same time, the concep-
tion of Europe showed evident asymmetries: the cartographical status 
of Germany is a case in point. It is this relatively limited, asymmetrical 
vision of Europe that was integrated into the collective mentality of the 
Dutch. Such a mentality is structural; it is, therefore, not malleable or 
easily pliable, certainly not in the hands of intellectuals and politicians, 
however well-meaning their intentions are. ‘Europe’ as part of a tough, 
robust mentality rather than an identity has more purchase in expla-
nations of recent events, ranging from Grexit to Brexit, than narratives 
that naively emphasize the enduring nature of a European civilization, 
or just as naively assume that Europe is a transient, constructed subjec-
tivity that is as easily made as it is unmade.
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From the Baltic to the Pacific : Trade, 
Shipping and Exploration on the 
Shores of the Russian Empire
Michael north
Introduction
For a long time, imperial and Soviet historians painted the Russian Empire 
as a homogenous unified nation state. They overlooked the fact that Rus-
sia was a complex conglomeration of peoples, religions, languages and 
ethnicities. Moreover, this Empire was made up of many heterogeneous 
peripheries, which pointed in different geographical directions. Its his-
tory exemplifies how asymmetrical encounters create imperial space. 
Within the process of negotiating these relations, a frequently shifting 
imperial core was not always identical with its political capital.1
This chapter examines how the Russian Empire created economic 
peripheries in outposts on the Baltic and the Pacific. Behind this attempt 
was the idea to build a Russian commercial network across the Northern 
Pacific to provide its settlements in the Far East and in Alaska with pro-
visions, and to link them with Spanish California and Manila, as well as 
with the Chinese port of Canton (Guangzhou). For this purpose, Russia 
used ships such as the Nadezhda (‘Hope’) and the Rurik to send Baltic 
German naval officers from the Baltic to the Pacific. Although their 
hopes of establishing a Russian trading empire and creating a ‘Russian 
Pacific’ failed, these explorations, and especially the travel journals by 
Adam Johann von Krusenstern and Otto von Kotzebue, had a long-last-
ing impact on public debates at home and on the European imagina-
tion. In the case of the Baltic provinces, the chapter demonstrates how 
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a European periphery was transformed into a core region of the Russian 
Empire. Taken together these two case studies show that peripheries do 
not simply emerge, but that they are the result of sophisticated economic 
strategies and imperial policies, and that they rarely stay the same over 
longer periods of time. Furthermore, the example of Russian economic 
expansion in the East forces us to rethink our Eurocentric map of the 
world: the focus on Russia’s imperial periphery places the Pacific at the 
centre of its system of trade.
Russian expansion in the seventeenth  
and eighteenth centuries
A brief outline of Russian expansion in the early modern period will set 
the scene for the subsequent analysis of the Empire’s new configuration 
of its various centres and peripheries. Following the consolidation of the 
Muscovite state in the fifteenth century, by the sixteenth century Rus-
sia stretched from the White Sea in the north and Pskov in the west, to 
the river Volga in the east. In 1552–6 Ivan IV invaded and defeated the 
Volga khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan, expanding the Muscovite state 
south to the Caspian Sea. This provided the way for further expansion 
into Siberia, which followed, on behalf of the rich merchant family of 
Stroganov, over the following decades. The leading motive behind this 
expansion was the race for furs, which were demanded as tribute (yasak) 
from the various local peoples. Cities such as Tobolsk (1587), Tomsk 
(1604) and Okhotsk (1648) were founded as centres of the fur trade, 
in order to satisfy Russian and Chinese demand. The attempt, however, 
to get a stable foothold in Livonia and on the Baltic Sea failed as a result 
of Danish, Swedish and Polish resistance, which excluded Russia from 
expanding its influence into the Baltic area until 1710.
Russia’s maritime ambition started with Peter the Great (1682–
1725), who in 1695–6 led a campaign to conquer the Ottoman fortress 
of Azov to gain access to the Black Sea. Even more important to him was 
access to the Baltic Sea, however. After taking Ingria from the Swedes, he 
founded a new capital at the mouth of the Neva River in 1703. His inten-
tion was to create an ‘imperial Amsterdam’, which was to be better suited 
to international trade than Archangelsk on the White Sea, which was fre-
quently blocked by ice. Although back in the early 1600s, on the land that 
was to become St  Petersburg, the Swedes had built a small settlement 
called Nyen, Peter planned a new city, which, like Novgorod before it, 
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would become the centre of all Western trade with Russia. By the end of 
the eighteenth century, St Petersburg, with a population of 220,000, had 
developed into the largest city on the Baltic Sea, outgrowing all other 
trading centres, including Copenhagen (101,000), Stockholm (76,000), 
Königsberg (55,000), Danzig (40,000) and Riga (30,000).
Thanks to Russia’s success in the Great Northern War, Sweden, in 
1721, signed the Treaty of Nystad and ceded the provinces of Livonia, 
Estonia and Ingria to Russia, along with a portion of Karelia. These ter-
ritories included the cities and fortresses of Riga, Dünamünde, Pernau, 
Reval, Dorpat, Narva, Viborg and Kexholm, along with the islands of Ösel 
and Dagö. In return, Russia ceded Finland to Sweden, and paid war rep-
arations of two million riksdaler. In addition, Swedish merchants were 
permitted to continue buying grain in Baltic ports up to a value of 50,000 
rubles, without paying duty.2
Having gained a stable foothold in the former Swedish provinces 
of the Baltic, Russia transformed these into its western provinces. This 
in turn led to the ‘Europeanization of Russia’s imperial image’, modelled 
after the European colonial empires.3 Russia also expanded its mari-
time interest in the south and the Far East. Although Peter’s campaign 
against Azov had been successful, the Turks prevented Russian ships 
from sailing out of Azov, and Russian goods from being shipped across 
the Black Sea to Constantinople. Only Catherine II, the Great (1762–96), 
was able to conquer the northern Black Sea coast. To achieve this, she 
sent the Russian Baltic fleet around Gibraltar in 1770. It blocked the 
Dardanelles, and reached Constantinople from the west. Although the 
Russian campaign was only partially successful, it ended the Turkish 
monopoly on shipping in the Straits and in the Black Sea. The Treaty 
of Kuchuk-Kainardji between Turkey and Russia (1774) declared ‘free 
and unimpeded navigation for the merchant ships belonging to the two 
Contracting Powers’.4 Furthermore, this sparsely populated territory 
(the so-called ‘New Russia’) attracted settlers from Russia and the Holy 
Roman Empire; and in 1794 the city of Odessa was founded as a further 
major Russian harbour in the Black Sea.
Russian ambitions in the Far East
In the Far East, where Russian trade with China had been carried out 
over land and via the great rivers Ob (via Tobolsk) and Yenisei (Irkutsk), 
the Russian expansion into the Pacific provided new opportunities. It 
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had occurred in several steps. After the initial foundation of a settlement 
for the fur trade at Okhotsk, several further expeditions led by the Danish 
captain Vitus Bering followed. During these expeditions, the Kamchatka 
Peninsula and the Russian Pacific coast were explored, and the Aleutian 
Islands and Alaska were discovered. From the 1750s onwards, Russian 
merchants sent fur hunters into these areas to catch seals and sea otters. 
In Kodiak and Sitka (Alaska) further settlements were founded, and in 
1799 Emperor Paul chartered a Russian-American Company to develop 
trade. The idea behind these initiatives was that the North Pacific’s 
endless supplies of fur would lead to new trade with China and Japan.5 
Russian economic interests, as well as concerns about a growing British 
presence in the North Pacific after Captain Cook’s third voyage, stimu-
lated further expeditions. These were led by the Baltic German officers 
Adam Johann von Krusenstern and Otto von Kotzebue, who had served 
in the Russian navy – and in the case of Krusenstern also in the Royal 
Navy.
The first Russian circumnavigation was launched from St Petersburg 
in 1803 and aimed at establishing a trade contact with Japan. Behind 
this attempt was the idea to build a Russian commercial network across 
the North Pacific in order to provide the settlements in the Far East and 
Alaska with provisions, and to link them with Spanish California and 
Manila as well as with the Chinese port of Canton (Guangzhou).
On 7 August 1803 the Nadezhda and Neva, under the command of 
Krusenstern and Yuri F. Lisiansky, left Kronstadt and sailed across the 
Baltic Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, calling at the Canary Islands and 
Santa Catarina in Brazil. After passing Cape Horn the ships crossed the 
Pacific with stops at the Marquesas and Hawaiian islands. From there the 
Neva headed to Alaska, the Nadezhda to Kamchatka. The Nadezhda left 
Kamchatka for Japan on 7 September 1804. Besides Krusenstern, the del-
egation included Count Nikolay Rezanov, who was supposed to become 
the first Russian ambassador in Japan and was going to ask for an open-
ing of trade relations between Japan and Russia. Although the Russians 
brought gifts, and returned Japanese sailors who had been shipwrecked 
on Russian Pacific shores, the mission proved to be a disaster. During 
their stay in Nagasaki, the Russians provoked serious tensions over ritual 
and etiquette, refusing to stand up in front of Japanese officials or to 
store their hand weapons, as shogunal regulations required. Therefore 
they were denied what they sought: the opening of trade with Japan. 
In G. H. von Langdorff’s Journey Around the World, Captain Krusenstern 
describes his own and Rezanov’s frustrations. Moreover, they expressed 
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their disdain for the culturally more attuned Dutchmen, who were bow-
ing and scraping for the Japanese in local fashion.6
While the mission itself was a failure, when Krusenstern and 
Rezanov returned to the Kuril Islands and met Japanese ships, the 
Japanese sold them provisions in exchange for ‘old clothes and buttons’. 
Captain Krusenstern found these transactions perplexing, as either the 
buttons must have been ‘of particular value to them, or herrings none at 
all, for they exchanged from fifty to a hundred of them dried, finer than 
I ever met them, for an old brass button’. Furthermore, ‘the Japanese bar-
tered pipes, lacquered dishes, and particularly books of obscene pictures’.7
For these reasons Krusenstern and Rezanov continued to believe 
that trade with Japan remained an option, leading Rezanov to draft 
a plan for a Russian-Pacific presence in Sitka. The major aim was to 
solve the problems of food supplies for the Russian-American colonies. 
Several options were discussed: one was to establish trade with Spanish 
California; another to force Japan to trade, especially to provide rice for 
Russian settlers. Further options discussed were trade with Manila or 
the establishment of a Russian colony in Northern California, based on 
the agriculture of indigenous people. A last option was to make contact 
with Boston traders, who frequently called on the Pacific coast. Having 
returned, via the Indian Ocean, to Russia on 22  July 1806, only one 
option of Rezanov’s ambitious plan proved viable: the establishment of 
a colony in Northern California, where in 1811 the Russian-American 
Company founded Fort Ross, located north of the bay.
Despite the various difficulties outlined above, the scientific out-
come of the Nadezdha expedition was remarkable. Krusenstern published 
a travel report in German (Reise um die Welt) and later in English (Voyage 
Round the World), as well as an atlas with 104 maps and engraved paint-
ings of the Pacific.8 The public interest in the first Russian circumnaviga-
tion triggered further Russian explorations into the Pacific, of which the 
expedition of the Rurik, led by Otto von Kotzebue, stands out. Kotzebue 
had been a member of the Nadezhda crew, and in 1814 received his own 
command from Count Nikolay Rumyantsev, a  St  Petersburg statesman 
and philanthropist, who financed the construction and voyages of the 
Rurik. Their aim was to discover for Russia the Northwest Passage, to 
acquire new knowledge of the Pacific and its inhabitants, and to assem-
ble objects of natural history for his private collection. This explains why 
the botanist Adelbert von Chamisso and the artist Louis Choris were 
recruited with the specific aim of bringing back objects, descriptions and 
paintings. The expedition of the Rurik (1815–18) resulted in the collec-
tion of rich materials and ample new knowledge. More than 400 islands 
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were recorded and put on the Pacific map. Furthermore, Chamisso 
produced two reports: Remarks and Opinions of the Naturalist of the 
Expedition and A Voyage around the World with the Romanzov Exploring 
Expedition, the latter including descriptions of his encounters with native 
peoples.9 Especially his encounter with Kadu from the Ratak Island in the 
South Sea, who for nine months travelled on board of the Rurik, strongly 
impressed Chamisso and his fellow crew members:10
He was not unteachable, not without intellectual curiosity. He 
seemed to understand well what we endeavoured to make him 
understand about the shape of the earth and our nautical arts, but he 
had no tenacity, became exhausted through the effort, and returned 
to his songs to avoid it. He took some pains to learn writing, the secret 
of which he had comprehended, but he as without talent for this diffi-
cult attempt. What he was told with the intention of encouraging him 
might have completely deprived him of courage. He suspended his 
study, took it up again, and finally put it aside entirely.
He seemed to grasp with an open mind everything that we 
told him about the social order in Europe, of our customs, morals, 
arts. But he was most receptive for the peaceful adventure purpose 
of our journey, with which he connected the intention of telling 
newly discovered peoples what was good and useful for them, and 
by this he understood chiefly what goes toward sustenance; but he 
also recognised that our superiority rested on our greater knowl-
edge, and he honoured and served our research efforts as much as 
possible, even when it would have seemed very idle to many a more 
educated person among us.11
Although the quest for political and economic domination in the Pacific 
failed, via the fur trade Russia and its settlements were closely linked to 
Spanish California and China, and thus to the emerging Pacific econ-
omy, in which British and American ships carried the lion’s share of 
commodity exchanges. Initially, the fur trade was centred on Okhotsk, 
from where Russian traders took the pelts inland to Kiakhta, thus satis-
fying Chinese luxury demand. Since Chinese consumers preferred fine 
sea otter pelts, their hunting, carried out by indigenous Aleut and Kodiak 
hunters, assumed a global dimension. When the sea otter population in 
the North Pacific declined, sea otters in California became the target of 
the Russian-American Company. Since Native Americans lacked the rel-
evant skills, the company used American ships to bring Aleut and Kodiak 
hunters, together with their weapons and families, to California. While 
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the men hunted, Aleut woman and children skinned and cooked the 
otters. American ships then took the pelts to Canton. On occasions also 
the labour force was shipped back to Kodiak and Sitka.
Despite these efforts, it remained difficult to sustain Russian inter-
ests in the area, and in 1823 Kotzebue was sent once again on an expedi-
tion into the North Pacific:
In the month of March of the year 1823, I  was appointed by his 
Imperial Majesty Alexander the First, of glorious memory, to 
the command of a ship, at that time unfinished, but named the 
Predpriatie (the Enterprise). She had been at first destined for a 
voyage purely scientific, but circumstances having occurred which 
rendered it necessary to change the object of the expedition, I was 
ordered to take in at Kronstadt a cargo to Kamschatka, and to sail 
from the latter place to the northwest coast of America, in order 
to protect the Russian-American Company from the smuggling car-
ried on there by foreign traders. On this situation my ship was to 
remain for one year, and then, being relieved by another, to return 
to Kronstadt.12
Russia’s Pacific provinces in the nineteenth century
The nineteenth-century Russian presence in the Pacific was still charac-
terized by the problem of long distances between the settlements on the 
western and the eastern shores, and the difficulty in providing them with 
provisions. Furthermore, competition from British and North American 
ships, from whalers, traders and fur hunters also proved difficult. By the 
1830s, only 800 Russians had settled in Alaska and the population subse-
quently declined, due to the difficulties with provisions and the exhaus-
tion of the fur supplies on which the Russian-American Company’s 
survival depended. After the near-extinction of sea otters, the fur hunt 
moved further south, concentrating on seals, which were available all 
over the Pacific. British, French, Spanish and American ships dominated 
the seal hunt, especially on the Juan Fernández Islands off the coast of 
Chile.13 Finally, in 1841 the Russian-American Company sold Fort Ross to 
the Swiss landowner and entrepreneur John Sutter.
The western coast of the Pacific, i.e. the Russian Pacific Coast, 
moved into the Empire’s focus when, in 1849, a Russian ship rediscov-
ered the mouth of the river Amur. Although in the Treaty of Nerchinsk 
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(1689) Russia had ceded this region to China, the Russians reoccupied it 
in 1854, and two years later declared it a free trade zone. They founded 
the fortress Khabarovsk and after the emancipation of serfs in 1861 pro-
moted migration to the area. In the unequal treaties of Aigun (1858) 
and Beijing (1860), China had to accept first the transfer of 600,000 km2 
from the Stanovoy Mountains to the Amur River, and two years later the 
Russian occupation of the coastal territory south of the Amur down to 
the Korean border. Here, in 1860, Russia established a new military and 
naval base, giving it the name Vladivostok (Ruler of the East). Russian 
settlement in the area remained slow, and only increased after the open-
ing of the Trans-Siberian railway at the end of the century. Nevertheless, 
peasants, small traders and seasonal workers migrated from Korea and 
China into the new Russian territories. Vladivostok became the basis for 
Russian expansion into Manchuria, where Russia claimed a protectorate 
over its northern part and established two new ice-free harbours at Port 
Arthur and Dairen.14
This successful expansion on the Pacific Coast changed the van-
tage point with respect to the American possessions.15 While Russia 
consolidated its transcontinental European-Asian Empire, the maritime 
American periphery became finally obsolete, especially since the driv-
ing motive of the eighteenth-century expansion, the fur hunt, no longer 
yielded sufficient profits. As a consequence, in 1867, after ten years of 
negotiations, Russia sold Alaska for $7.2 million to the United States. The 
sale to the United States, rather than Britain, also fulfilled Russia’s aim to 
undermine British power in the Pacific.
Ethnic nationalism and Russification 
in the Baltic provinces
In the Baltic provinces an intensified integration into the Russian Empire 
and the emergence of national movements among Estonians and Latvi-
ans took place. Administrative ties were strengthened under Catherine I 
(r. 1725–7). A  law commission was set up to advance legal unification 
and the administrative reach of the tsarist Empire. Representatives of the 
nobility and the cities took part in this effort, and together with the Finn-
ish representatives and those of the former Polish-Lithuanian territories 
in Ukraine, they defended the rights of the provinces against those of 
the Russian Empire. After Russia’s successes in the wars against the Otto-
man Empire, Catherine II, the Great (r. 1762–96), intensified her reform 
efforts, and in 1775 she introduced a new provincial ordinance. Initially 
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this came into force in Russia alone, but in 1783 it was extended into 
the Baltic provinces and, similar to the effects of introducing the Rus-
sian head tax, bound these provinces closer to St  Petersburg. Stuck in 
provincial narrow-mindedness, the nobility was initially pleased that it 
continued to be exempt from taxation, and that taxes were largely borne 
by the Estonian and Latvian population. Also, the allodification of the 
manorial farms (which became actual property) was welcomed by the 
nobility. The cities, however, resisted the elimination of their privileges 
that followed the Russian municipal ordinances of 1785. Meanwhile, 
the ordinances led to freedom of trade and, for example in Riga, laid the 
ground for the industrialization of the following century. Although Paul I 
(r. 1796–1801) restored the old city and provincial constitutions when 
he was enthroned in 1796, he introduced the Russian military recruit-
ment law in the provinces, which meant long-term service in the Russian 
army for any young man caught up in its net.16
Over the following century the position of the Baltic-German rul-
ing class was increasingly challenged by rising Latvian and Estonian 
nationalism. Already around 1800, pastors and physicians promoted a 
new image of the Estonians and demanded improvements to their eco-
nomic and social situation, especially in the form of agrarian reforms. 
‘Estophiles’ – culturally engaged Baltic Germans and Estonians who had 
risen into the middle class – joined them. Their writings would culmi-
nate in the national movement of the second half of the century, while 
also serving as a cultural mediator between the urban middle class and 
the Estonian peasantry. A  Latvian literary society (Latviešu Literāriskā 
Biedrība) was formed in 1824, largely by Couronian pastors, while in 
Dorpat the Estonian physician Friedrich Robert Faehlmann (1798–1850) 
founded the Learned Estonian Society (Õpetatud Eesti Selts).
The main political concern of Estonians and Latvians was to secure 
equality with Baltic Germans, both in education and before the law. The 
liberalized pass ordinance of 1863, which granted the peasantry free-
dom of movement, brought about greater mobility, especially in south-
ern Estonia. The effect of political publications such as Perno Postimees 
(Perno Postman), the first Estonian newspaper, published in Pernau in 
1857, or the Latvian Mājas Viesis (House Visitor) in 1856, should not 
be underestimated.17 Song festivals became a regular fixture celebrat-
ing national sentiment in Estonia from 1869 and in Livonia from 1873 
onwards.18 Estonian and Latvian developed into modern cultural lan-
guages by precisely this literary process. Voluntary associations also 
reflected these developing national cultures. Farmers, volunteer fire 
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brigades, mutual aid organizations, teetotallers and choristers formed 
societies at the local level, which soon developed into larger associations 
with regional and even national members.
In the Baltic provinces, pastors influenced by Enlightenment ideas, 
along with Estophiles, prepared the groundwork for agrarian reforms. 
Although the peasant ordinances of 1802–4 had validated the laws tying 
the peasantry to the soil, new laws promulgated in 1816, in Estonia, and 
in 1819, in Livonia, freed the serfs. The manorial landowners, however, 
continued to own the land, which forced the now independent peasants 
to sign rental agreements to farm that land. As elsewhere in Europe, crop 
failures, starvation and revolts led to new agrarian laws in Livonia (1849) 
and Estonia (1856), which allowed the peasants to acquire land and reg-
ulate its acquisition with the help of public credits. Moreover, land they 
used to farm was transferred into their property in exchange for ceding 
one-sixth to the landowners. The previously dominant form of natural 
rent or labour eventually gave way to financial operations. This resulted 
in economically viable and productive units that could compete on the 
open market with the manorial farms. This was especially successful with 
crops such as linseed and for cattle and horse breeding. Vodka distilling, 
to meet demand in Russia, also proved extremely profitable.19
In the Russian Baltic provinces, the expansion of the railway net-
work served as a powerful impetus to trade and transport because port cit-
ies could now be connected both with each other and with the hinterland. 
A direct connection between Riga and Mitau was opened in 1868. In 1870, 
this was followed by the line from Baltischport (Paldinski) to St Petersburg 
by way of Reval and Narva. The construction of railway lines worked in 
favour of the port cities through which they ran. Once Riga was connected 
with the hinterlands of Ukraine and southern Russia, it suddenly became 
a major player in grain exports. The population almost tripled between 
1871 (103,000) and 1897 (282,000), reaching 520,000 in 1913. Riga 
recruited its population primarily from the countryside. Libau (Liepāja) 
was also able to improve its position by exploiting its railroad connection, 
while Reval grew into the second most important Russian port for imports 
after St Petersburg. Industrialization kept up with urbanization.20
With the population increase, the ethnic composition of these cit-
ies also changed fundamentally. In Riga Latvians replaced Germans as 
the dominant nationality during this period, while the Russian element 
remained approximately stable. A glance at the structure of the labour 
force demonstrates another transformation. While Germans, despite 
their general decrease in the population as a whole, continued to be rep-
resented in the bureaucracy and in the free professions, the proportion 
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of Germans working as artisans, merchants and in the service sector 
decreased. Latvians became more prominent in these sectors and in 
industry generally. Russians were equally active in administration, trade, 
industry, the manual trades and other services. The Jewish population 
became more prominent in the free professions and as merchants.
Out in the countryside, by contrast, the changes were less signifi-
cant, because during the nineteenth century Estonia was already 90 per 
cent Estonian, while Latvians were the predominant population group in 
Livonia (about 80 per cent). The transformation was much more dramatic 
in the cities, especially in Riga, where Germans felt caught in a pincer 
by the progressive Russification of the region, by the Latvian national-
ist movement, and as a consequence of the industrial labour movement 
(social democracy). For Latvians social mobility in the industrial society 
fostered the emergence of a Latvian national movement. Latvian agita-
tion was directed first against the Germans and then the Russians. Both 
Latvians and Russians cultivated anti-Semitic stereotypes, which in turn 
found ready acceptance among the Germans.21
Thus, the intensification of Russian rule strengthened the connec-
tions between the Baltic provinces and St Petersburg, as well as the role 
of Russian culture in the area. This meant at the same time a redefini-
tion of the region’s sense of belonging, from forming the periphery of a 
European Empire to becoming a core area of a (new) Russian Empire, 
alienating at the same time many of its (non-Russian) people from tsarist 
rule.22 This process would culminate in the anti-German revolts during 
the Revolution of 1905, as well as (in 1918) the success of the Baltic inde-
pendence movement.23
Conclusion
This chapter elucidated different economic and political developments 
in two distant peripheries of the Russian Empire. Their role and eco-
nomic function changed over time. Fuelled by the fur hunt and respec-
tive Chinese demand, around 1800 the Russian Pacific area formed part 
of a global Pacific economy; but its role shifted during the nineteenth 
century, due to the exhaustion of fur supplies and growing international 
commercial and naval competition. This led to the Russian retreat from 
the American continent and the concentration of imperial policies on 
the Russian land Empire, although even then its eastern outposts were 
expanded and militarily consolidated.
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While the Russian Far East remained an imperial periphery, the 
Baltic provinces lost their peripheral status. Through the railway net-
work, integration of the administration and Russification, they were 
economically, institutionally and culturally linked to St  Petersburg 
and came to constitute the core region of the modern Russian Empire. 
Furthermore, since the Baltic Sea was crucial for Russian shipping to all 
parts of the world, the Empire’s western fringe came to play the role of a 
middleman and mediator for Russia’s relationship with Western Europe 
and the wider world.
Despite the consolidation of its imperial policies, however, the 
Empire remained vulnerable. The Russian navy continued to operate in 
three different arenas, which were characterized by enormous distances 
between them. Since its Black Sea fleet was more or less geographi-
cally isolated, when Russia wanted to increase its naval presence in the 
Mediterranean it had to dispatch ships from its Baltic fleet. Furthermore, 
Russia had no naval bases between Libau on the Baltic and Port Arthur 
on the Pacific. This became obvious when Japan, as the newly emerging 
Pacific power, tried to stop the Russian expansion on the Russian Pacific 
coast and besieged Port Arthur. Russia sent its Baltic fleet, which had 
been based at Libau, the long way around the Cape of Good Hope to the 
Pacific, only to be defeated by Japan in the Battle of Tsushima in May 
1905.24 The effects threw Russia into deep turmoil and marked the rise of 
a new empire in a different region of the world.
The two case studies show how imperial peripheries are formed, 
and how their function changes due to global economic processes, but 
also how a European periphery became the core of an empire that over 
the centuries had changed its outlook on the world. Within the context of 
this collection of essays, the chapter demonstrates that core and periph-
ery, and the spatial hierarchies that regulate the relationship between 
them, in no way represent absolute categories.
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Republics of Knowledge : Interpreting 
the World from Latin America
nicola Miller
Introduction
In 1882 the celebrated poet, José Hernández, was offered a generous 
sum of money by the government of Buenos Aires Province to spend a 
year in Europe and Australia investigating how to boost agricultural pro-
ductivity. As the author of the bestselling poem El gaucho Martín Fierro 
(1872 and 1879), which had rapidly acquired the status of a national 
epic, he potentially lent a certain credibility to a government initiative 
based on the assumption that best practice could only be imported from 
overseas. The story goes that officials took his acceptance so much for 
granted that they did not even trouble to consult him before announcing 
it to the newspapers. Hernández, however, at once refused to go: such 
a trip would be a complete waste of money, he insisted, because Euro-
pean ways of doing things were not applicable to Argentina. He could 
write a far better book, far more quickly, if he stayed right where he was. 
That was exactly what he did: after several months travelling around 
local estates, collecting information from the people who worked on 
them, he produced 330 pages of astute and comprehensive advice on all 
aspects of livestock raising, which became known as Instructions for the 
Rancher: A  Complete Treatise on the Planning and Running of a Country 
Estate (1884).1 The government declined to purchase a single copy of it, 
and printed no fewer than 5,000 copies of a report produced, at great 
expense, by authors more in sympathy with the official view that Europe 
was the fount of all useful knowledge.2 But their extensive survey – all ten 
volumes of it – of the state of the art in Europe could not begin to compete 
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with Hernández’s short and serviceable libro criollo (creole book), which 
sold out in several editions and was still being reprinted in the 1940s.
This incident brings into sharp relief the two main themes of this 
chapter: i)  the collectivity of knowledge; and ii)  the recognition of 
knowledge.
On the collectivity of knowledge, the immediately striking point is 
that Hernández, as he acknowledged, was heavily reliant for informa-
tion about best practice on the local experts he consulted. He had been 
born on a cattle ranch, where his father worked as a foreman, but his 
own career was in journalism, politics and literature. Less obviously, 
Instructions for the Rancher would probably not have made it into print 
at all had it not been for the courage of a certain bookseller-publisher, 
Carlos Casavalle, founder of the Imprenta y Librería de Mayo, whose dis-
tinguished reputation and networks of connections not only in Argentina 
but throughout South America gave him the invincibility necessary to 
incur government displeasure by publishing Hernández’s book. Although 
much of the history of knowledge has consisted of studying the ideas of 
intellectual luminaries down the ages, the landscapes of knowledge were 
populated with a far wider range of people, all of whom made distinctive 
and often transformative contributions.
The extent to which such work was recognized (theme ii), either by 
contemporaries or historians, raises a series of questions about the status 
and legitimacy of knowledge. Categories of ‘national’ and ‘foreign’ knowl-
edge coalesced at this specific conjuncture in Argentina, in the 1880s, when 
knowledge acquired locally succeeded in being recognized, by some if not 
all participants in public debates, as more valid than knowledge acquired 
elsewhere. Such developments point to the importance of thinking not only 
about how knowledge is produced or even how it is received but also how it 
acquires the necessary validation to be deemed worthy of being received. 
In turn, this relates to the importance of distinguishing between varying 
kinds of transnationalism: the near and the far; the experienced and the 
imagined. Hernández chose not to travel to Europe, but he did bring trans-
national experience to his treatise, having spent time in both Uruguay and 
Brazil. Moreover, his view that European agriculture was not applicable 
in South America was formed precisely through extensive reading about 
practices from Europe and elsewhere that had given him a comparative 
framework within which to operate. His rejection of one kind of transna-
tionalism – going to Europe – for another – drawing comparisons closer to 
home – alerts us to the very different kinds of experience that can be cov-
ered by the umbrella term of transnationalism. Crossing continents is not 
the same as what I call localized transnationalism, that is, the multitude 
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of connections, exchanges and comparisons that occurred between coun-
tries in Latin America, affecting most levels of society. There is more than 
one type of reference culture: the stimulus of common endeavour in simi-
lar conditions may be as great a source of inspiration and ideas as success 
achieved under very different conditions. Latin American countries looked 
to each other at least as much as any of them looked to Europe.
My themes will be illustrated with evidence from Latin America, 
the history of which offers an illuminating perspective on the history of 
knowledge, especially its role in modern nation-making. As the region 
of the world which rejected colonial rule during the Age of Revolution 
to found a second wave of modern republics (1808–26), Latin America 
was foundational to nineteenth-century debates about culture and poli-
tics. These new political communities all made a founding commitment 
to promoting knowledge and its circulation as central to the formation 
of modern societies. This commitment was particularly strong in the 
republics of Spanish America, where a rhetorical embrace of popular sov-
ereignty was widespread, even if it was limited in practice, but it was 
also evident in the independent monarchy of the Empire of Brazil, which 
became a republic in 1889. These new countries were the ultimate test 
cases of nation-statehood, because they were constituted without any 
obvious differences of race, language or culture to differentiate one from 
another, as Benedict Anderson long ago pointed out.3 What was meant 
by a ‘nation’ was debated throughout Europe and the Americas for much 
of the nineteenth century; it was not so much the idea itself that was 
European as the ‘one state, one culture’ model that acquired the status 
of ideal type there. The differently constituted nation states of Latin 
America have been grappling for two centuries with questions that have 
more recently become troubling throughout the world. To what extent 
could modern political systems based on secular rights and freedoms 
coexist with widespread religiosity and racially based social hierarchies? 
How could the defence of sovereignty be combined with openness to 
investment and ideas from elsewhere? What role could the circulation of 
knowledge play in fostering collective identities and participatory dem-
ocratic life, especially in the context of the modern global hierarchies 
of knowledge established during the nineteenth century? The varied 
histories of nation-making in Latin America, with their interconnected 
experiences of colonialism, independence and neo-colonialism, provide 
a unique body of evidence about all of these matters. These histories 
therefore open up a range of questions about the methodologies histori-
ans adopt and the categories they employ.
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The collectivity of knowledge: Drawing teachers  
in Latin America
In the spirit of recent scholarship in the history of science,4 I explore how 
the history of knowledge might look different if we saw beyond a minor-
ity of prominent figures. The celebrated individuals who tend to attract 
all the attention are of course worthy of interest, but so too are a host 
of other people: printers, editors, booksellers, librarians, trade unionists 
who ran night schools, compilers of almanacs and encyclopedias, lexi-
cographers and bibliographers. In this chapter, I focus on drawing teach-
ers, for two separate but, I argue, related reasons.
First, it is remarkable how many of the primary sources from the era 
of independence emphasized the pressing need to establish Schools of 
Drawing; the teaching of drawing was continually declared fundamen-
tal to popular education throughout the nineteenth century and into the 
early twentieth century. Second, national histories of art, which began to 
be written around the time of the centennials of independence and con-
tinued into the 1960s, routinely highlighted the autodidacticism of nine-
teenth-century artists, elaborating the idea of the exceptional individual 
springing untutored from his – or very occasionally her – native land to 
express the spirit of the people.
On the first point, the need to found schools of drawing, some 
impressive claims were made for the contribution of drawing to 
nation-making. Father Francisco Castañeda, who campaigned in 1815 
for a school of drawing in Buenos Aires, saw drawing as the source of 
all possible desirable qualities and capacities for the first generation of 
the new republic. It was the one great skill that would deliver the people 
from ignorance and barbarity, instilling a work ethic, creating receptivity 
to republican laws and cultivating good taste. By learning to draw squares 
and circles the students would begin to understand geometry; by draw-
ing hands and eyes they would apprehend anatomy; by drawing build-
ings and forts and ships they would learn the principles of civil, military 
and naval architecture; and by drawing machines they would appreciate 
mechanics and glean the principles of invention. Their drawing practice 
would give them a good knowledge of ancient history and mythology, 
of the Bible, and of modern history, and it would lead them naturally 
to other desirable accomplishments in music, dance and theatre.5 More 
measured voices declared drawing to be not only indispensable to the 
development of industry and the professions, but also a virtuous outlet 
for the physical energies of artisans.6 Many of the prominent figures of 
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the time, across the continent, lent their support, financial and/or polit-
ical, to the creation of drawing schools, not least the Liberator José de 
San Martín, who made drawing central to the curriculum of the school 
he founded in Mendoza.
Skills in drawing were indeed necessary to many of the activities of 
the new political communities that emerged from the wars of independ-
ence: the surveying of land and sea; map-making; natural history and 
science; architecture and town planning; civil and mechanical engineer-
ing; military strategy; and the dissemination of all kinds of information, 
including images of national heroes (and villains) and impressions of 
war. The art of the miniature, which flourished in the 1820s and 1830s, 
helped to make a divided social elite visible both to itself and to other 
sectors of the population, because the cameo portraits were published 
in the social columns of newssheets and on the death notices posted out-
side the local church or the town hall.7 Photography came early to Latin 
America and certainly played an important role in stimulating national 
consciousness from the 1840s onwards, but the camera lens could not so 
easily – or so cheaply – caricature or satirize as the cartoonist’s swift pen; 
nor did the photograph lend itself so readily to the archetypes of nation-
alism. Thus, drawing was not an ornamental extra or something of inter-
est only to art historians, but a skill that was fundamental to becoming 
modern societies and economies. Drawing teachers were highly prized 
and sought-after individuals, embedded in networks – both local and 
transnational – of engineers, geographers, scientists, artists, writers and 
politicians.
The best-known examples of drawing’s contribution to national 
imaginings are the ‘customs and costumes’ collections of sketches and 
watercolours depicting the peoples and landscapes of various regions 
of a country. These were an international nineteenth-century publish-
ing phenomenon, along with the records of scientific expeditions and 
the diaries of individual adventurers. Many of the early albums on Latin 
America were produced by artists visiting from Europe, who spent a few 
months following what quickly became well-established itineraries, and 
they were published in Europe for a well-heeled European audience.8 In 
most Latin American countries, however, there were local artists who 
became celebrated for their representations of scenes and people of the 
national territories, many of which were printed in cheap editions or on 
posters, pamphlets or flyers. It was these artists whose supposed auto-
didacticism was later made so much of by nationalists.
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An example from Peru: who taught Pancho Fierro?
Francisco Fierro (1807–79), usually known as Pancho, painted hundreds 
of watercolour vignettes of Lima and its people, which circulated widely 
both in Peru and beyond. They were used as illustrations for the emerging 
mid-nineteenth-century genre of urban guidebooks; they adorned the 
famous and popular books of stories, Peruvian Traditions (1872–1910), 
by Ricardo Palma, Peru’s main nineteenth-century chronicler of social 
life.9 Fierro, who was Afro-Peruvian, has been described as ‘the painter of 
the people’ who spontaneously expressed ‘Peruvian creole identity’. Such 
accounts acknowledged that he was highly daring and accomplished 
technically, yet still claimed that ‘he never set foot in an academy’,10 an 
apparent contradiction which has prompted several recent attempts to 
identify where and how he learned to draw and paint. Who taught Pan-
cho Fierro? The detective challenge has yielded no conclusive documen-
tary evidence so far, but these investigations have exposed as illusionary 
the romantic image of an inspired but isolated dabbler who unwittingly 
tapped into a latent essence of Peruvianness.11
In order to understand the sources of Pancho’s methods, it helps 
to think about a wide range of factors on various scales: local, national 
and transnational. The immediate context was the emergence of mod-
ern drawing teaching in late eighteenth-century Peru, when there was 
a marked switch from religious imagery to historical and social subjects. 
That development, in turn, has to be understood in the context of a chang-
ing political and administrative order in colonial government, manifested 
in the Bourbon Reforms, especially from the 1760s under Charles III. The 
Spanish Crown took steps to preserve its monopoly on trade and to pre-
clude the emergence of industrial competition from its overseas posses-
sions, but the reforms had only limited success, which prompted some 
creoles, especially those who had worked in Spain, to start planning for 
industrialization in the Americas. Such initiatives were boosted by the 
spread of Enlightenment ideas, including the Spanish Enlightenment, 
and by the increasing visibility of science and the possibilities for scien-
tific exploration and exchange – of which Humboldt’s journeys through 
the Americas (1799–1804) were the most famous among many.12 By the 
early nineteenth century, i.e. before the imperative of republican citi-
zenship, the conditions had been created for education to be made more 
widely available, and for it to be provided by the state instead of the reli-
gious orders. Changing local market conditions also have to be taken into 
account: the late eighteenth-century move away from the devotional art 
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commissioned by the Church or by wealthy lay families was also made 
possible by a growing internal market for portrait painting.
The context for understanding Pancho Fierro’s work also includes 
the history of Peru as a major centre of cultural production during the 
colonial period. The renowned Cusco school of art had enjoyed 250 years 
of influence on the plastic arts throughout South America. Growing up 
in Lima, Fierro would have had models of sophisticated religious paint-
ing and sculpture to observe all around him. Peru’s distinguished artistic 
tradition also meant that it was an attractive destination for the mas-
ters of drawing who came with foreign scientific expeditions. One rel-
evant example was Francisco Javier Cortés (1775–1841), from Quito, 
a highly skilled botanical artist, who had travelled with the naturalist 
José Celestino Mutis. He became Professor of Drawing at the School of 
Medicine in Lima and gave free evening classes open to all. It is likely, 
although it cannot be confirmed, that Fierro was in touch with Cortés, if 
not actually taught by him.13
During the early nineteenth century, as a result of all these con-
verging factors, drawing evolved from being a means of designing or 
recording (as in the colonial term trazador, derived from the verb trazar, 
literally ‘to trace’) to being a means of imagining or interpreting by the 
dibujante (someone who draws, from dibujar, to draw).14 Drawing, in a 
generic sense, was becoming a mode of apprehending the world, which 
in itself contributed to the conditions of possibility for new political 
communities.
With independence, new institutions were created to teach draw-
ing; there was an influx of visitors, including itinerant artists from Europe; 
and international publishers began to export to Latin America, expanding 
the variety of images in circulation. Although Pancho Fierro supposedly 
‘lived and died in poverty, without fame or glory’, there is evidence that he 
made a lot of money selling his watercolours to foreign visitors.15 All those 
contacts were part of the repertoire of knowledge that informed his crea-
tive practice; he sustained a successful career for five decades and clearly 
knew how to adapt and respond to market demands and how to fulfil the 
role expected of him. Investigations about who taught Pancho Fierro have 
also unearthed new international and transnational connections. The 
historian Natalia Majluf, who argues that the mythology of the popular 
artist both dehistoricizes culture and denies agency, searched customs 
records to find that there was a high volume of trade between Peru and 
China in the 1830s. She also found travel accounts indicating that images 
of Lima were sent to China, sold well there and were then re-exported, so 
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Fierro probably saw these Chinese images of Peru, signs of which can be 
detected in his own work.16
Nationalist histories of art from the mid-twentieth century tended 
to divide artists into two categories: ‘academic’, i.e. divorced from their 
roots; and ‘popular’, i.e. authentic expressions of purely local experience. 
Fierro was often contrasted with Ignacio Merino, who was sent to Paris 
very young and lived in Peru for only 12 years (1838–50) before return-
ing to Europe. His work has been dismissed by cultural nationalists as 
‘salon painting’,17 but his works have been analysed by later historians 
as illustrating a whole range of critiques of the methods he had been 
taught in Paris. The academic/popular divide, like so many other bina-
ries, paints over so many other possibilities.
One reason, then, why it is so important to ask about possible teachers 
is in order to differentiate history and myth in relation to autodidacticism. 
A claim that somebody was self-taught is a key for unlocking information 
about the opportunities a society offers to acquire cultural capital. Instead of 
thinking in terms of what is lacking – formal education – it is worth explor-
ing what made it possible for certain individuals to learn informally. Was 
there a familial or other social context in which learning was valued? What 
other routes were available for gaining access to knowledge? There are many 
possibilities to consider, including bookshops, libraries, the informal circula-
tion of printed matter, reading aloud from newspapers or other ephemeral 
materials, talks or lectures, contacts with more educated individuals pre-
pared to act as guides and mentors, and opportunities to do a variety of jobs 
and to travel. Thus autodidacticism, which is portrayed as a celebration of 
individualism, actually reveals the significance of the social structures and 
networks – both local and transnational – that made the creative work of 
autodidacts possible.
Perhaps the greatest problem for anyone trying to learn without 
formal guidance is how to select – what to read, what to look at, what 
to study. As Carlos Fuentes put it, it is difficult to know how to know. 
This brings us to my second theme, namely the question of the status, 
legitimacy and recognition of knowledge. It was no coincidence that José 
Hernández’s ringing denial of the applicability of European knowledge 
to Argentina happened during the 1880s. In most countries of Latin 
America there was greater political stability in this decade than hitherto, 
combined with an upturn in international trade, which stimulated eco-
nomic growth. There was an expansion in the capacities of the state and 
an array of nation-building initiatives. In this section, I will illustrate the 
corresponding emergence of a conception of ‘national’ knowledge, as dis-
tinct from ‘foreign’ knowledge.
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The emergence of ‘national’ knowledge in the late 
nineteenth century: Art
In the same way that nations emerged in reciprocal interaction with trans-
national processes, so was the scope for knowledge production shaped by 
the potential for recognition. During the 1880s several Latin American 
states began to offer scholarships to study art in Europe. Although bud-
ding artists in Lima or Buenos Aires could by then receive formal training 
in drawing, painting and sculpture, the problem remained that there were 
still very few opportunities to see the works of art deemed to be canonical: 
art galleries, museums of fine art, even printed images in newspapers, all 
came at least a decade later. Students knew all about European art from 
written accounts, but they could not actually see it, beyond the few iso-
lated prints or sculptures to be found at random in bookshops or diora-
mas. The glossy art books produced in Europe were deemed too expensive 
for Latin American markets, although the emerging international trade 
in artefacts began to target its wares at the newly rich of Latin America, 
selling them paintings and sculptures, often of indifferent quality, made 
especially for export. During this specific transitional period, lasting no 
more than a couple of decades, a visit to Europe, especially Italy and Paris, 
became a rite of passage for any aspiring artist, just as the Grand Tour 
had earlier been for the young adults of wealthy families. These artists 
were mostly from immigrant families of modest means, and dependent 
upon government grants to travel. Although the scholarships were not 
generous, they imposed significant expectations on their recipients. Art-
ists from Latin America eking out an existence in Paris or Rome felt that 
in order to justify their state funding they needed not only to be successful 
– by getting their work into the French Salon or the Venice exhibition and 
winning European prizes – but also somehow to be representative of their 
native country. They were caught between two courts of public opinion: if 
they were intentionally and obviously ‘national’ in terms of content, they 
would go unrecognized in Europe, but if they avoided ‘national’ subjects 
they ran the very real risk of being accused of having cut themselves off 
from their roots in their native land.18
In the midst of these multiple pressures, however, artists from 
Latin America carved out plenty of scope for debating what ‘national’ 
art might mean. One interesting case is Martín Malharro (1865–1911), 
who was born in a small town in Buenos Aires province. Living in Europe 
from 1895 to 1901, without either a scholarship or family resources, he 
earned his living as an illustrator for Le Figaro and other publications. 
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On his return to Argentina he had a successful exhibition of his paintings. 
Often described as a ‘self-made man’, whose ‘independent spirit rebelled 
against any influences, making him a true original’,19 he was actually 
trained in Buenos Aires printing workshops and then at the free classes 
run since 1879 by the private Society for the Promotion of Fine Art. In 
Paris, as his own letters show, he spent his whole time exploring muse-
ums and galleries, endlessly looking, studying and comparing.20
Back in Buenos Aires in 1903, by which time a Museo Nacional de 
Bellas Artes had been founded (1896), albeit not yet opened to the public, 
Malharro inveighed against what he called ‘patrioterismo’ (chauvinism or 
jingoism) in art, arguing that ‘Art is a unity, without flags or pennants’.21 
Any art ‘had to be national’, he argued, in the sense that it was bound to 
be a reflection of a specific cultural environment: ‘if we take into account 
that the conception of feeling and of action is not the same in our land as 
it is in Europe, just as it is not the same in Europe as in Japan or China, we 
will find that there cannot be any universal ideal of beauty in an absolute 
sense’. Yet those nations conventionally associated with great art were 
those whose artists were deemed to have transcended their national con-
text, painting ‘without patrioterismo, without any ideal other than Art’. 
Thus, those cultural gatekeepers who lauded ‘Italian’ art or ‘French’ art 
were trying to have it both ways, enthroning ‘absolutes that had no more 
value than the sly artifice’ behind them. But given the established recog-
nition of Italian and French art as both national and universal, any artist 
born in Argentina was obliged to forget – which meant first having to 
learn – ‘all the best from the European schools of art’. Thus, for an artist 
from anywhere deemed to be peripheral, winning recognition even as 
national, let alone universal, entailed challenging global hierarchies of 
knowledge that excluded all but the most culturally confident societies 
from the possibility of transcending local specifics.
The knowledge hierarchies woven into the connections between 
centres and peripheries have had major consequences in the fields of 
economics and politics as well as culture. Elsewhere, I have analysed a 
series of major infrastructure projects in Latin America in the light of 
the tensions between science and sovereignty.22 My findings suggest that 
the oft-reiterated claims that Latin American countries ‘needed’ foreign 
technical expertise in order to develop – because they lacked sufficient 
home-grown expertise – are almost wholly unfounded. In the ‘century of 
engineers’, as Jürgen Osterhammel has characterized the 1800s,23 these 
case studies vividly convey that it was not so much a question of local 
expertise being lacking as of its being undervalued. Here, I will explore 
the example of port facilities at Buenos Aires.
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Argentina’s ‘first engineer’ and the port of Buenos Aires
Buenos Aires is a famous and significant port, but it is not a natural 
one. Shallowness, silting, sand banks drifting in wayward winds and 
tides – all make for major engineering challenges. As late as the 1980s, 
when the Argentine government defied the United States by selling 
grain to the Soviet Union, not the least of the problems involved in this 
act of Cold War brinkmanship was that the huge Soviet grain tankers 
could not dock at Buenos Aires. Even today, there is a constant need 
for dredging. It is hardly surprising, then, that its nineteenth-century 
development was fraught with difficulties. By 1870 all that there was 
to show for repeated attempts to build a modern wharf was a heap 
of discarded plans. These frustrations were caused partly by political 
factors – a series of costly wars, both internal and external, and the 
uncertain constitutional status of the City of Buenos Aires in relation to 
the rest of the country – but also by a lack of consensus about the best 
technical solution and the consequent difficulty of securing finance for 
a project fraught with risk.
In the late nineteenth century, the building of a new port caused 
the first public controversy in Argentina that could meaningfully be 
described as national. It was played out in the two recently founded 
national newspapers, La  Nación and La Prensa, which took opposite 
sides. The protagonists were Luis Huergo (1837–1913), the man known 
as ‘the first Argentine engineer’ because he was the first to graduate, in 
1870, from the engineering degree newly established at the University of 
Buenos Aires, and Eduardo Madero (1823–94), a wealthy businessman 
and international trader. Huergo was already a public figure, elected 
to Congress while still a student. He was a founder and first president 
of the Argentine Scientific Society (1872). Unusually for an Argentine 
at that time, he had been educated in the United States, at a Jesuit col-
lege in Maryland, where he learned English. Back in Buenos Aires, he 
trained first as a surveyor, then from 1865 as an engineer. In contrast, 
Madero, who had inherited a role in his family’s business, had no tech-
nical training. However, after spending several years in Montevideo, he 
returned to Argentina preoccupied, some said obsessed, with ensuring 
that Buenos Aires had the modern facilities that would enable it to trump 
Montevideo’s natural advantages. By 1870 he had already presented two 
plans for the development of Buenos Aires, both drawn up in collabo-
ration with British engineers, neither of which had garnered sufficient 
political support.
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There was a long-established practice, dating back to the 1820s, of 
inviting European – mostly British – engineers to tender for the moderni-
zation of Buenos Aires port. In 1870, President Domingo Sarmiento com-
missioned yet another foreign expert to find a solution: John F. Bateman, 
whose plan – drawn up after spending less than a month in Buenos 
Aires – involved cutting a long canal in order to build the docks close to 
the heart of the city. It attracted ‘a deluge of criticism’ from locals, who 
argued that Bateman had completely underestimated the problems and 
the costs involved in such extensive dredging.24 A government-appointed 
Commission made up mainly of other ‘foreign engineers’ concluded that 
it would cost at least seven times what Bateman had estimated.25
It was in this context that Luis Huergo successfully argued for the 
development of the existing facilities at the alternative site of Riachuelo, 
just south of the city centre, in the area now known as Boca. As a reform-
ist politician, recently elected as senator for the Province of Buenos Aires, 
one of his main concerns was to avoid the exorbitant costs he anticipated 
from pursuing any version of Bateman’s idea.26 He sought a realistic pro-
posal not a prestige project. Huergo’s plan was supported by both pol-
iticians and engineers. It received state funding in 1876 and by 1883 
works had progressed so well that one of the new transatlantic steamers, 
L’Italia, was able to dock at Buenos Aires for the first time. This event 
was hailed in the press, both in Italy and Argentina, as a vindication of 
the plan devised by ‘a creole engineer, without authority in the scien-
tific world and in opposition to the powerful opinions of an expert of 
European fame like Mr Bateman’.27
In light of this success, in 1882 Huergo submitted detailed plans to 
extend the docks northwards. The next thing he knew, apparently from 
reading it in the press, was that the government had decided instead 
to back a third plan championed by Eduardo Madero, drawn up by the 
British company of Hawkshaw, Son & Hayter, with the promise of finance 
from Barings. Madero had returned from a visit to London, sought an 
urgent meeting with President Roca (which he obtained through the 
good offices of his uncle, the Vice-President), and persuaded Roca 
to support a plan supposedly designed by the great engineer Sir John 
Hawkshaw. In fact, Sir John had handed the project over to his son, who 
in turn passed it on to someone else. In general, the company specialized 
in railways, rather than port works. The plans were very sketchy and had 
been drawn up without even the briefest of visits to Buenos Aires; they 
ignored Riachuelo and all the existing facilities; they were very similar, 
with the same problems, to those of Bateman’s plan rejected in 1871. 
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Yet Madero’s proposal was forced through Congress by President Roca, 
without consulting the Argentine Department of Engineers.
The Congress did, however, stipulate that the final version of the 
plans had to be endorsed by the Department of Engineers. The government 
first tried to circumvent this requirement by establishing a Commission 
of Experts, two out of the five of whom were English and US engineers. 
This Commission reported that the drawings Madero had supplied were 
too sketchy to evaluate. What happened then, it later emerged, was that 
the President simply summoned the head of the Department of Engineers 
and ordered him to ensure that a set of suitable drawings was made, along 
the lines indicated by Hawkshaw, Son & Hayter.28 When these supposedly 
‘definitive’ plans were presented in 1884, they were approved by decree 
and Roca summoned three former presidents, no less – Mitre, Avellaneda 
and Sarmiento – to sign the contract with Madero.29 This public display of 
official preference for British over Argentine expertise unleashed a storm of 
criticism. The Argentine Assembly of Engineers of 1886 was unequivocal 
in concluding that 1) Hawkshaw, Son & Hayter’s plan would not result in a 
good port for Buenos Aires (on the contrary, the high costs of its construc-
tion and operation would ‘impose a burden incompatible with the general 
interests of trade’); and 2)  Huergo’s far more detailed design not only 
met ‘the technical, general and commercial demands of a port for Buenos 
Aires’, but also would cost only a third of Madero’s plan.30 Nevertheless, 
the government went ahead with the Madero-negotiated contract. Huergo 
and the head of the Department of Engineers both resigned and were 
supported not only by their colleagues, but also by thousands of people 
who turned out to cheer the awarding of a medal to Huergo in Boca del 
Riachuelo.31 Work on what became known as Puerto Madero began in 
1887 and was completed a decade later. The project ran way over budget: 
even the supportive La Nación (19  January 1919), estimated, conserva-
tively, that it had cost at least twice the amount originally specified; French 
engineers dubbed it ‘the most expensive port in the world’.32 It was already 
congested by 1902 and ceased functioning altogether in 1925. In 1909 the 
government decided to build a new port, along the lines of what Huergo 
had envisaged back in 1882.
There are two key points in this story. The response of the English 
engineers to any of the specific criticisms set out by locally based engi-
neers was to claim that their proposals were ‘as advised by modern sci-
ence and practice’.33 Yet the experienced and distinguished Luis Huergo 
had actually done more than most individuals anywhere to modernize 
engineering. He carried out many other inventive projects including 
sanitation and irrigation works throughout Argentina and in Paraguay, 
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always undertaking extensive research into human health and nutrition 
to inform his engineering.34 Despite all of these pioneering scientific 
endeavours, Huergo was denied the mantle of modern expertise.
The second point – which is perhaps even more telling – is that 
President Roca could not have secured the drawings he needed to force 
this project through Congress had it not been for the fact that an engineer-
ing degree had been started at the University of Buenos Aires in 1865, 
creating a cohort of trained, capable staff at the government Department 
of Engineering. Roca was reliant upon home-grown expertise to rectify 
the technical defects in the work done by the foreign company he wished 
to impose.
Conclusion
The examples above illustrate what can be gained by thinking about the 
history of knowledge as a collective endeavour, involving a wide variety 
of people beyond the famous intellectuals who are often at the centre of 
historians’ attention. Switching the focus to other, apparently marginal 
figures, may light up the shadowy configurations of power that shape 
the possibilities for knowledge creation in any particular time and place. 
As research from many fields has shown, the margin can be a place of 
creativity, empowerment and renewal, but my evidence supports the 
argument that it is nonetheless crucial not to lose sight of the wider 
asymmetries that embed the marginal. The framework of centres and 
peripheries runs the risk of reifying these distinctions and imbalances, 
but if flexibly conceived as a spectrum of relational possibilities it can be 
helpful in enabling historians to bring together big-picture analysis and 
fine-grained interpretation of historical shifts in distributions of power.
The evidence from this chapter also draws attention to the impor-
tance of thinking not only about cognition but also about recognition. 
The scholarly literature still tends to emphasize either the creation of 
knowledge and how that is shaped by coloniality, or networks of knowl-
edge circulation and how they decentre hierarchies of material power. 
Yet far less work has been done on fundamental processes of legitimation, 
which are equally subject to power relations both within and beyond sites 
of production or routes of dissemination. It is one thing to control access 
to knowledge, but who decides what actually counts as knowledge? 
Everybody has always borrowed ideas and techniques from elsewhere, 
as Voltaire neatly conceded when he defined originality as judicious 
imitation. Over the course of the nineteenth century, however, various 
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forces combined to create hierarchies of knowledge in which some acts 
of imitation were celebrated as of universal interest and others were dis-
missed as only of local relevance. As postcolonial scholars have shown, 
concepts, classification systems and disciplines specific to the local con-
texts of Europe were gradually projected, through imperial power, as 
being of universal validity. The independent countries of Latin America, 
evolving both after colonialism and during the rise of neo-colonialism, 
carried out nation-state-making in the midst of the coalescing global 
hierarchies of knowledge of the nineteenth century. Knowledge practi-
tioners from elsewhere were increasingly denied universal reach, instead 
being expected – both abroad and at home – to be authentic expressions 
of their local culture. The poet César Vallejo, living in Paris in the 1930s, 
eloquently evoked the anguish it caused him. ‘Why do I always have to 
be “Peruvian” when I write?’ he demanded. Even Lorca, from Spain, the 
metropolitan status of which had long been undermined by Black Legend 
stereotypes of backwardness and superstition, had succeeded in being 
accepted as a poet with a universal message. Yet Vallejo felt condemned 
to be national, denied the possibility that anything he said or thought 
could be deemed of interest beyond its relevance to the country where 
he happened to have been born; that is, he felt – and he was – denied the 
possibility of being fully human. Anyone who has read Vallejo’s poetry 
will know that he spoke fully to the human condition. Nearly a century 
later, thanks in part to the work of scholars committed to thinking about 
transnationalism in all its varieties, this is beginning to be recognized. 
In this context, the centre–periphery framework helps to interpret the 
processes by which some kinds of knowledge, produced in certain places, 
at specific times, came to be recognized as generalizable to other places. 
It was not just the theft of history, to borrow Jack Goody’s vivid phrase,35 
but the theft of the right even to think about what ‘history’ might be.
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From Manchester and Lille to the 
World : Nineteenth-century Provincial 




Hindle Wakes is one of the few plays written by the Manchester play-
wright Stanley Houghton (1881–1913) which still enjoys some fame 
today.1 It was a sensation when it was first performed in 1912, quickly 
transferring to London after a short run in Manchester. Later the same 
year it received its international première in New York.2
One of the principal characters of the play is Alan Jeffcote, the son of 
a wealthy cotton manufacturer in Hindle, a fictional Lancashire town on 
the outskirts of Manchester. He is described in the stage notes as follows:
He is dressed by a good Manchester tailor, and everything he has is 
of the best. He does not stint his father’s money. He has been to the 
Manchester Grammar School and Manchester University, but he 
has not lost the characteristic Hindle burr in his accent, though he 
speaks correctly as a rule … He has no feeling that he is provincial, 
or that the provinces are not the principal asset of England. London 
he looks upon as a place where rich Lancashire men go for a spree, 
if they have not time to go to Monte Carlo or Paris. Manchester he 
looks upon as the centre or headquarters for Lancashire manufac-
turers, and therefore more important than London … The feeling 
gives him sufficient assurance to stroll into the most fashionable 
hotels and restaurants, conscious that he can afford to pay for 
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whatever he fancies, that he can behave himself, that he can treat 
the waiters with the confidence of an aristocrat born – and yet be 
patently a Lancashire man. He would never dream of trying to con-
ceal the fact, nor indeed could he understand why anybody should 
wish to try and conceal such a thing.3
Though this is a fictionalized description, the author was drawing on his 
own experience. Houghton, the son of a cotton merchant, was born in 
Ashton-under-Lyne, near Manchester, in 1881. Like his creation, he was 
educated at Manchester Grammar School and then went to work in his 
father’s business. Young men like Jeffcote were a feature of his every-
day experience: taking the train to work in the warehouse on Whitworth 
Street, reading the paper in the Reform Club, drinking in the bar of the 
Midland Hotel. In Houghton’s description, Jeffcote’s central character-
istic is a sense of certainty in his social status that was rooted in his eco-
nomic position and his identity as a Mancunian and a Lancastrian. He 
was sufficiently confident in himself to feel that he belonged in a global 
elite but, paradoxically, the security of this sense depended upon his 
deep roots in a local identity. When he thought of England, and indeed of 
Europe, the imagined geography upon which he drew did not recognize 
centres and peripheries, or if it did it reversed them: Manchester was cen-
tral, London was not.
As I argue in this chapter, Jeffcote’s worldview, as described by 
Houghton, is a revealing fictionalized presentation of a value widely 
shared among members of the elite in the industrial cities of Manchester 
and Lille at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This was 
the conviction that modernity was best navigated at the scale of the local, 
using social structures and cultural ideas that took their form at the local 
scale. As they reacted to and made sense of economic globalization and 
transnational cultural exchange, the middle classes of Manchester and 
Lille rooted their responses in ideas of the local, drawing upon an idea 
of global space that was not always hierarchical, that did not always run 
from the provincial periphery to the metropolitan centre. On the con-
trary, the provincial city could be central, and could make connections 
with the rest of the world on its own terms.4
This chapter argues in opposition to a longstanding tendency 
among historians and other social scientists, for whom the idea of ‘cen-
tres and peripheries’ has commonly shaped their readings of nineteenth- 
and twentieth-century Europe. This approach has been rooted, I would 
argue, in the continued importance of the paradigms of ‘modernity’ and 
‘nationalism’ to their accounts. Nationalism has commonly been regarded 
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as the most powerful theory of political legitimacy in the nineteenth cen-
tury: an extensive historiography has traced its development beginning 
in the late eighteenth century.5 Modernity too has been conceived both as 
a way of understanding the changed nature of human experience in the 
face of industrialization, and as a means of naming and conceptualizing 
related social, political and cultural developments.6 Both continue to be 
important to historians and social scientists, both as objects of investiga-
tion in themselves, and as useful conceptual frameworks with which to 
approach empirical problems.
However, where theories of nationalism have posited the decisive 
role played in nation-building by social elites, generally associated with 
one geographic place within the national territory (usually the royal 
court or national capital), and accounts of modernity have identified its 
cultural manifestations in large cities as archetypal and definitive, both 
have tended towards a hierarchical understanding of European and 
global spaces. Nations have their central core and provincial peripheries, 
while modernity itself is seen as emanating from particular central places 
to peripheries.7 This teleological tendency relegates sub-national places 
to a secondary role.
Despite its geographically enlarged frame of reference, global his-
tory, too, risks embedding hierarchical understandings of space into its 
explanatory models. A focus on connections and networks – say, between 
Lebanese diaspora merchants – might identify Abidjan and São Paulo 
as local ‘centres’ in a global circuit of capital, with their hinterlands as 
peripheral regions in peripheral parts of the world. Histories of interna-
tional organizations or state diplomacy may also reproduce the spatial 
logic of the objects of study. Attempts to understand modern global his-
tory in terms of the development of whatever process is thought to drive 
that history – say, industrial capitalism – centre the process and thus 
also produce their own spatial hierarchies, contrasting central industrial 
cities with peripheral producers of raw materials. In response to such 
criticisms, often framed as a problem of ‘Eurocentrism’, there have been 
urgings to ‘provincialize’, ‘decentralize’ or ‘fragment’ the field of global 
history, a call which should inform the way that global space is modelled.8
In this chapter I aim to take on this challenge by critically examining 
the paradigms of nationalism and modernity in the light of recent schol-
arship, with reference to two case study cities at the end of the nineteenth 
century. In a context of economic globalization and cultural globaliza-
tion, elites in Manchester and Lille – two supposedly peripheral, provin-
cial cities – engaged with debates about national identity and modernity 
on their own terms, rather than ceding the intellectual terrain to capital 
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cities. Through an examination of the ways they used municipal policy 
to articulate ideas about the relationship between the city and the rest of 
the world, I argue that they did not understand their cities to be periph-
eral, neither in their respective national contexts nor at the global scale 
as they understood it. I show that the building of models with which to 
make sense of global space must not mean sorting that space into graded 
hierarchies of centres and peripheries, but something more complex. In 
the concluding paragraphs I discuss how this might look.
The role of opera
The art of the opera has long played a vital role in histories of politics, 
society and culture in nineteenth-century France. Opera houses in Paris 
were handsomely subsidized by successive regimes, while changes in the 
art form itself were commonly presented by contemporary observers as 
related to wider changes in French society.9 A vast literature has explored 
this rich history, focusing particularly on the most celebrated composers 
and impresarios, and the developments of the art in Paris.10 This liter-
ature has framed the opera, as a historiographical problem, as a ques-
tion of national identity and national politics. ‘No signal could have been 
stronger: [the opera] was as important to Napoléon III’s government as 
the railways, the military, and probably the Church.’11 When transna-
tional connections have been considered, for example in the influence of 
Italian composers or of Richard Wagner, the focus has still been on Paris 
as the reception and transmission point of foreign influence.
Yet the opera was the central art form of urban life throughout 
France, playing a crucial role in the shaping of civic identity. To maintain 
a healthy municipal opera theatre was a mark of a sophisticated modern 
city, and an important preoccupation of municipal councils and mayors 
across France, and indeed Europe.12
Lille was never an internationally important centre of opera in 
the same sense as Paris. Nevertheless, even the fairly average talents 
that made up the permanent company of a city like Lille were part of 
a European employment market by the 1860s. Jules-Henry Vachot, the 
director of the opera in the 1865–6 season, had formerly been director 
of the Ghent and Antwerp theatres. After leaving Lille he returned to 
Belgium to manage La Monnaie in Brussels, at the time considered one of 
the finest opera theatres in Europe. He later returned to Paris, where he 
died in 1884.13 Eugène Bertrand, director in 1867–8, a year local theatre 
historian Léon Lefebvre called ‘one of the finest the Lillois had seen for 
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20 years’, had spent five years managing theatres in the United States of 
America, as well as time in Brussels.14 Under his direction Adeline Patti 
gave her first performance of Faust in French.15 He later became man-
ager of the Paris opera. Biographies of the hundreds of performers and 
directors in Lefebvre’s history of the Lille theatre demonstrate that such 
mobility was the norm, while listings in the Parisian theatrical and musi-
cal press show that this was the case elsewhere too.16 Efforts to raise or 
maintain the quality of the local opera were framed in a comparative reg-
ister, with municipal councillors making repeated reference to the inter-
national character of the art form in their discussions on the subject.17
At the same time as investing political capital in emulating cities 
across Europe, municipal political elites in Lille asserted their independ-
ence from Paris. In the late nineteenth century Paris lost its pre-eminence 
and its reputation for producing important new works of Grand Opéra, 
a genre which had dominated the mid-century art form. In some years 
during the 1870s there were no new works at all performed at the Opéra 
Garnier.18 Some music critics and interested political observers became 
concerned that the Paris-centred system, particularly the emphasis 
placed on Grand Opéra, did not afford young dramatists and compos-
ers the opportunity to experiment and to bring their works to new audi-
ences.19 Some began to develop a set of ideas and policies that associated 
the possibility of a regenerated French opera with a revival of the oper-
atic scene outside Paris. This policy agenda came to be known as ‘theatri-
cal decentralization’ (décentralisation théâtrale).
For the liberal republican Géry Legrand (1837–1902), mayor of 
Lille from 1881 to 1896, theatrical decentralization meant revitalizing 
the repertoire by increasing the number of works performed each sea-
son that had not previously been staged in Lille. Upon his election he 
revised the cahier des charges (a  document which specified the terms 
and conditions of the opera director’s engagement) to specify that at 
least three new works should be performed each season.20 In compari-
son, just two new works per season were required at the Opéra Garnier 
in the same period.21 The revised cahier also gave the mayor the power 
to mandate the director to stage up to two new works per season by 
Lillois composers or writers, if suitable works were available. It was for 
this reason in particular that Legrand was recognized as a ‘partisan’ of 
decentralization by a local theatre historian.22
The most interesting product of this moment in the Lille opera was 
a work called Lydéric, a new opera performed in Lille in 1895 and 1896.23 
Its composer was a man called Émile Ratez, and the lyrics were written 
by two local journalists. Ratez was born in Besançon and studied in Paris, 
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but later became ‘a Lillois … by adoption’, spending forty years as direc-
tor of the Lille conservatoire.24
Lydéric was based upon the legend of Lydéric and Phinaert, a medi-
eval epic poem, elements of which appeared in various Latin, French and 
Flemish versions between the eleventh and sixteenth centuries.25 Lydéric 
was a kind of popular local hero, regarded as the founder of the city. Giant 
figures of the two characters were popular features of the Lille carnival, 
and Lydéric was celebrated in local literature, both in the dialect poetry 
of Alexandre Desrousseaux, and in conventional verse by local hommes 
des lettres.26 The story was widely known, with Lydéric the ‘popular hero’ 
of the people of Lille.27 In other words, this opera, by a local composer, 
told a very local story.
Despite its locally derived story and its emergence from a munici-
pal policy of favouring local works, the opera was consistent with wider 
trends within the avant-garde of French opera. Lydéric belonged to the 
genre of drame lyrique,28 a form that had come to replace Grand Opéra, 
and had largely been associated with French wagnerism.29 Ratez’s opera 
was recognized as being ‘modern’ and ‘Wagnerian’ in its musical style, 
both by hostile reviewers and those who praised the work.30 Ratez had 
‘the skill and the science of a serious musician’ according to one local 
periodical,31 while a review in a local paper claimed that ‘he is from this 
modern school of which the formula goes like this: to abandon entirely 
the form of opera with a series of airs in duets or trios, with no link 
attaching one to the next; to achieve the intimate union of the poem 
and the music, by giving to the vocal and symphonic parts their appro-
priate place; and doing so by the constant employment of characteristic 
motifs’.32 The prominent Wagnerian critic Louis de Fourcaud had two 
years earlier named Ratez among a list of seven young composers who 
in recent years had played ‘an important part in the movement of the 
modern [musical] art’.33
Lydéric therefore illustrates two important things. Firstly, that 
experimentation with new aesthetic techniques, including those inspired 
by the still controversial figure of Richard Wagner, did not take place 
only in Paris. Nor were Wagner’s ideas transmitted into France solely 
through Paris. The process of cultural exchange and influence was 
more diffuse than that, involving supposedly peripheral places like Lille. 
Secondly, rather than responding to Wagner only in terms of the chal-
lenge he posed to French music or to French identity, the composer of 
Lydéric instead took the Wagnerian model of sweeping mythical story-
telling and innovative compositional techniques, and applied it to a local 
myth, rooted in civic identity and local popular culture. Lydéric therefore 
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demonstrates that peripheral spaces too could be the site of modernist 
innovation, while the context of its creation underlines the capacity of 
sub-national political formations to take on the role of cultural patrons, 
participating in the development of a modern art form independently of 
national trends.34
The art gallery and the city
Around the same time, in Manchester, the city art gallery was a focal 
point for debates about the relationship between the city and an increas-
ingly globalized artistic culture. Thanks to the raising of a £2,000 per 
annum fund for new purchases, launched in 1882 by the city council, by 
1897 the permanent collection was ‘one of the best of its kind outside 
London’, according to the council’s Art Gallery Committee.35 From just 
18,000 in 1884, by the end of the century this collection received over a 
quarter of a million visitors a year. As the collection continued to expand, 
and new exhibition conventions developed – particularly the practice of 
hanging pictures at eye level in a single row, rather than all over the wall 
at various heights – it was increasingly difficult to find sufficient space 
for the collection. In common with other British cities at the time, Man-
chester needed more space for its gallery.36 In 1900, the lack of space 
cost the city the donation of a collection of more than a thousand items, 
including oil paintings by Botticelli, Rembrandt and Delacroix, which the 
Manchester-born Greek merchant Constantine Alexander Ionides gave to 
the Victorian and Albert Museum instead.37
In such a context, the perceived shortcomings of the Manchester 
art gallery were profoundly troubling for many Mancunians. For a loose 
coalition of city councillors, journalists, academics and amateurs of art, 
Manchester fell short in matters of culture, especially in comparison to its 
economic pre-eminence in cotton textiles. As their counterparts in Lille 
did when discussing the opera, they expressed their criticisms in compar-
ative terms, looking to what had been done in other large cities in Britain 
and on the continent.38 In particular, though not exclusively, they looked 
to German cities as an example.
The city Art Gallery Committee settled upon a plan to build a new, 
much larger gallery. In March 1905 the mayor and three councillors 
set off on a tour of thirty-one galleries in Britain, France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Germany. Their itinerary included collections of oil 
painting, sculpture, decorative art, prints, drawings, industrial art, pho-
tographs, antiquities and local historical material. They met with gallery 
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directors including Alfred Lichtwark in Hamburg and Wilhelm von Bode 
in Berlin, curators and conservators, and local politicians.39 In Munich 
they were welcomed to a ceremonial dinner with municipal councillors. 
The result of this research was an extensive report synthesizing their find-
ings and making detailed proposals for the new gallery in Manchester.40
In taking lessons from their tour of the continent, the committee 
attempted to be synthetical, absorbing what they saw but adapting only 
those things that they regarded as relevant to the city, taking care to high-
light areas in which Manchester’s existing practices were more appropri-
ate. Next to Dresden, for instance, ‘Manchester compared favourably in 
regard to attendance, local interest, free entrance, and number of hours 
which the galleries are open for the pleasure of the public.’41 They por-
trayed themselves as learning from galleries in Europe in order to create 
a better gallery adapted to local conditions, rather than simply setting 
out to create a facsimile of galleries they had encountered abroad.
Members of the Manchester Art Gallery Committee saw them-
selves as belonging in a social and cultural space whose boundaries were 
not identical with those of the nation. Believing that promoting artistic 
beauty could be both a means and an end of reform in the industrial city, 
they recognized that similar attempts were being conducted in other 
parts of Europe, where they were often more advanced. They therefore, 
on the basis of an identified affinity between Manchester and other cit-
ies in north-western Europe (especially Germany), set out to learn from 
the practice of those cities. Mancunian elites viewed the management of 
cultural institutions as a way both to respond to their experiences of glo-
balization, and to make new connections across national borders. The art 
gallery was both a means of making Manchester into a European city, and 
an expression of the extent to which it already was.
Mancunians were able to make this conceptual and spatial leap 
thanks to the similarities that existed between the social and economic 
structure of Manchester and other cities, as well as the many cultural val-
ues that the bourgeoisie shared across Europe. While earlier moments 
of transnational connection such as the exhibition of German, French 
and Belgian artists held in 1860 had been achieved by the private Royal 
Manchester Institution, this time it was the municipal government that 
was the common, mutually comprehensible form that existed across 
the continent. As historians of the ‘municipal moment’ have noted, the 
building of connections between European and American cities in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries depended on the existence 
of ‘transboundary connections between individuals [with] certain rules, 
principles and/or concepts in common’.42
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Such connections included those between the Manchester coun-
cillors and the various officials and politicians they met on their trip in 
1905. They also included the friendship that developed between Walter 
Butterworth and Édouard Herriot, the radical mayor of Lyon and later 
Prime Minister of France. This friendship dated to the visit of a group of 
Lyon councillors to the city in 1906, when Butterworth, as the best French 
speaker on the council, held many conversations with Herriot. They met 
again during a return trip to Lyon in May 1907.43 This trip to Lyon was 
to form the basis of the proposed textile gallery in Manchester, which 
had not been discussed at much length in the initial committee report.44 
Butterworth – a polyglot who spoke eleven languages by the time of his 
death – was also a fluent speaker of German, which facilitated conver-
sations with Lichtwark, Bode and others during the visit to Germany. 
Underlying such connections was the idea that the municipality was a 
common entity across different parts of Europe, and that municipalities 
could be compared with, or rival, their counterparts elsewhere. The exist-
ence – or perceived existence – of institutional similarity across borders 
was at least as important as the relationships formed between individuals.
In the proposals for a new art gallery, and the discussions surround-
ing their possible implementation, the European continent seems to have 
been perceived as something resembling a network of cities, rather than 
a patchwork of homogenous nations. Relationships could be formed and 
affinities identified that went across borders, without being conceived 
through the paradigm of the nation. When the Manchester delegation 
was in Munich, for instance, it was treated to a grand luncheon by the 
local council. In a speech, the mayor of Manchester presented himself 
first of all as an emissary of the city, rather than his country. He thanked 
his hosts ‘heartily in the name of the city of Manchester, the great com-
mercial city I have the honour to represent’.45 ‘Art especially stands above 
geographical relations’, he also said, ‘[and] we feel that you stretch out 
the hand of friendship from one town to the other’. This is not to claim 
that politicians in Manchester (or Munich) were not nationalists, or 
would not have sent their sons to fight in northern France nine years 
later, but rather that their plans for the art gallery were an opportunity 
for them to articulate a way of thinking about the European space in a 
way which did not foreground the nation.
Here the mayor evoked a sense that Manchester, as a great com-
mercial and industrial city, was capable of establishing connections with 
other cities and other parts of the world. These relationships were not 
perceived through the prism of nationhood but rather of local charac-
ter. Manchester need not be peripheral but could establish itself as a 
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culturally (as well as industrially) modern city by emulating European 
cities such as Munich or Cologne that it perceived as being appropriate 
comparators. Vital to this way of seeing the relationship between the city 
and the rest of the world was a networked idea of global space in which 
connections between places were horizontal, not vertical.
The overriding conclusion of this chapter is therefore that elites in 
Lille and Manchester in the second half of the long nineteenth century 
developed their social, political and cultural lives around the theme of the 
‘local’. Though rooting themselves in this identity, at the same time they 
were connected to global economies and cultural trends, and aware of 
global events through the local press. They travelled abroad as far as their 
means would allow them, and gathered information on other parts of the 
world when they could not. As they made these global or transnational con-
nections, their actions were guided in part by their ideas about local iden-
tity, both the identity of the industrial bourgeoisie, and the identity of the 
city. Manchester and Lille were not simply a British and a French city, they 
were cities in the world, connected to a network of transfers and exchanges 
in which they did not see themselves as playing a peripheral role.
Conclusion
This conclusion gives rise to three themes which lie outside the scope of 
this chapter itself but suggest avenues for further study within the con-
text of the centres and peripheries project. These themes I have called 
roots, models and which worlds?
In this chapter I have explored the different ways in which elites in 
the two cities imagined the world. What I have addressed less explicitly, 
however, is how and why those imaginations came to be. What were the 
roots of provincial transnationality, and how and why did people in sup-
posedly peripheral cities see themselves as central actors in the drama of 
modernity? Arguably, these roots belong in the cities’ economies, for it 
was industrialization that brought the cities into relations with the rest 
of the world. Indeed it was industrialization that shaped them into their 
modern form, with decisive impacts on ideas of local identity. The tone 
and intensity of local discussions on this subject indicate that industrial 
production and exchange had acquired powerful symbolic meanings that 
were intertwined with local identity. While the cultural resonance of 
technological change in the nineteenth century is a subject that histori-
ans have already worked on at great length, local iterations of this effect 
have been comparatively neglected. The uneven and distributed nature 
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of economic development in the nineteenth century, a fact increasingly 
recognized by historians of industrialization, makes a hierarchically 
graded model of global space increasingly difficult to sustain.46
How therefore should we model the imagined geographies of pro-
vincial elites? The nationalist world geography encodes within it a hier-
archical idea of space: from locality to nation, and thereafter to world. 
As Jürgen Osterhammel called it, this represents ‘a size-graded hierarchy 
of settlements stretch[ing] up pyramid-like … from a multiplicity of vil-
lages at the bottom to a central location at the top’.47 This clearly does 
not represent the imagined geographies of the people I have described in 
this chapter. For them, the global space was not vertically integrated, and 
transnational connections from their cities did not pass through, either 
literally or conceptually, a national capital or an idea of the nation. For 
them, transnational connections were horizontal, and the city existed 
in a network of connections in all directions, some stronger and some 
weaker, in a global space that shrank and stretched in uneven ways.
Finally, as we have recognized the uneven nature of the connec-
tions that develop with globalization, it will not do to speak of ‘the city 
and the world’. Which worlds? This study suggests that in constructing 
an imagined global geography Mancunians and Lillois sorted the planet 
into many worlds, each defined by particular characteristics. When they 
thought of opera, Mancunians referred to Italy or perhaps Germany; when 
Lillois thought of painting their minds turned to Flanders; for Mancunians 
the best universities and art galleries were in Germany; Africa contained 
virgin markets and racial Others; raw cotton came from America, but was 
spun in Manchester. This differentiated global geography conformed to 
the self-perception of the two cities: the division of the world into regions 
defined by their cultural or economic products mirrored the definition of 
the home city by its industries. This worldview was represented daily in 
the rubric of the local newspapers. As a cotton spinner like Jules-Émile 
Scrive spread the Écho du Nord over his breakfast table, no doubt his eye 
would turn to the financial pages, where he would find news of the har-
vest in Mississippi, and the price of a bale in Manchester.
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Part III




Turning Constitutional History Upside 




Most historians associate the European Mediterranean in the first half 
of the nineteenth century with backward regions at the periphery of the 
continent setting out for modernity. Leading contemporary politicians 
such as the Austrian foreign minister and future chancellor Metternich 
fostered such a discourse of orientalism. They moulded the once stimulat-
ing South into a part of Africa, referring to ‘tyranny, superstition, poverty’ 
and calling the consequences of these characteristics ‘barbaric’, ‘hot-tem-
pered’ and ‘violent’.1 Thus, it is hardly astonishing that classical Western 
historiography on the nineteenth century almost forgot about the South 
and, until just a few years ago, concentrated on the great powers – Great 
Britain, France, Prussia, Austria and Russia.2 At the Congress of Vienna 
in 1814–15, these five countries as a political centre divided Europe into 
bully pulpits, which left no space for the former great powers of Spain 
and Portugal, the once powerful trading centres in the Italian peninsula, 
or the tottering Ottoman Empire. The master narrative suggested for a 
long time that there existed just one European model of modernization 
that was valid for the entire world. Normative progress in the form of 
modern constitutions could come only from the liberal Western powers 
of Great Britain and France, which had negotiated a new social contract 
between monarch and people. According to the political power centre in 
the North, the normative centre, too, was to be found there.3 Such uni-
lateral dichotomies of cultural and political transfers have only recently 
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been questioned.4 These discourses neglect to consider that the eventual 
peripheral South had quite independent answers for the challenges of 
the post-Napoleonic era and that one cannot apply only one concept of 
modernization to all socio-historical contexts even within Europe.5 Such 
judgements have been possible also because the 1820s revolutions failed 
mostly after very little time and were remembered, at most, as mere epi-
sodes in the history of the nineteenth century, or were simply ignored.6
This chapter focuses on the events of the European Mediterranean 
between 1812 and 1823 and tries to understand Europe ‘from the 
periphery’.7 It starts out from the assumption that in this period the 
Mediterranean revolutions sparked early liberalism, models of political 
representation and European constitutional thought in a distinctive way. 
With reference to Shmuel Eisenstadt’s idea of ‘multiple modernities’, it 
questions the hegemonic Western way of understanding modernity, by 
provincializing it.8 The peripheral European South generated particu-
lar modernization projects of its own. A  good example is the Spanish 
Constitution of 1812 that, by 1820–1, had been introduced in four coun-
tries: Spain, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, Portugal and Sardinia. 
Since this model had no major role in the Greek War of Independence 
against the Ottoman Empire, we will concentrate on the Iberian and 
Italian peninsulas. These transnational perspectives enable us not only 
to analyse European discourse, but also to identify transatlantic refer-
ences to the Americas, as well as the global implications of a revolution-
ary South that includes the Indian subcontinent and reaches as far as 
the Philippines.9
Firstly, this chapter will outline the situation of the region under 
consideration between the birth of the Spanish Constitution of 1812 and 
the end of the Napoleonic Empire in 1815. Secondly, it focuses on the 
Restoration years and opens up the European perspective on the trans-
atlantic Spanish and Portuguese colonies in Latin America, thus turning 
the Italian states into an ‘Atlantic periphery’.10 Then my focus will turn to 
the revolutions of the 1820s in southern Europe. By examining the press, 
diplomatic sources and exchanges between liberal exiles, the chapter 
will outline mechanisms of cultural and intellectual exchange between 
shifting centres and peripheries. Finally, dealing with the legacy of the 
Spanish constitutional model until 1848, the chapter will conclude that 
accounts of the nineteenth century should not be limited to the history of 
independence movements, nationalism and nation states, but that they 
need to include issues such as political participation, individual liberties 
and the role of written constitutions.
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1812: Spain’s ‘most progressive’ constitution
Traditionally, the beginnings of the modern age in Europe used to be 
linked to the Enlightenment. Although scholars nowadays increasingly 
question this equation,11 a turn to more self-reflectivity in all European 
societies of this period is evident. Even if characterized by different junc-
tures and characteristics, the Enlightenment gained acceptance not only 
among the intellectual and economic elites in France, Great Britain and 
the Holy Roman Empire, but also in Spain, Portugal, Naples and Sardinia. 
The same applies to the politics of enlightened reform and the search 
for alliances with other ‘enlightened’ monarchs. Meanwhile, before the 
French Revolution, hardly any monarch was willing to give up absolute 
sovereignty and to grant a written constitution – with the remarkable 
exception of the Habsburg ruler Pietro Leopoldo of Tuscany, although the 
European public learned of his achievements only long after his death, 
by 1825.12
The actual constitutional development in southern Europe 
was closely related to the foreign stimulus coming from Napoleon 
Bonaparte.13 While Piedmont was soon at the mercy of French interests, 
and fell victim to French imperial expansion, Naples experienced a short 
republican period, producing its own constitution in 1799, before being 
granted an authoritarian constitution based on the Statute of Bayonne 
under Napoleon’s brother-in-law Murat. In 1815 it was granted a new 
constitution based on the restoration of the monarchy. In content, all of 
these constitutions were far removed from the state’s political realities.14
As far as Portugal is concerned, the Braganza dynasty had already 
escaped to Brazil before the first of three invasion attempts starting in 
1808. Due to British protection of Portugal, Napoleon never succeeded 
in conquering the country completely and in 1811 he withdrew from 
the western part of the Iberian peninsula.15 The Congress of Vienna rec-
ognized the Braganzas’ new kingdom across the Atlantic, which was 
governed in personal union with the European mother country. The far 
bigger country on the peninsula, Spain, fell victim to the last stage of 
Napoleonic expansion in the Mediterranean. While the two Italian king-
doms, Piedmont-Sardinia and Naples, had to wait for independence until 
Napoleon’s fall, Spain, which was never completely occupied, defied 
French rule. In the Spanish War of Independence, the country’s intellec-
tual elites, who were very unhappy with the Bourbons’ timid reform poli-
cies, saw the opportunity to establish a new political order by means of a 
constitution.16 How could this happen?
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When the Bourbon King Charles  IV and his son Ferdinand  VII 
were quarrelling over the Spanish throne in 1808, Napoleon ordered 
his General Joaquin Murat to conquer the northern part of the 
Iberian peninsula. Once he reached this goal, Napoleon asked the 
two Bourbons to meet him at Bayonne in southern France. There, on 
5 May, he dictated diplomas of abdication to both of them, imposed 
the so-called Statute of Bayonne two months later, and installed his 
brother Joseph as José I on the Spanish throne. Napoleon’s interven-
tion proved to be an event of unparalleled consequences in Spanish 
constitutional history.17 Soon, large parts of the Spanish population 
began to put up resistance. Local juntas made a stand against the dep-
osition of their dynasty, and against the ongoing invasion by French 
troops, for two reasons: first, they supported their legitimate king, 
Ferdinand  VII; and second, they regarded the people’s fundamental 
right to co-decide in matters of succession as having been violated by 
Napoleon. Thanks to the new guerilla tactics of their army and with 
support from Britain, by 1813 Spain had managed to expel its French 
invaders. As a result of the people’s enthusiastic participation in the 
struggle for independence, the prospects for revolutionary and liberal 
ideas were promising. The power vacuum that briefly prevailed after 
the defeat of the French opened up the opportunity to establish a new 
order in Spain: a constitutional monarchy.18
In the microcosm of the occupied city of Cádiz, elected deputies 
from the free and occupied provinces and from overseas flocked together 
to discuss the future of their country. Generally, about one-third of 
this crowd can be ascribed to the first estate, only three per cent to the 
nobility and approximately two-thirds to the third estate. These socially 
rather well-off men referred to themselves by the traditional name of the 
Spanish parliament: the Cortes. Since there were enough representatives 
from all three estates, both from the cities as well as from the provinces, 
the Cortes could legitimately claim to constitute an assembly of delegates 
that represented the entire Spanish nation in both hemispheres.19 For the 
first time in Spanish history they decided, against the will of the royal-
ists, to meet in a single chamber that was constituted irrespective of class 
differences. The constituent Cortes declared, in their very first decree on 
24 March 1810, that they represented the sovereign will of the Spanish 
nation and that the envisioned constitution was to be based on the prin-
ciple of the separation of powers.20 Soon three groups emerged: liber-
als, royalists and Americans. Of these three, the liberals were by far the 
largest group. All groups discussed different constitutional models.21 In 
the end, on 19 March 1812, they promulgated a constitutional text that 
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combined elements from French, American and British constitutional 
thought along with historically Spanish traditions.22
Two more contemporary constitutional models were in circu-
lation in Europe at the time: the Sicilian constitution of 1812 and the 
French Charte constitutionnelle of 1814. Compared to these texts, the 
Constitution of Cádiz was by far the most complex as far as the diversity 
and multiplicity of theoretical influences is concerned.23 In the Sicilian 
case the project was based on an initiative by the British governor Lord 
William Bentinck, even if parliament played a central role. In France, the 
Charter was imposed by Louis XVIII. As a consequence, only in Spain did 
the nation flock together as the constituent power. Article Three declared 
that ‘sovereignty lies essentially with the nation’; no such mention 
existed in the Sicilian or French texts. The progressive character of the 
Spanish constitution is also reflected in its reference to universal male 
suffrage for Spanish citizens, while suffrage in Sicily and France was 
restricted by census. Nowhere else was parliament more powerful than 
in Spain, where the single chamber enjoyed far-reaching prerogatives. 
The Spanish parliament’s unique position was further strengthened by 
the fact that the king only had a suspensory veto and no right to dissolve 
parliament. Thus, compared to the Sicilian and the French models, the 
Spanish text was by far the most progressive.24 France’s Charte constitu-
tionnelle sought to balance the people’s sovereignty with monarchic abso-
lutism. As an octroi it emphasized the pre-eminence of the king, although 
it had to accept the essential result of the revolution that monarchical 
power was restricted by a constitution. The moderate Sicilian constitu-
tion, where the role of the king was weaker, has to be situated halfway 
between the two others.25
Among Spain’s several constitutions during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, the Constitution of Cádiz was the most progressive. 
Neither the Royal Statute of 1834 nor the constitutions of 1837 and 1845 
conceded similar power to parliament and nation. Only the constitution 
of 1869 got close to the Cádiz model, again by the exact designation of 
the text as the ‘Democratic Constitution of the Spanish Nation’ and the 
word-for-word copy of Article Three. However, contrary to the situation 
in 1869, in 1812 and 1820 no republican ideas were on the agenda. 
Likewise, during the first half of the nineteenth century, ‘democratic’ was 
still considered a swear word that liberal constitutionalists did not use. 
Only conservatives and absolutists, who were hostile to written consti-
tutions in principle, made frequent use of the term in order to denounce 
the danger of antimonarchic conspiracies and the potential of liberal con-
stitutions for encouraging social upheaval in post-Napoleonic Europe.26
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‘Restoration’ in southern Europe: Old empires  
and new peripheries
Historiography has characterized the years following the collapse of the 
Napoleonic Empire as the Restoration era. For the period from 1815 to 
1830, the term is misleading and offers no key to understanding nine-
teenth-century European history as a whole.27 Only in the Mediterra-
nean and in a few German states did the monarchs who had governed 
before Napoleon return, and almost everywhere monarchical rule had 
to adapt to new conditions.28 Recent studies question the conventional 
dichotomy of revolution and restoration, describing the relation between 
the two in more nuanced ways.29 For instance, Brian Vick stresses that 
such bipolar schemes, referring to the period following the Congress of 
Vienna, are of little explanatory value. Instead, he underlines the multi-
faceted process by which a new international order emerged, one charac-
terized by a multilateral European dimension.30 Similarly, new research 
on Spain relates the return of the Bourbons in Madrid to developments 
elsewhere in Europe.31 After all, the old colonial powers of Portugal and 
Spain remained imperial states with territories in both hemispheres – 
although after the Napoleonic expansion and the Spanish War of Inde-
pendence they struggled with their colonies’ fight for independence in 
Latin America.
If we now look at the Congress of Vienna, and at the aims pursued 
by the centre (namely the European great powers) towards the periph-
ery (i.e. southern Europe), we note a ‘policy of security’ that was defen-
sive and constructive at the same time.32 Analysing the Treaty of Paris 
of May 1814, three agreements concerning Spain, Portugal and the 
Italian states have to be mentioned: the rollback of French borders to the 
state of 1 January 1792 Art. III); the reconfiguration of Italy into inde-
pendent states (Art. VI); and the restitution of Santo Domingo to Spain 
(Art. VIII).33 At the Congress of Vienna there was no Italian, Portuguese 
or Spanish commission. In the conference proceedings of 8 June 1815, 
twenty articles of the fifth paragraph deal exhaustively with Italian 
affairs. Among the most important results were the enlargement of 
Sardinia to include Genoa (Art.  85–90), the Austrian expansion into 
northern Italy (Art.  93–5) and the return of the Habsburg secundog-
enitures – Habsburg-Lorraine, Habsburg d’Este and Bourbon-Parma in 
Modena, Massa and Carrara, Parma and Piacenza, as well as in Tuscany 
(Art.  98–100). Furthermore, the Spanish infanta Maria Luisa received 
the principality of Lucca (Art. 101–2) and the Papal State was restored 
 TURnInG ConsTITUTIonAl HIsToRY UPsIDE Down 117
as a stabilizing factor in the Italian peninsula (Art. 103). The Bourbon 
Ferdinand IV returned to his throne in Naples and ruled from now on as 
King Ferdinand I of the Two Sicilies (Art. 104), with Naples as the capital, 
turning Sicily into a peripheral position within the new kingdom. Three 
articles of the sixth paragraph (Art. 105–7) dealt with Portugal and its 
relationship to France. It settled the return of Olivenza by Spain and of 
French Guyana.34 Portugal was one of the signatories of both the Treaties 
of Paris and the Vienna Final Act, whereas Spain was so upset that its 
demands for Parma, Piacenza und Guastalla had been ignored that its 
minister plenipotentiary, Pedro Gómez de Labrador, refused to sign the 
Act (which King Ferdinand VII belatedly did in 1817).
In the field of European high politics, the Italian states, Portugal 
and Spain indeed found themselves in a peripheral situation, because 
they were excluded from the most important decisions made by the 
four victorious powers plus France, and participated in the Congress of 
Vienna simply as signatory powers of second rank.35 Although the inde-
pendence of all southern European states was formally re-established in 
1814–15, the great powers preserved considerable informal influence, 
southern Italy being the most evident example. Here, Vienna and King 
Ferdinand of the Two Sicilies agreed on a secret treaty to grant Austria 
the right of military intervention in case the internal conditions of the 
southernmost kingdom should change in a revolutionary way.36 Neither 
in Spain nor in Sardinia, where the Bourbon Ferdinand VII and the Savoy 
Victor Emanuel  I re-ascended to their thrones in spring 1814, were 
similar arrangements to be found. Nonetheless, both states remained 
in the French geostrategic sphere of influence, whereas Britain, as an 
imperial sea power, performed a similar function in Portugal and in the 
Mediterranean’s insular and maritime provinces – the southern Italian 
ones in particular.37
Turning towards Latin America, it has to be stressed that ‘consti-
tutionalism was, essentially, an Atlantic phenomenon’, because both 
Spanish and Latin American deputies had given birth to Hispanic lib-
eralism, which combined enlightened with Catholic elements.38 The 
constitution of 1812 played an important role during the first constitu-
tional period, but a minor one in the second. Despite treating Spanish 
citizens as equal concerning taxation (Art.  339), its abstract ideals 
were hardly implemented in practical politics, neither during the years 
1812–14, nor during the revolution of 1820–3. Furthermore, people of 
African origin in the colonies were mostly excluded from citizenship, 
and slavery continued to exist until the end of the nineteenth century. 
Thus, the colonies continued to find themselves in a peripheral position 
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towards their European motherland and, starting with the Spanish War 
of Independence against Napoleon, most of them tried to fight for their 
own independence. Within the framework of this short chapter we 
cannot summarize the manifold regional consequences of these move-
ments for the Spanish constitution in the colonies. It should be enough 
to state that even though all Hispanic revolutions started in the absence 
of a king, their constitutional debates and handling of the Cádiz model 
of 1812 were far from linear or homogeneous.39 
It is remarkable that Portuguese Brazil maintained the imperial 
political system of the ancien regime until 1821. Unlike in the Spanish 
colonies, in Portuguese Brazil there were hardly any demands for an 
independent kingdom or for constitutional liberties; and there were no 
fights between republicans and royalists. This is usually explained by 
the transfer of the Portuguese court to Rio de Janeiro, meaning that the 
Braganza dynasty was present – historically a unique reversal of the tra-
ditional relationship between metropole and colony.40 In other words, 
periphery did not mean periphery forever. This scenario implied that in 
contrast to the Spanish territories, in the case of the Portuguese Empire 
the emergence of centrifugal forces in the provinces could be avoided, 
creating a sense of Brazilian unity at a time when many Portuguese in 
the motherland felt abandoned. Contrary to most former Spanish col-
onies that chose a republican form of government, Brazil opted for a 
monarchical government in 1822 that lasted until the end of the Empire 
in 1889.41 Ultimately, the Atlantic region might be best defined as a 
huge laboratory for a variety of open-ended political experiments.42
Returning to the chapter’s initial argument about the Restoration 
period, in the case of the Mediterranean we suggest talking about res-
torations in the plural, that did not follow any monolithic principle. On 
the one hand, monarchical legitimacy – i.e. divine rights related to the 
recognition of the hereditary succession from one sovereign to the next, 
with the approval of the international community – regained accept-
ance.43 On the other hand, in several cases the restoration of the former 
dynasties was the result of specific conditions such as Napoleon’s brief 
return to power. Concerning the return to the more general conditions 
of pre-Napoleonic Europe, the answer has to be even more nuanced: 
while in Madrid and Turin an absolutist revival turned back the clock 
to pre-revolutionary times, in the Two Sicilies many administrative and 
judicial reforms remained in force. In addition, in all three kingdoms the 
Napoleonic experience had left an impact on people that could not be 
extinguished by one brushstroke. If we do not insist on a mere consti-
tutional definition of restoration, but take into consideration social and 
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cultural agents, it makes little sense to talk about a ‘Restoration’ in the 
singular; and nowhere in Europe do we see a  general rollback to the 
ancien regime.44
The first post-Napoleonic revolutionary wave
It seems justified to ask whether, after Napoleon, a harmonious order of 
peace in Europe could be achieved without violence; or if violence was 
not a desired aim and an instrument to counteract violent changes. By 
establishing a new equilibrium at the centre of the continent, did mon-
archs and politicians not merely risk moving the outbreak of violence 
to the periphery? At least in southern Europe in 1820–1, Metternich’s 
strategy to prevent revolutions through reform politics had failed. Fur-
thermore, in February 1820, Charles-Ferdinand d’Artois, Duc de Berry, 
a potential heir to the French throne, fell victim to an antimonarchical 
attack.45
In the German Confederation and in Britain, the authorities were 
mostly successful in avoiding uprisings and the spread of terrorist 
attacks. Exceptions were the assassination of the writer and diplomat 
(then in the Russian service) August von Kotzebue, or larger protests 
such as at Peterloo in 1819, or the Cato Street conspiracy in 1820, which 
was directed against the entire British Cabinet and may well have turned 
into a proper revolution.
However, after Simón Bolívar and other insurgents took advantage 
of the unstable situation in Europe and established independent repub-
lics in Latin America, a new cycle of revolutions began hitting Europe. In 
Spain, on 1 January 1820, troops meant to suppress the turmoil in the 
colonies, rebelled in in Cádiz. Spain was followed by the Two Sicilies, 
Portugal and Sardinia, as well as by the south-eastern parts of the Balkans 
that belonged to the Ottoman Empire. The fact that the European periph-
ery had been defeated during the Napoleonic Wars, but now propagated 
liberty and constitutionalism, reveals the fragility of the arrangements 
undertaken by the victorious powers at Vienna.
These signs of political unrest, over a period of fifteen months, were 
nourished by increasing discontent over the politics of absolutist govern-
ments among large parts of the population. Social and economic factors 
such as the high price of bread – the result of a famine following the 
climatic crisis after the eruption of the Tambora in Indonesia in 1815 – 
had particularly severe consequences for the essentially agricultural 
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southern European societies.46 Similarly dramatic for public finances was 
Portugal’s and Spain’s loss of most of their transatlantic colonies, since 
the mother countries were used to gaining high profits from overseas. 
Deprived of imperial trade, they no longer knew how to handle their 
debts.47 In addition, the experiences of the French Revolution and of the 
Napoleonic era had made people aware that they had enjoyed superior 
forms of government before. The Spanish liberal Álvaro Flórez Estrada 
wrote to King Ferdinand  VII from his London exile: ‘Today there is no 
craftsman or agricultural worker who would not long for any change of 
government, because he recognizes that the current government has lost 
its entire moral strength, because it only has the power to do bad and 
because it is impotent and void concerning the benefit for society.’48
Liberal movements in the western hemisphere identified the soci-
etal benefits of extensive modernization associated with rationalized 
bureaucracies, liberalized economic activity, political participation, inde-
pendent academic institutions, freedom of the press and the increase of 
literacy among the masses. In order to express their demand for substan-
tial reforms, they organised their discontent in many ways. In Spain, one 
pronunciamiento followed another without showing results. These highly 
formalized coups d’état by military means envisioned the establishment 
of a more liberal political order. In the Italian states and Portugal, essen-
tially military secret societies such as the Carbonari, Federati and o Sinédrio 
re inforced their activities. In southern Italy, the Murattiani, the former 
administrative and military elites of the Napoleonic period, espoused a lib-
eral and constitutional form of government. Thus, parts of the army, first 
of all officers who were at the same time highly educated members of the 
secret societies, together with parts of the petty bourgeoisie, landowners 
and tradesmen, now claimed political participation. They justified their 
demands by reference to their strongly increased economic influence. In 
Sardinia, the same applied to young aristocrats. However, in all of these 
cases the decisive factor was the army, where liberal officers took the lead 
and proclaimed constitutions, while riding across the country, initially 
with just a few hundred men.49 According to Metternich, the idea of the 
army as an institution of political modernization constituted a far more 
fatal development than speeches in constitutional parliaments.50
No revolutions broke out in the capitals, where complacent old 
men were often involved in the same solidified elite circles for decades, 
but they did in the provinces, i.e. in the respective peripheries. This is 
hardly astonishing if one considers the fragmented, but essentially agrar-
ian, social and economic structure of southern Europe. After 1815, more 
than two-thirds of the population still worked in the primary sector. 
 TURnInG ConsTITUTIonAl HIsToRY UPsIDE Down 121
Meanwhile, agriculture and the agrarian elites witnessed during that 
period a real boom due to the permanently increasing prices for their 
products. In addition, the provincial elites benefited from the end of 
feudalism, which brought a paradigm shift from privilege to merit. 
Intimately connected with the increase in power for the provincial nota-
bles was a new individualism that resulted in political demands to protect 
private property and civil rights. Similar to the arguments espoused by 
Marta Petrusewicz in the introductory section of this book, and contrary 
to the unbridled Manchester liberalism reigning in much of northern 
Europe, southern European societies opted for a slow and gradual mod-
ernization, preserving social hierarchies, traditions and local knowledge. 
This essentially local and regional character contributed significantly to 
the peacefulness of the revolutions, which were almost without violence 
and not directed against the ruling monarchs. The character of these 
movements constitutes a central argument against the stress on nation-
ally motivated acts of violence related to ‘essentially European terrorism 
between 1817 and 1825’.51
Referring in this context to the term ‘national’ requires some brief 
remarks about the nation state as an alleged telos and a political leitmotiv 
during the early nineteenth century. In the case of the two old empires, 
Spain and Portugal, the transformation into nation states shows several 
peculiarities. Spain changed from a Catholic monarchy to a Catholic 
nation, where the legitimation of power did not simply derive from 
divine right but from sovereignty shared between monarch and citizens. 
This arrangement was guaranteed by the written constitution.52 In the 
Portuguese case, constitutional change was linked to the transfer of the 
court to Brazil.53 In many Latin American countries a sense of national 
identity did not emerge before the middle of the nineteenth century.54 
The same applies to Portugal and Spain, where a national consciousness 
only emerged in response to the dissolution of the empire.55 In the Italian 
case, the idea of the nation state as it emerged in 1861 was largely con-
structed teleologically, after unification. Sardinia, around 1820, at best 
envisioned the unification of northern with central Italy. The majority 
of the people of the Two Sicilies regarded southern Italy as their nation 
and responded to the Risorgimento with a peripheral sense of patriotism. 
Moreover, they struggled against a violent Sicilian separatism. At most 
they imagined an Italian confederation of states presided over by the 
Pope. Thus, national discourse was largely based on local and regional 
identities.56
The Spanish pronunciamiento of January 1820 aimed at reinstating 
the Constitution of 1812. Other constitutions were hardly discussed. The 
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Charte constitutionnelle was opposed due to anti-French prejudices. The 
moderate liberal elites in Naples, Lisbon and Turin – foremost among them 
the Murattiani and young noblemen around the young intellectual Cesare 
Balbo – supported a constitutional model along French or British-Sicilian 
lines, but soon had to give way to the pressures of secret societies to accept 
as their model the Spanish Constitution of 1812. Following the Spanish 
War of Independence against Napoleon the reputation of this document 
had assumed almost mythical dimensions, as Balbo has pointed out: ‘The 
Spanish Constitution was the slogan, the name, the flag around which all 
liberal opinions, the liberal hopes of Italy gathered together’.57
Although the revolutionary elites relied not on democratic radi-
calism but on legitimate dynasties in order to realize their political pro-
jects, the four monarchs on the Iberian and Italian peninsulas shared a 
considerable disdain for constitutional forms of government. However, 
we can observe important differences between them in the run-up to 
the proclamation of the constitution. Ferdinand VII took the lead in the 
constitutional movement – against his own conviction, but following the 
State Council – by saying: ‘I swore to this constitution that you desired 
and I will always be its strongest supporting pillar … Let us go on sin-
cerely, and me first, on the constitutional path.’58 His uncle in Naples, 
Ferdinand I, dissociated himself from the constitutional regime, by vest-
ing his son Francis with official duties. John VI of Portugal returned to 
Lisbon only reluctantly and after parliament had urged him to take the 
oath on the constitution. After that, his son Peter – left behind in Rio de 
Janeiro, the ‘tropical Versailles’,59 – proclaimed the Empire of Brazil to be 
independent and became head of state. In the end, Victor Emanuel I in 
Turin was the only monarch to retain his anti-constitutional attitude, and 
he abdicated in favour of his brother Carl Felix. The Italian and Spanish 
monarchs reached out to the European great powers to seek the quickest 
possible end to constitutional government.
Taken together, there are five points which seem to confirm the 
peripheral situation of these southern European countries prior to the 
revolutions of 1820.60 Firstly, geography and topography conditioned 
a peripheral position at the edge of Europe, although Portugal and 
Spain remained transatlantic colonial powers even after the emergence 
of independence movements in Latin America. Secondly, in economic 
terms, southern Europe remained essentially agrarian and did not pro-
duce many high-quality consumer goods for export. With the increas-
ing loss of their colonies, raw material resources and other sources for 
revenue collapsed. Thirdly, regarding political conditions, the formally 
independent countries of Portugal, Spain, Sardinia and the Two Sicilies 
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became part of the informal influence spheres of the great powers – 
France, Britain and Austria – resulting in a loss of sovereignty. Fourthly, 
concerning the prerequisites of an extensive modernization of society, 
the future did not look very rosy in view of weak governmental and 
administrative structures. Finally, there was their socially peripheral 
situation, which was due to an almost total lack of the middle classes, 
which explains why agrarian elites continued to play such an important 
role in the modernization of southern Europe.
The main problem of the period 1815–20 consisted in the fact that 
urgently needed administrative, infrastructural, economic, political and 
judicial reforms, which leading European politicians such as Metternich 
demanded, were only partially and reluctantly introduced. Therefore, 
there seemed to be no other solution than revolution to modernize soci-
ety. Paying reference to a pivotal historical event such as the Spanish 
War of Independence, heroes such as Rafael del Riego in Spain led the 
southern European revolutions to a temporary success, suddenly turning 
Europe’s periphery into a centre of change.
Modernization from the periphery: The Cádiz 
constitution and the Mediterranean revolutions, 1820–3
In what ways did the constitutional monarchies seek international recog-
nition for their revolutionary path to modernization? At least three lev-
els can be identified: first, they worked through the international press; 
second, they sought direct and indirect diplomatic support for their new 
regimes; and third, they participated in the transnational networks of 
secret and patriotic societies, joining other European liberals, especially 
in Spain and Greece, in order to support their fight for liberty, independ-
ence and constitutionalism.61
The press and public opinion in the southern European kingdoms 
identified numerous parallels and connections between the revolutions. 
Meanwhile, with regard to the revolutionary process, different countries 
ascribed different roles to themselves and to each other. Liberal Spain saw 
itself as the pioneer of the constitutional movement in the Mediterranean 
and stressed the revolutions’ moderate character, distancing itself clearly 
from extreme ideas and violence: ‘These are the maxims that will bring 
the Neapolitans security in their institutions, peace in their villages, 
dignity for the nation, the respect and appreciation of Europe. These 
are also the maxims that will guide the Portuguese to be happier and to 
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be respected.’62 Journalists in the Two Sicilies emphasized the Spanish 
Constitution’s role as a model for civilized political and constitutional 
change,63 but also underlined the rapid success of their own revolution.64 
Revolutionaries in the Kingdom of Sardinia worked towards an imminent 
uprising in the whole of Italy, which in the long term should lead to the 
unification of the entire peninsula. It was for the aim of national unifica-
tion that Cesare Balbo opposed a revolutionary strategy, as well as the 
implementation of the Spanish Constitution of 1812.65 The Piedmontese 
liberals assigned themselves an essential role in the transformation of 
Italy and southern Europe, which presented the basis for their role on the 
even bigger European stage.66
Enemies of the revolutions in Europe were clearly aware of the 
events’ international and transnational dimension. The Piedmontese 
consul-general in Tunis, Luigi Filippi, complained in 1822 that with their 
revolutionary ambitions the liberals would teach all of Europe princi-
ples such as independence, liberty and equality, thus nurturing rebellion 
and anarchy. The liberals’ biggest offence consisted in having divided 
the monarchs from their loyal subjects and in having initiated reforms 
by way of radical revolutionary uprisings.67 Many contemporaries made 
similar observations, underlining the principle behind all of these upris-
ings, ‘that contagious spirit of democratic swindle which … puts social 
peace at risk’.68 Meanwhile, they seemed unable to prove the widespread 
theory that these networks of European liberals worked by a perfidious 
plan of French agitators and diplomats to start constitutional revolutions 
in the European periphery, which were in turn to spread across the conti-
nent.69 The same applies to Metternich’s conviction that they were fight-
ing a well-organized, disciplined and monolithic secret society that was 
responsible for the revolution in Europe as a whole.70
As controversial as the press and public opinion was diplomacy. 
Similar to the views prevailing in Vienna, at the congresses of Troppau, 
Laibach and Verona the representatives of the Two Sicilies, the Duke of 
Campochiaro and Prince Cariati, both of them Murattiani, opposed the 
two legitimist representatives of Ferdinand I, Cardinal Ruffo and Prince 
Serra-Capriola. Contrary to the situation in 1814–15 in 1820–1 the consti-
tutional monarchists found themselves in the position of having to defend 
themselves and were not received by Metternich. Most other European 
courts also denied the liberal Neapolitan delegates accreditation. Even if 
they started their duties as representatives of their government, they were 
often isolated or found themselves in trouble regarding the gathering of 
information or communication with their respective capitals, as was the 
case for the Neapolitan envoy Troiano Pescara in Turin, the consequence 
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of direct Austrian intervention.71 Thus, foreign secretary Campochiaro 
had to find other public and secret channels for making Naples’ voice 
heard in Europe.72
The liberals in northern and southern Italy received designated dip-
lomatic support from Spanish ambassadors in both Naples and Turin, Luis 
de Onís and Eugenio Bardají. However, this commitment came too late, 
because already in Troppau the great powers had agreed on the inter-
vention principle. On the other hand, recommendations and statements 
of solidarity usually remained mere lip service.73 Concerted actions by 
Spanish, French and Bavarian diplomats – all representatives of consti-
tutional monarchies – to introduce liberal constitutions in the Italian 
states on a permanent basis remained unsuccessful.74 The Piedmontese 
envoys in Madrid (Antonino Brignole Sale and Vittorio Balbo Bertone 
di Sambuy) and Naples (Raimondo de Quesada, Earl of San Saturnino/
Clemente Solaro della Margherita) watched the events closely. They 
criticized the Spanish Revolution as an arbitrary act by a few thousand 
men directed against their monarch. In the case of the Two Sicilies they 
were aiming for a more restrained modification of the constitution.75 The 
ambassadors of the Two Sicilies in Turin and Madrid (Troiano Pescara 
and Andrea Coppola, Duke of Canzano) were hoping for an anti-Aus-
trian uprising all over Italy and for open Spanish support in international 
circles.76
Italian and Spanish secret or patriotic societies represented the 
third transnational element behind these events. Alongside the huge 
constitutional debate in Italy and all over Europe at the time, translations 
of constitutions, the publication of constitutional commentaries and of 
constitutional catechisms contributed to the exchange of liberal ideas in 
Europe and beyond. The agitation among liberal exiles everywhere in 
Europe formed the climax of this public debate in the Mediterranean. 
From early 1821 onwards, Italians moved the Carboneria to Spain, 
where they made plans for actions at home and in 1823 fought along-
side Spanish liberals against the French intervention. In addition to 
serving their personal interests as exiles, they thus displayed practical 
international solidarity. Spain received them benevolently and granted 
them financial aid. The Spanish integrated the Italian liberals into their 
constitutional army, founded new patriotic societies and supported their 
extensive journalistic work.77 Thanks to the help of his friend the Spanish 
diplomat Luis de Onís, the protagonist of the Neapolitan revolution, 
Guglielmo Pepe, managed to escape the death penalty and flee to Spain, 
where the inhabitants of Barcelona welcomed him triumphantly.78 Many 
Neapolitan and Piedmontese liberals received similar aid. Narciso Nada 
126 RE-MAPPInG CEnTRE AnD PERIPHERY
counted more than a thousand people, of whom most were radicals and 
chose Spain for exile, whereas a moderate and less compromised minor-
ity fled to France, Britain, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands and 
other European countries.79
Most recent studies have emphasized the importance of the Italian, 
Spanish and Portuguese experience of exile for the development of 
national identity at home, as well as the influence of the different host 
countries on the exiles’ intellectual biographies. The international and 
cosmopolitan background of these people, their mobility and their 
multilingual background, contributed significantly to the emergence 
of a liberal, patriotic, and to some extent republican political culture in 
Europe and Latin America. In particular this was the case in hotspots 
like London and Paris, but also on the other side of the Atlantic.80 This 
background also explains why a majority of these liberals did not accept 
the borders imposed in 1815, and why many of them thought beyond 
their own national background. For many of them it seemed obvious 
that the domestic political order could only be overcome within a bigger 
international context.81 When Spain as the South’s last bastion of pro-
gressive constitutionalism fell in 1823 – in the two Italian states this had 
happened as early as 1821 – the only field of transnational activism for 
European liberals remained the Greek War of Independence against the 
Ottoman Empire.82
Cádiz‘s legacy: The ratio of constitutional modernization 
between periphery and centre
Even today, the events of the 1820s in southern Europe are – if at all – 
described disparagingly as skirmishes, riots or revolts that seem insignif-
icant due to their short lifespan.83 Such assessments, however, misjudge 
the importance of these revolutions led by a generation of Europeans that 
had come of age during the years of the Napoleonic Wars. This period 
of constitutional government started with the first parliamentary elec-
tions based on almost universal male suffrage. In Portugal, the liberals 
borrowed the electoral law of the Spanish Constitution and, by  February 
1821, had produced a proper ‘Political Constitution’, while the parlia-
ment of the Two Sicilies, by January 1821, and in coordination with 
the king, adapted its constitution to the specific needs of the kingdom. 
In Portugal, the Spanish model seemed to attract interest everywhere, 
until the revolutionary movement had reached its goal of reforming the 
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political system and of making Lisbon once more the political centre of 
the Portuguese Empire. Only in Sardinia, in the short time before the rev-
olution’s suppression, was no substantial constitutional change granted, 
though even here the liberation of the press allowed for a brief flour-
ishing of public debate. Although the constitutional period in southern 
Europe lasted for only a few months or years, and was far from being 
free of tensions, for the liberal elites in capital cities and provincial towns 
democratization and parliamentarization remained central features of 
political debate, with the result that at the next opportunity, in the 1830s 
and 1840s, the protagonists of these events were prepared to stand up 
again for political and individual rights, and for written constitutions.84
The works of historians such as John Davis and Marta Petrusewicz 
confirm these views. On the one hand, they stress the continuity of insti-
tutional, judicial and economic reforms under the Bourbons before, dur-
ing and after French rule. On the other hand, they question older ideas of 
a passive Italian South and underline the contribution to these reforms 
precisely by the southern intellectual and administrative elites.85 For this 
reason, the revolutions of 1820–1 should be interpreted as an attempt to 
translate the controversial political legacy of the French Revolution into 
constitutional liberties. This would be far more than just ‘the last dream 
of a generation’, as the liberal philosopher Benedetto Croce argued.86
Only once a new type of modern constitution arrived in Europe, 
in the form of the revised French Charte constitutionnelle of 1830 and 
the Belgian Constitution of 1831, did the influence of the Cádiz model 
decline. These new constitutions reconciled liberalism and Catholicism, 
as well as the relationship between parliament and monarch.87 After a 
last brief intermezzo of its 1812 Constitution, even Spain introduced this 
new type of constitution in 1837. Meanwhile, the memory of the Spanish 
model in Europe lived on, for instance during reflections about a possible 
revival of the Constitution of the Two Sicilies during the Revolution of 
1848.88 Only with this last, bigger and more effective revolutionary wave 
did the first liberal constitutional model of the nineteenth century begin 
to fall into oblivion.89
Taken together, the events of 1820–3 in southern Europe should 
be read as forerunners of liberal constitutional revolutions for the entire 
continent, happening in countries that did not pause passively at the 
periphery of Europe, but took the initiative for themselves. They adopted 
this stance while Britain and France were struggling for world domina-
tion, and within the context of a crisis of the Iberian monarchies that 
lasted for decades. Although Portugal and Spain had left the narrow 
circle of great powers, and the Italian states remained under Austrian 
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domination for almost another fifty years, recent studies suggest that 
these Mediterranean countries did not merely stand at the edge of 
great power politics.90 The foreign and domestic policies of the pent-
archy counteracted the revolutionary emancipation movements in the 
Mediterranean, while also benefiting from the inner conflicts and emerg-
ing civil wars within the revolutionary countries. Generational conflicts 
between older Bonapartists and younger radicals as well as anti-imperial 
emancipation movements further weakened the revolutions. Ultimately, 
the ‘Vienna Settlement’ survived its first test. Meanwhile, the great pow-
ers soon started to act more flexibly, as demonstrated by the fact that 
they intervened in Spain and in the Italian states, while standing aside in 
the cases of Portugal and Greece. On the one hand, the European pent-
archy led by Metternich succeeded in suppressing revolutions through its 
conference policy, and until 1848 it prevented the formation of constitu-
ent assemblies in Spain and the Italian states. From this point of view one 
might describe the Congress system as an experience anticipating ideas 
and institutions such as the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations, 
the United Nations or the European Union.91 On the other hand, crushing 
the revolutions encouraged the use of violence, radical action and sub-
version in southern Europe for years to come. There were no means for 
peaceful conflict resolution. Europe’s leading politicians failed to perma-
nently establish any such organizations. Instead, the ‘principles of 1789’, 
which had resulted in twenty-five years of revolution and warfare, con-
tinued to guide European politics.
Coinciding with the revolutions of 1820–3, we observe a first wave 
of transnational liberalism that over the following decades would grow 
in importance. The experience of exile represents a general pattern of 
this generation. Consequently, this informal Liberal International, which 
was the direct result of the patriots’ mobility for political and military 
purposes, became a haven of cosmopolitan as well as national ideas. 
With respect to recent comparative and transnational studies, I suggest 
sharpening the focus conceptually to discuss a specific Mediterranean 
liberalism of the 1820s and 1830s.92 It was tied together by a sense of 
friendship and solidarity, political kinship and empathy, the endeav-
our for constitutions, civil rights and parliaments. The exiles shared the 
experience of battles in the Iberian peninsula or Greece, and ideologi-
cal bonds such as patriotism and the fight for independence and against 
absolutism. The liberal exiles did not want crowned heads to roll; they 
aimed for constitutional monarchies and parliamentary participation. 
The failure of the Mediterranean liberal movements contributed to the 
discourse of decline and degeneration of Southern societies, which in 
 TURnInG ConsTITUTIonAl HIsToRY UPsIDE Down 129
turn inspired the Romantic movement. Meanwhile, if we turn our gaze 
from the much-studied politics of the great powers to the global revolu-
tionary South in the 1820s and 1830s, reaching from Latin America and 
southern Europe to Asia, we perceive ‘a history of democracy and plural-
ism’ that contrasts with the narrow view of conflicts and ruptures.93 Of 
course, there was no single revolution in the 1820s, which suggests that 
in intellectual history we have to ‘privilege contexts over ideas’.94
As a consequence, it should be possible to rethink the categories 
of centre and periphery in the age of revolutions, the origins of political 
modernity in Europe, and the question of how liberty and constitutional 
government, as well as social and political change, could be achieved 
by legal means. If one accepts and takes seriously this challenge, rather 
surprising perspectives appear, as the example of the Mediterranean 
revolutions of the 1820s shows. In this constellation, from a Southern 
perspective, the continent suddenly resembles the image its former col-
onies have themselves made of Europe. Not only does eurocentrism as 
such appear in a different light, but also the idea of a European centre 
of gravity formed by Britain, France and the German states is put into 
question. Conventional spatial hierarchies collide here with asymmetric 
power relations, requiring a more differentiated analysis. At long last the 
voices of the losers of history emerge over the grand narratives that have 
traditionally been written by the great and powerful, by the victors of 
history.
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The Cosmopolitan Morphology 
of the National Discourse : Italy as 




The idea of Europe has always been a prominent topic of reflection for 
Italian authors. Dante Alighieri, in the Paradiso of his Divina Commedia, 
highlighted how Europa took upon herself the burden of bringing her 
peoples together under the banner of Christianity,1 a  view appearing, 
with even greater force, in De Monarchia.2 Already in the fourteenth cen-
tury, the identification of the geographical boundaries of the continent 
went hand in hand with reflections on the coexistence and, often, the 
unity of its peoples. Later on, the Protestant Reformation, political frag-
mentation and the division of Europe into nation states challenged views 
depicting Europe as a unitary, organic entity. Federico Chabod, author 
of the Storia dell’idea di Europa, reminds us of the clash between cosmo-
politan ideals and the genesis of national unification projects, suggesting 
that the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries revealed the emergence 
of significant asymmetries among the European nations, concerning 
their engagement with the idea of Europe.3 Similarly, Benedetto Croce, 
who published Storia d’Europa nel secolo decimonono in 1932, provided 
a sharp analysis of the Risorgimento as an age of nationalisms, point-
ing out that these thwarted, if not completely defeated, cosmopolitan 
enthusiasms.4
Croce’s argument, initially formulated in the immediate aftermath 
of World War I, is powerful and accurate in its simplicity: the nineteenth 
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century, especially after the Restoration, witnessed the proliferation 
of various, often conflicting, worldviews and political doctrines, most 
notably clericalism, monarchic absolutism, democratic ideals and 
communism. These ideals, appearing to different extents in the vari-
ous European countries, being so closely tied with the articulation of a 
national and nationalist discourse, called into question people’s belief in 
the cultural unity and, possibly, political homogeneity of Europe.
While Croce saw the Risorgimento as characterized by a ten-
sion between nationalisms and the European ideal, Gramsci proposed 
a different interpretation, focused on how foreign ideas and events, 
most notably the French Revolution, had an impact on the process of 
Italian unification: ‘the origin of the Risorgimento’, he claimed in his 
Quaderni dal carcere, ‘namely the formation process of the conditions 
and the international relations allowing Italy to unite itself as a nation … 
should not be searched in this or that concrete event taking place on 
a given date, but in the very historical transformation process of the 
European system’.5 Gramsci’s statement was exceptionally significant: 
on the one hand, it cemented the idea of the Italian Risorgimento as a 
transnational, i.e. European, phenomenon, encouraging the study of 
this period so as to take into account the interplay of numerous endoge-
nous and external factors; on the other hand, it hinted at the possibility 
of challenging the tension between nationalism and European ideals by 
establishing that the quest for the articulation of an Italian national iden-
tity was intimately connected with the negotiation of the country’s posi-
tion in the life of modern European nations.6 An approach of this kind 
inevitably contributed to the systematic rethinking of the asymmetrical 
relation between Italy and Europe, eroding notions of social and cultural 
backwardness and fully exploring an ideal of a unified Italy as a centre of 
European modernity.
Scholarship on the Risorgimento has, in recent years, contributed 
to an understanding of this period that goes beyond the mere analysis 
of political and socio-economic conditions, drawing attention to the 
specific, context-bound outillage mental, namely the constellation of 
discursive practices notionally belonging to the wider cultural and phil-
osophical spheres, reflecting inclinations and concerns of the local intel-
lectual landscape. In consequence, challenging the asymmetry between 
Europe and Italy entails the need to investigate the presence of a cos-
mopolitan sensitivity not only in Italian political thought, but also – and 
perhaps more importantly – in the broader cultural debates and philo-
sophical attitudes of the decades preceding the unification. In short, the 
rethinking of the asymmetrical relation between Italy and Europe in the 
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nineteenth century has to begin with a more compelling understanding 
of their encounter: one that is focused on the transnational morphology 
of the unitary discourse.
Italy and Europe: An asymmetrical encounter
One may wonder why the relationship between Italy and Europe in the 
nineteenth century could be deemed ‘asymmetrical’. This can be illus-
trated by hard data: according to at least one interpretive model of the 
Risorgimento, namely one that engages primarily with socio-economic 
indicators, Italy was undoubtedly the laggard of Europe. Often errone-
ously attributed to Massimo D’Azeglio, the famous statement highlight-
ing the need to ‘make the Italians’ after Italy had been ‘made’ after 1861, 
captured the nature of the challenges the new government was called 
to address, as it famously reflected the social ills and divisions of the 
period. Illiteracy amounted to a dramatic 75 per cent, and inhabitants 
of the South still referred to their northern neighbours as forestieri. This 
is striking if one compares these numbers with Britain, where the Vic-
torian ‘obsession’ with education had boosted literacy rates to 75.4 per 
cent for men and 65.3 per cent for women in 1861.7 On the eve of the 
Franco-Prussian war, thanks to the efforts to promote mass literacy, 77 
per cent of French men and 67 per cent of French women were able to 
read and write,8 with the gender gap being fully closed in the following 
years. Moreover, when Germany was unified in 1871, the literacy rate of 
the population amounted to 88 per cent.9
In 1861, only 2 per cent of the Italian population had a right to vote: 
crippled by a debt of 2.5 billion lire, Italy’s wealth and political organiza-
tion did not match those of other European nations. In the same years, 
Victorian Britain was enjoying economic prosperity and was about to 
approve the 1867 Reform Act, doubling the size of the electorate from one 
to two million people. The average income of Italian citizens was half that 
of their British contemporaries and a third of the French. Infrastructure, 
especially in the south of the peninsula, was scarce: in 1861, Italy’s rail-
way system extended for 2,400 kilometres, while the Austrian Empire’s 
exceeded 3,000 kilometres, France’s 9,000 kilometres, Germany’s 11,000 
kilometres and Britain’s 14,600 kilometres.10 Despite Italy’s advantageous 
geographical position, it suffered from severe insufficiencies in maritime 
transport, with the French able to move twice and Britain eight times 
the tonnage of the Italian fleet. Energy production was problematic, too: 
while industrialized Britain could rely on the production of 85 million 
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tonnes of coal a year and Germany of 18.7 million, Italy produced a mea-
gre 34,000 tonnes.
The economic problems of the unified state were exacerbated by 
the historical divide between the north and the south of the peninsula, 
thematized as the questione meridionale by the inquiries led in the 1870s 
by Leopoldo Franchetti and Sydney Sonnino. Central to these studies was 
the identification of a dichotomy between North and South with regards 
to industrial development: in the Mezzogiorno, for instance, a remark-
able lack of industry prior to unification reflected an extensive reliance 
upon proto-industrial production and agriculture; moreover, while the 
North had been receptive to technological innovations introduced in the 
context of the Napoleonic Wars, the South retained a systemic organiza-
tion that resembled feudal structures.11 Production in the Kingdom of the 
Two Sicilies was largely geared towards domestic consumption and this, 
together with the exorbitant trade tariffs imposed by the Bourbon monar-
chy, resulted in a significant separation between northern and southern 
markets. Indeed this lack of homogeneity reflected profound structural 
differences: southern markets were poorly structured and very unassum-
ing in their size, and so could not represent a viable destination for the 
manufacturing goods produced in the North. Similarly, agricultural pro-
duce from the South, most notably oil, wine and citrus fruit, was either 
too expensive for the relatively modest markets of Central Italy and of the 
North, or else its distribution was thwarted by competition from analo-
gous goods produced in loco.12 In short, when Italy was unified in 1861, 
cultural cohesion among Italians had not yet reached its maturity and 
a proper Italian economy, connecting all regions of the peninsula, was 
yet to be born.13 With powers like Britain, France and Germany leading 
Europe to an experience of modernity marked by technological progress, 
literacy and economic prosperity, Italy had the status of a periphery.
The nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of the concept of 
nation as the central subject of political life. The tension between national 
drives and the idea of a European order was particularly visible in polit-
ical projects and philosophical speculation. One of the leading advo-
cates of unification during the first half of the century, Gian Domenico 
Romagnosi, demonstrated a remarkable sensitivity for the encounter of 
national and continental interests, positing, however, that the two were 
not necessarily antithetical. His posthumously published Scienza delle 
costituzioni spoke extensively of the ‘reciprocal’ influence of European 
nations, a phenomenon deemed to be ‘unceasing’ and defining the con-
tinent since the Roman Empire.14 Nations, Romagnosi argued, ought 
to pursue independence and unity to become part of a ‘great European 
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family’: not a fully fledged confederation of states but a system of mutual 
enrichment and peaceful cooperation.15
Romagnosi’s most notable pupil, Carlo Cattaneo, one of the 
most active proponents of a republican constitution for a unified Italy, 
reprised his mentor’s vision of a cohesive Europe, making it overtly polit-
ical. A strong critic of any nationalist inclination, Cattaneo spoke of the 
much-debated notion of a ‘United States of Europe’, a federal institu-
tion aiming at preserving the ‘inner and external peace, ensuring the 
uniformity of the monetary system and spreading ideals’.16 This project 
was deemed unavoidable, due to the historical interconnectedness of 
Europe and to the nations’ tendency toward ‘a commonality of travels, 
commerce, science and laws’.17 Consequently, Cattaneo proposed the 
institution of yearly congresses, where scholars from various regions of 
the continent could come together and discuss matters of commerce, 
agriculture, geography and industry. For the author, a famous believer 
in the civic and socio-economic uses of scientific knowledge, the vision 
of the United States of Europe would serve a double purpose: on the one 
hand, it would enable the solid establishment of peace; on the other, it 
would contribute to the strengthening of Italy’s own political and cul-
tural identity, a process fundamentally defined by a cultural and histor-
ical relationship, as well as the awareness of Europe qua geopolitical 
space, which Italy belonged to and continuously engaged with.18
The idea of Europe also permeated the thought of one of the fig-
ureheads of the unification, Giuseppe Mazzini. Largely informed by 
the desire to foster European support for the cause of Italian unifica-
tion, Mazzini’s reflections on a continental confederation emphasized 
the need to actively educate people about European ideas and values, 
in contrast to Romagnosi and Cattaneo’s reliance on notions of the his-
torical interconnectedness of the continent and faith in progress. In this 
sense, Mazzini’s calls for the articulation of a European identity entailed 
the need for the voluntary and deliberate action of the various states, 
whom he urged to educate, via a programme hovering between politics 
and pedagogy, the youth on the grand ideals of the federation. In con-
sequence, Mazzini was fundamentally hostile to any attempt to unify 
Europe via military action, such as Napoleon’s campaigns, or via formal 
unions among leaders, such as the making of the Holy Alliance by Austria, 
Prussia and Russia in 1815. Crucially, while a precise characterization of 
his European project remained rather nebulous throughout all his writ-
ings, there is little doubt that Mazzini’s political thought was animated 
by the desire to amalgamate local sovereignty with a wider transnational 
sensitivity. Consequently, he established the Giovane Italia in 1831 and 
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the Giovane Europa in 1834, whose primary goal was to bring together 
the European people who aspired to national unity as a means to spread 
the values of European democracy and peace.
It can already be seen, at this point, how the idea of Europe was 
prominent in nineteenth-century Italian political thought, but, while 
a significant number of authors were drawn towards a cosmopolitan 
dimension of politics, others highlighted the utopian character of this 
vision. What united these viewpoints was that they all acknowledged the 
asymmetries among European nations, whose peaceful and democratic 
coexistence was thus inevitably threatened: while firmly believing that 
some form of engagement among European people was one of the defin-
ing characteristics of the Western world, Giuseppe Ferrari admitted that, 
following the Revolution and the Napoleonic experience, France had 
imposed itself as the leading power in the continent, and was destined to 
act as a guide to all other nations.19 Camillo Benso, Count of Cavour was, 
already in the 1820s, profoundly hostile to the establishment of European 
institutions. In his analysis, this would only be possible if no state had any 
comparative advantage over others, whether in an economic, political or 
cultural sense. In the nineteenth  century, his argument continued, the 
implementation of a European project would give the strongest powers of 
the continent carte blanche to interfere with both the foreign and domes-
tic policies of the others.
More examples of sensitivity to the asymmetrical encounter between 
Italy and Europe can be found in Cesare Balbo’s 1844 text Delle speranze 
d’Italia, in which he plotted the difficult path towards Italian national unity 
against the wider context of European politics and society. His analysis 
highlights the idiosyncrasies of the country’s production and employment 
rates, military expenditure, geography and government, drawing attention 
to their relative backwardness vis-à-vis other continental powers.20 This, in 
turn, would make any sort of agreement or alliance among European pow-
ers boil down to an entente of the stronger ones, sharing common polit-
ical and commercial interests. Consequently, despite an awareness of the 
debate connected with a project of European scope, Balbo urged his readers 
to direct their efforts to the pursuit of national unification alone. A similar 
argument was provided by Terenzio Mamiani, who, as an exile in Paris, 
attempted to convince the French government to intervene in the Papal 
States to avert the dangers connected with the local restoration backed by 
Austrian forces.21 The failure of this project paved the way for Mamiani’s 
acknowledgment of the impossibility for Italy to pursue independence 
and unity with the support of any foreign power. His judgment essentially 
revolved around the recognition of the selfishness driving the individual 
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states in the international arena. The European project, therefore, appeared 
fundamentally flawed to Mamiani, as it would hinder the free deployment 
of Italy’s national character and further enforce its servility to the stronger 
powers of the continent.
While the verdicts on the vision of a unified Europe among nine-
teenth-century Italian political thinkers diverged – both in terms of their 
judgments on the encounter of nationalist and cosmopolitan sensitivi-
ties and with regard to the acknowledgment of the existing asymmetries 
between the peninsula and the rest of the continent – their debates on the 
unification of the country were often connected with reflections on the 
European dimension of politics. Put simply, for many political thinkers 
of the Risorgimento, reflections on the political organization of a unified 
Italy naturally entailed the need to interrogate where the country was 
to stand in relation to the other continental powers. The juxtaposition 
of national and European themes reflected a bi-directional relationship 
between Italy and Europe in the Risorgimento political imagination: not 
only did Italian intellectuals question the extent to which Italy was to take 
part in the vision of a European order, but they also – and more impor-
tantly – explored the extent to which foreign powers were to inform the 
process of Italian unification. This intuition is an opportunity for histo-
rians of the Risorgimento who understand this period as characterized 
by transnational connections to attempt to map out the European forces 
acting on the process of shaping the Italian national identity.
National primacy and transnational sensitivities
Nation is not exclusively a political concept. Alberto Banti reminded us 
that national discourse imposed itself, in the nineteenth century, as an 
amalgam of three distinct meanings: birthplace, the commonality of cus-
toms, and the historical cultural and linguistic community.22 The third 
meaning of the term ‘nation’ is the most interesting one since, especially 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the articulation of an 
Italian national identity revolved around the historical development of 
the peninsula’s culture and traditions.23 In consequence, the identifica-
tion of cosmopolitan elements belonging to the discourse of unification 
ought to take into account much wider debates taking place throughout 
the decades preceding 1861, going beyond a purely political domain 
and highlighting the thematization of European modernity as part of a 
broader cultural and intellectual milieu. What ought to be investigated is 
the openness of Italian intellectuals towards foreign ideas, seen not only 
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as a means to contribute to the definition of a national identity, but also 
as conducive to the negotiation of a space for Italy in the intellectual life 
of the continent.
The centrality of the topic of nation owes much to Vincenzo Cuoco’s 
speculation at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Cuoco, who 
famously fled Naples following King Ferdinand IV’s retaliation against 
the supporters of the Neapolitan Republic briefly established in 1799 by 
the French, devoted his work to a clear goal, one that already revealed 
the need for Italy to acquire a unified national cultural and philosophi-
cal character to stand tall in the contemporary philosophical landscape 
of Europe. Specifically, Cuoco aimed at ‘forming the public spirit of the 
nation’ and ‘beginning to engage, at least with our thought, with other 
nations, growing accustomed to considering the glory of Italy as a shared 
one’.24 Crucially, while the concept of nation was generally adopted by 
the Southern émigré as a signifier for the Mezzogiorno alone, recent 
historiography has highlighted how his works featured the earliest the-
orization of the nazione del Risorgimento discussed by Banti.25 This was 
because at the core of Cuoco’s verdicts lay a remarkable sensitivity to the 
asymmetries characterizing the relationship between an Italian spirit 
and its continental counterparts, notably France’s: in his analysis, the 
French Revolution had brought about a sense of unity and solidarity that 
was simply missing in Italy, due to the failure of the 1799 revolution-
ary impulses, so deepening the gap between the country’s ‘two peoples’, 
a well-off minority and a badly off majority, on whose reconciliation 
hinged the cultural and political unity of the nation.26
Elsewhere, he applauded the US Bill of Rights for appealing to 
the public sentiment of the American people, suggesting that even the 
political organization of a country largely depended on a solid national 
identity and shared values and customs.27 This operation could only 
be achieved by fostering ‘self-esteem’ in Italy’s public spirit, a quality 
observable, in Cuoco’s view, in French and English debates on their 
respective national character.28 An understanding of the means by 
which European nations managed to acquire greater ‘self-esteem’ led 
the Neapolitan author to identify the rediscovery and evaluation of a 
nation’s cultural tradition as conducive to a stronger national unity: 
Germany and France, he argued, ‘have endowed history with a dra-
matic garb which renders it at once more pleasant and more instruc-
tive. For the same reason that people prefer fables to speeches, they 
prefer drama to fables, for they become fellow citizens of the protag-
onists of the story, and they are instructed almost as if witnessing and 
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acting in the first person, which is the easiest and most effective way to 
instruct oneself’.29
Cuoco’s call for the articulation of an organic national identity 
clearly stemmed from his perception of the asymmetrical encounter 
between Italy – a nation yet to be culturally, let alone politically, unified – 
and other European powers that championed shared values, sentiments, 
culture and customs. It did not, however, take long for Cuoco to elabo-
rate a blueprint for the intellectual unification of the nation. This took 
the form of an epistolary novel, Plato in Italy, published between 1804 
and 1806. Cuoco presented it as a translation of an imaginary ancient 
Greek manuscript, detailing Plato’s visit to Southern Italy. In the book, 
the Greek philosopher visits a number of small communities that display 
strikingly progressive customs, such as the complete emancipation of 
women among the Sannites, excellent organizational skills, a very cre-
ative language, peaceful behaviour and sheer brilliance in the scientific 
and intellectual domains. These talents are associated with an obscure 
Pythagorean genius, which Plato comes to identify with the historical 
making of the Italian national character: ‘I venture to say’, he declares, 
‘that Pythagoras never existed; he is rather an idea conjured up by people 
to denote a system of cognitions whose origins are very ancient, and that 
has been conserved and handed down through a board of wise men who 
were born and raised in Italy’. Cuoco identifies these ‘wise men’ as the 
Etruscans, regarded as the bearers of the ‘most ancient wisdom of the 
Italians’ initially theorized by the Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista 
Vico.30 This notion leads Plato to acknowledge the Italians’ superior-
ity over the Greeks, as ‘these nations that we deem barbaric have been 
cultured long before us’.31 Cuoco’s Plato in Italy can be read as a meta-
phor for the encounter, in the nineteenth century, of the Italian and the 
French nations: the boastfulness and over-inflated sense of pride of the 
external observers is dramatically challenged by the observation of the 
‘Pythagorean genius’ of the Italians. Therefore, just as Cuoco’s Plato was 
forced to recognize Italy’s cultural superiority over Greece, the French of 
the present must acknowledge the uniqueness of the peninsula’s tradi-
tion and its historical intellectual primacy over Europe.
This notion of primacy is unquestionably a key concept to inves-
tigate in order to make sense of Italy’s relationship with the European 
intellectual landscape of the nineteenth century. An investigation of 
this concept, however, is rendered problematic by the fact that it served 
a dual purpose: on the one hand, it allowed Italian thinkers to appeal 
to their tradition to challenge their perceived asymmetrical position in 
relation to contemporary experiences of European modernity; on the 
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other, it erected a wall around the country’s cultural heritage, render-
ing it untouchable and fundamentally hostile to foreign influences. At 
any rate, while the transnational implications of the notion of primacy 
remain an open question, the relevance of this concept to the discourse 
of the unification is not in doubt: by projecting this idea to the core of the 
debates concerned with the cultural unification of Italy, Cuoco contrib-
uted to the definition of the Italian people as a cohesive and organic unit, 
popularizing his belief in the unified nation as a reflection of a shared 
cultural heritage.
Following Vincenzo Cuoco’s exhortation to embrace Italy’s great 
tradition, there was a proliferation of works arguing the same: Ugo 
Foscolo’s Sepolcri praised the resilience of the Italian national character, 
positing that it was exactly on the example of the men of genius of the 
past that a newfound cultural cohesion ought to be established; Giuseppe 
Micali’s book L’Italia avanti il dominio de’romani (1810) went even fur-
ther back, connecting the efforts of the present with the shared pre-Ro-
man origins of the Italian people; Angelo Mazzoldi’s Delle origini italiche 
e della diffusione dell’incivilimento italiano (1840) linked the historical 
origin of the Italian nation with Plato’s allegory of Atlantis, the fictitious 
embodiment of the ideal city-state detailed in the Republic, to symbolize 
the historical intellectual primacy of Italy over other European nations. 
At any rate, while these works differed in so far as they tended to locate 
the origin of an Italian national culture in different areas and different 
historical periods, their most striking shared feature was a passionate 
cult of history and of the past. It is difficult, therefore, to see how the 
primacy of Italy – which, according to Foscolo, was still observable with 
Machiavelli and Galileo – could be rescued from a sterile cult of the past 
and fully projected into the context of the nineteenth century. New ques-
tions therefore emerged: could Italy’s primacy still be observable in the 
present? How would it inform the country’s relation to other European 
nations?
One of the most interesting and notorious answers to these ques-
tions appeared in 1843, when Vincenzo Gioberti’s essay Del primato 
morale e civile degli italiani proposed an unconventional solution to the 
problem of the unification, indicating, at the same time, how the coun-
try was to stand in relation to its European peers. Initially associated 
with Mazzinian ideals, to such an extent that his self-imposed exile was 
caused by unjust accusations concerning his alleged involvement with 
initiatives promoted by the Giovane Italia in the early 1830s, Vincenzo 
Gioberti soon became one of the most influential moderate liberals of 
the 1840s, who, in direct opposition to Mazzini’s call for political action 
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‘from below’, sought to elaborate programmes of reform in concert with 
the existing powers and with the support of the liberal aristocracy, but 
without profoundly altering the status quo. Gioberti’s Primato proposed 
a reprise of Guelph federalism, arguing in favour of the full liberation 
from foreign influences and the transformation of Italy into a confeder-
ation of existing states, with the Pope acting as a symbolic head of the 
union.32
Gioberti’s political project, however, reflected much wider consid-
erations on the historical character of the Italian nation that appeared to 
be consistent with the ongoing tendency to look at Italy’s past traditions 
to remodel the present and shape the future: his was a precise under-
standing of Italian history, concentrating on the identification of religion 
as an inherently national institution. The Church was seen as the chief 
source of Italy’s cultural unity and prosperity in the past, as well as a 
guide to follow if the country was to carve out a prominent position for 
itself in contemporary European politics.33 Gioberti’s idea was not a novel 
one. It was the Neapolitan Giambattista Vico who, more than a hundred 
years earlier, had spoken of Christianity as the prime source of cultural 
unity,34 but these observations appeared in Gioberti with unprecedented 
force, further amplified by the political significance that they bore. The 
author’s understanding of the history of Italy, the ‘religious nation par 
excellence’,35 was essentially an inquiry into its primacy and the ways in 
which this had become manifest throughout history: the spiritual powers 
supporting the edifice of Italian culture and politics made the latter tower 
above all other nations of Europe for centuries, granting Italy an author-
itative status in all aspects of knowledge from philosophy to literature, 
from science to fine arts, from political theory to history, which virtually 
no one could challenge.
Ever since Roman times, Gioberti argued, the historical develop-
ment of Italian culture had been inextricably linked with the actions of 
the Church: Rome’s position at the core of Christian Europe was synony-
mous with a moral and civic vantage point over the rest of the continent. 
Even after the end of the Roman Empire, the Church managed to main-
tain a degree of unity and cohesion, at least in terms of shared tradition 
and customs, among the people of the peninsula. The centuries following 
the end of the Empire, he continued, witnessed the continuous efforts of 
the Church to rescue Italian culture from the threat of fragmentation, 
especially considering the tendency, particularly evident between the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to portray the papacy as an obsta-
cle to national unification.36 The Reformation aggravated the threat of 
divisions, not only in terms of the immediate challenge it posed to the 
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unity of Christianity, but also – and, in Gioberti’s view, even more dra-
matically – because of the introduction of foreign ‘barbarian’, subjectivist 
and empiricist, ideas into the philosophical landscape of the peninsula.37 
For these reasons, Italy found itself in a position of subordination to the 
emerging European powers such as France, England and Prussia. France, 
in particular, was targeted with remarkable force by Gioberti: the actions 
of Charles VIII, Louis XIV and, later on, Napoleon, were accused of having 
dramatically challenged Italy’s aspirations to independence and having 
contributed to spreading a tendency to ‘corrupt, maim and uproot’ the 
principles of divine revelation, by encouraging a blind obedience to the 
ideas of René Descartes.38 As a result, Italian culture, tainted with a ser-
vile imitation of foreign ideas, ideologies and institutions, engaged with 
the rest of Europe in a relationship of dependence, strongly hindering, 
on the one hand, the country’s unique spiritual status and, on the other, 
preventing the flourishing of the local, native culture.
Yet the acknowledgment of the asymmetrical nature characterizing 
Italy’s relationship to the rest of Europe from the Reformation onwards 
did not prevent Gioberti from offering a positive evaluation of the coun-
try’s historical primacy in the context of the Risorgimento. He boldly 
stated, in fact, that ‘Italy features within itself, mainly thanks to religion, 
all the necessary conditions for its national and political Risorgimento’,39 
arguing against Mazzinian revolutionary ideals and the dependence 
on foreign intervention. All it takes, he posited, is the consolidation of 
national culture, along lines informed by the historical pre-eminence of 
the Church in the intellectual life of Italy, as well as the perpetuation of 
its centrality in politics, a programme seen as unquestionably consistent 
with the country’s history.40 Yet while the book, both in its historical anal-
ysis and its propositions for the Risorgimento, revealed an interest in the 
cultural and political dynamics of the wider continent, the tone was not 
a cosmopolitan, but a nationalist one. More specifically, Gioberti’s argu-
ment rested on the idea that the relationship between Italian and foreign 
culture must be radically altered, with preference given to native forces 
over external ones.
The idea of complete closure to foreign influences, already visible 
in Antonio Rosmini’s essay Nuovo saggio sull’origine delle idee (1830), 
achieved wide popularity thanks to the dissemination of Gioberti’s 
Primato, which was circulated in virtually all regions of Italy. Francesco De 
Sanctis recounted, in his autobiography La giovinezza, how, on reading the 
book, he had immediately identified it as the ideological forerunner of a 
new, rapidly growing school of thought that championed the absolute pri-
macy of the Italian language, rhetoric, style and culture at large, rejecting 
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any engagement with its European counterparts.41 This view was reflected 
by the popularity, in the 1840s, of literary purism, a trend upholding the 
imitation of Italian language and literature of the fourteenth, fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries, in direct opposition to the French inflections per-
ceivable in various regions. Indeed, Gioberti’s Primato was exceptionally 
critical of France, which he accused of having ‘infected’, with its ideas and 
language, the cultural patrimony of other nations. Germany was com-
monly targeted, too: Luigi Palmieri, who became a university professor 
of philosophy and logic in Naples in 1847, believed in the need to pre-
vent the spread of the dangerous ‘German pantheism’ in national culture, 
encouraging, instead, the systematic rediscovery of the local tradition: 
‘In declaring myself openly to be a loyal follower of our native thought’, 
he claimed in the introductory lecture of his university course, ‘I cannot 
but reprove the repeated attempts to enable certain foreign doctrines to 
take root among us. Today we are infested with German encroachments 
because there are some teachers who would indoctrinate our youth with 
German pantheism, especially with that brand which is rigged out in the 
imposing and grandiose cloak of George Frederich Hegel.’42
Gioberti and Palmieri’s examples of exasperated cultural national-
ism could hardly represent an encouraging background for compelling 
developments in Italian philosophy, let alone for the movement of Italy 
towards a European conception of modernity and the negotiation of a 
vantage point in the intellectual landscape of the continent. While their 
arguments attempted to strengthen a national identity via cultural unity, 
they remained ambiguous as to the relevance of Italy’s past primacy in 
the present, and hence failed to articulate the progressive character of 
the country’s intellectual forces. Not long before unification, therefore, 
the asymmetry between Italy and Europe had not been overcome: on a 
purely socio-economic level, the peninsula paled in comparison to the 
other powers of the continent; on a political level, the cosmopolitan 
enthusiasms of the Mazzinian generation, especially following the bat-
tle of Goito on 30 May 1848, had been replaced by a widespread feeling 
that the cause of national unification could not be pursued by relying on 
anyone other than Carlo Alberto, thereby further establishing the cen-
trality of Piedmont in Risorgimento politics. It was in the intellectual 
field, however, that nineteenth-century Italy presented the most vehe-
ment resistance to European ideas: fully conscious of the contemporary 
decline of Italian philosophy, several intellectuals of the period opted 
for a passionate, yet fruitless, veneration of the country’s past tradition, 
based on debatable notions of historical primacy, therefore shielding the 
peninsula from any foreign contamination.
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Challenging Asymmetry: Spaventa’s ‘circularity’ 
of European thought
This nationalist swing in cultural debates of the nineteenth century was 
particularly marked in the South, where, especially after the revolution-
ary turmoil in 1820–1, institutional arrangements set forth by the Bour-
bon monarchy had strongly undermined the penetration of European 
ideas into the Kingdom.43 Already in 1820, King Ferdinand returned to 
Latin as the language of education, substantially increased import taxes 
on foreign books, and issued a list of prohibited texts. Libraries in the 
Kingdom were subject to regular inspections carried out by a special 
commission and, in most cases, witnessed significant portions of their 
collections, most notably German philosophy books or treatises on the 
Enlightenment, being taken away. At the end of June 1821, the King sym-
bolically marked the rejection of late eighteenth-century French philoso-
phy by publicly burning books by Voltaire, Diderot and d’Alembert. After 
the Revolution of 1848, the Bourbon monarchy renewed its efforts to 
maintain control over the Kingdom via the creation of a loyal and efficient 
bureaucracy, the reorganization of the army and the refusal to engage 
with European politics and ideas, encouraging instead an unconditioned 
allegiance to Neapolitan culture and tradition, as was often lamented by 
local chroniclers.44
At the same time, the South also represented the cradle of a truly 
progressive philosophy, namely one that fully blurred the lines between 
nationalism and cosmopolitanism, one that completely subverted notions 
of primacy and asymmetries, and finally depicted Italy as a philosophical 
centre of European modernity. While, in fact, the neo-Guelph Giobertian 
solution was acquiring traction in public debates and intellectual circles, 
a group of Southern intellectuals, brought together by passionate sup-
port for the cause of unification, a common revolutionary fervour and a 
particular fondness for German idealism, emerged as the forerunner of 
an intellectual revolution aimed at establishing the cultural unity that 
was seen as the most salient characteristic of modern European nations, 
especially Germany. Among these intellectuals, Bertrando Spaventa 
quickly affirmed himself as the figurehead of the new worldview. Born 
in the Abruzzo town of Bomba in 1817, Bertrando moved to Naples at an 
early age and, together with his brother Silvio, wrote for the periodical 
Il Nazionale, a left-leaning newspaper that served as a voice for the radical 
Neapolitan youth. After the failure of 1848, Spaventa, unlike his brother 
who was sentenced to prison, was exiled to Turin, where his journalistic 
activity remained devoted to the popularization of Hegel’s philosophy as 
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a paradigm for the cultural unification of Italy, a means for the promotion 
of secular politics and, broadly speaking, a guiding light for the future of 
Europe.45 It was between 1858 and 1860, however, with his lectures at 
the universities of Modena and Bologna, that Bertrando’s philosophical 
vision was fully realized as the theory of circularity of European thought, 
later published in the volume La filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni colla 
filosofia europea.
A dart of criticism directed against Gioberti’s neo-Guelph cul-
tural nationalism, Spaventa’s best-known work dismantled the popular 
view that Italian philosophy was fundamentally detached from modern 
European thought.46 In this sense, the blind exaltation of the country’s 
past tradition was condemned as a deplorable solution and a means 
of shielding oneself from the ideas of present-day Europe. Italian phi-
losophy, according to Spaventa, did not end with the Renaissance; 
rather, it ‘went on to develop in freer lands and among freer intellects’.47 
Consequently, engagement with contemporary European ideas was seen 
as synonymous with the discovery of a new chapter in the life of Italian 
philosophy, namely one that took place abroad: ‘seeking Italian philo-
sophical thought in its new fatherland does not entail a servile imitation 
of German nationality. Rather, it constitutes a recovery of something that 
belonged to us, of something that, under different guises, has become 
part of a universal spirit, the essential condition of our civilization, as 
well as all other people’s. It is not our philosophers of the last two cen-
turies, but Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel who are the true 
disciples of Bruno, of Vanini, of Campanella, of Vico and other illustrious 
authors’.48
Spaventa proposed a very elastic definition of philosophy that was 
not bound to specific national traditions, but emerged as a global phe-
nomenon, stemming from intergenerational, transnational exchanges. 
Already during Roman times, it was possible to speak of the transna-
tional nature of philosophy’s vocabulary: drawing extensively upon 
Vico’s definition of Antiquissima Italorum Sapientia, Spaventa suggested 
that many terms were characterized by a philosophical meaning that 
was too great to have evolved out of the popular use of the terms them-
selves. Consequently, he concluded, they must have been borrowed from 
foreign populations, particularly the Etruscans and Ionians, as already 
hinted by Cuoco roughly half a century earlier, in his commentaries on 
Vico. Transnational intellectual exchanges were even more evident from 
the Renaissance onwards and their effect was said to be extremely vis-
ible in the present: ‘Modern philosophy’, Spaventa claimed, ‘is not the 
work of a single nation, but of all’. Those that appeared to be ‘national 
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philosophies’ were, instead, ‘nothing more than stations through which 
thought, in its immortal course, passes. Modern philosophy, therefore, 
is neither exclusively English, nor French, nor Italian, nor German, but 
European.’49
Spaventa identified Italy during the Renaissance as the birthplace 
of modern ideas, paying particular attention to the ongoing rejection 
of Scholastic philosophy via the rehabilitation of inquiries on nature 
and subjectivity. He then illustrated how these innovations ought to be 
seen as conducive to the encounter of local and foreign philosophies: 
Giordano Bruno’s definition of Nature as Deus in rebus was said to have 
anticipated Spinoza’s Deus sive Natura, the manifesto of modern imma-
nentism; Tommaso Campanella’s emphasis on sensitivity and experience 
as the basis of all knowledge was described as the forerunner of empir-
icism and Cartesian rationalism. As the mature reflections of Spinoza 
and Descartes revealed the magnitude of the dichotomy between sense 
perception and intellect, man was still perceived exclusively as an effect, 
that is, as a product of God’s creation. It was exactly the critique of this 
mono-directional account of causality, operated via Locke’s empiricism 
in England and Gottfried Leibniz’s Monadology in Germany, that sought 
to elaborate an account of man as cause, namely as the free maker of 
himself. While these ideas originally appeared abroad, it was only in 
Italy, Spaventa continued, that the tension between man as effect and 
man as cause was resolved. The philosopher credited for this innovation 
was Giambattista Vico, who blurred the definitions of the two categories 
by amalgamating them in a wider notion of progress, seen as the World 
Spirit’s perpetual process of self-negotiation. ‘Vico denies any parallel’, 
Spaventa writes; ‘nature is the phenomenon and the basis of Spirit, the 
premise that Spirit makes for itself, in order to be true unity. True unity, 
the true One, true development: development of itself; from itself, via 
itself, to itself: that is, completely itself’.50
Vico’s innovation paved the way for the elaboration of a new met-
aphysics, accounting for perpetual progress and self-negotiation, rather 
than immediate causation. In a particularly poignant section of his book, 
Spaventa claimed that ‘Vico anticipates the problem of knowledge, 
demanding a new metaphysics anchored to human ideas; he is sensitive 
to the idea of Spirit, hence creating philosophy of history. Vico is the true 
precursor of Germany’.51 This is exactly where, according to the author, 
the diaspora of Italian philosophy was most dramatically observable: after 
Vico, it was only in other European countries, particularly in Germany, 
that a meaningful intellectual life had been taking place. Immanuel 
Kant was to be credited for the elevation of the themes problematized 
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by Vico into a transcendental psychologism, resolving the problem of 
knowledge and its intelligibility with the intuition of its synthetic unity.52 
Later on, Spaventa continued, the presence of the same problem could 
be observed in Fichte’s Selbstbewußtsein, the transcendental realism of 
Schelling’s Naturphilosophie and, more importantly, Hegel’s idealism, 
positing the ultimate question as to how Spirit realizes itself in history 
and in man’s experience of it. According to Spaventa, it was exactly in 
the Italian philosophy of the Renaissance that the debates animating 
the nineteenth-century European intellectual landscape would deepen 
their roots: La filosofia italiana illustrated a well-defined trajectory link-
ing Bruno and Campanella with present-day German thought, brought 
together by the persistent search for unity in history.
The stage was now set for the final thrust of Spaventa’s argument. 
To restore its status of pre-eminence among the nations of Europe, Italy 
had to rediscover its own philosophy in its mature, cosmopolitan form: 
as the country’s tradition had ‘developed in the motion of German intel-
lects’, it was necessary, for the thinkers of the peninsula, not to engage 
with foreign authors ‘in the same way as goods are imported’, but via 
the recognition of their shared intellectual genealogy.53 This process, 
according to the author, was already well underway. Both the Italian 
and the German traditions were said to have deep roots in debates ini-
tially appearing during the Italian Renaissance and, consequently, they 
were both concerned with the same questions. As proof of this, Spaventa 
drew a parallel between Pasquale Galluppi and Immanuel Kant: both had 
‘inherited’ a concern for the problem of knowledge from Vico. As a result, 
thanks to his empiricist philosophical inclination, Galluppi was said to 
be ‘unknowingly Kantian’.54 Similarly, Antonio Rosmini, notoriously crit-
ical of foreign ideas, was nonetheless said to have theorized a notion of 
‘primitive synthesis of reason and perception’ mirroring Kant’s notion of 
‘transcendental imagination’, mediating between sense and intellect.55 
Another interesting comparison was between Hegel and Gioberti: just as 
the German idealist had moved beyond his predecessors by positing the 
absolute self-awareness of Reason as a token of the infinite possibility of 
knowledge, Gioberti had overcome the limits of Galluppi and Rosmini 
by theorizing an ‘Absolute Mind’, decreeing the infinite potentiality of 
knowledge via the dialectic of its creative force. To paraphrase Spaventa’s 
verdict on Galluppi, Gioberti was seen as ‘unknowingly Hegelian’, much 
closer to German idealism than he was ready to admit himself. It was 
only thanks to the recognition of the similarities between the Italian and 
German philosophical landscapes, Spaventa argued, that the peninsula 
could achieve the cultural unity observable in other European countries, 
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thus creating ‘a historical Italy, having its worthy place in the common 
life of modern nations’.56
Conclusion
The ‘circularity of European thought’ was not only an attempt to chal-
lenge notions of primacy, seeing the centrality of the Italian tradition as 
limited to the Renaissance, but also – and much more importantly – a 
means of de-provincializing nineteenth-century debates taking place in 
the country, showing how they reflected a much more modern, European 
experience of modernity. This verdict rests on a series of interconnected 
insights.
First, the political and cultural discourse concerned with the unifica-
tion of Italy reflected a concern for the nation’s role in the broader picture 
of the whole continent. Ever since the early decades of the Risorgimento, 
Italian intellectuals had questioned the extent to which a unified country 
was to partake in a European scheme of coexistence and cooperation. 
The variety of their answers was extraordinary, ranging from visions of 
a fully fledged continental federation to downright rejections of any for-
eign influence. Yet even the most markedly nationalist positions, such 
as Rosmini and Gioberti’s, stemmed from cosmopolitan premises or, at 
least, from the recognition of the historical tendency of nations to come 
into contact and affect one another.
Secondly, while the analysis of nineteenth-century thinkers’ 
appraisal of Italy’s place in Europe already revealed the strikingly cos-
mopolitan morphology of the national discourse, debates on Europe’s 
relationship to Italy, especially in the broader cultural and philosophical 
spheres, provided even more interesting food for thought, challenging 
notions of asymmetries and imbalances between the two. Bertrando 
Spaventa’s theory of the circularity of European thought was the most 
progressive and convincing attempt to rethink the relation between 
the country and the continent, dealing a hard blow to the widespread 
ultra-nationalist views of the 1840s. More specifically, Spaventa beat 
Gioberti at his own game: his argument rested on the same premise 
as his opponent’s, namely the recognition of the centrality of Italian 
Renaissance philosophy. Unlike Gioberti, however, who saw it as fun-
damental to a nationalist discourse, Spaventa slotted it into the wider 
cosmopolitan ideal of a purely European intellectual history, positing a 
serious challenge to the idea of an asymmetrical encounter between Italy 
and the rest of the continent. In this sense, the theory of the circularity 
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of European thought towered above the plurality of nineteenth-century 
theories about this encounter, thanks to its originality and the breadth 
of its scope.
A third insight had to do with the very nature of the challenge pos-
ited: once again, unlike Gioberti, who countered the perceived asymmetry 
by completely turning it on its head, Spaventa posited that no imbalance 
had ever existed, considering that the history of European philosophy was 
one of constant, self-perpetuating transnational exchange, of continuous 
dialogue among its parts, and of non-competitive encounter.
Lastly, it is notable that the most compelling and successful attempt 
to negotiate a vantage point for Italy in the intellectual life of modern 
European nations came from the leading exponent of a group of Southern 
thinkers. And noticing that the South, a peripheral region in a peripheral 
nation of Europe, put itself and the rest of Italy at the very centre of the 
continent’s intellectual landscape is a charming discovery.
Notes
 1. Paradiso, XXVII, 84.
 2. De Monarchia, III, 17.
 3. Federico Chabod, Storia dell’idea d’Europa. Bari: Laterza, 2005, 44–80.
 4. Benedetto Croce, Storia d’Europa nel secolo decimonono. Bari: Laterza, 1932.
 5. Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni dal carcere. Turin: Einaudi, 1963
 6. Excellent illustrations of the transnational nature of Risorgimento political thought can be found 
in Christopher Bayly and Eugenio Biagini (eds), Giuseppe Mazzini and the Globalisation of Demo-
cratic Nationalism 1830–1920. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008; Maurizio Isabella, Risor-
gimento in Exile: Italian Émigrés and the Liberal International in the Post-Napoleonic Era. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009; Maurizio Isabella, ‘Nationality before Liberty? Risorgimento Polit-
ical Thought in Transnational Context’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 17.5 (2012): 507–15; 
Martin Thom, Republic, Nations and Tribes. London: Verso, 1995.
 7. Richard Johnson, ‘Educational Policy and Social Control in Early Victorian England’, Past & 
Present, 49 (1970), 96–119.
 8. Louis Maggiolo, Ministère de l’Instruction Publique: statistique rétrospective. Etat récapitulatif 
et comparatif indiquant par département, le nombre des conjoints qui ont signé l’acte de leur 
mariage aux XVIIe., XVIIIe. et XIXe. siècles. Documents fournis par 15923 instituteurs, recueillis 
et classés par M. Maggiolo, recteur honoraire, chargé d’une mission spéciale per M. le Ministre de 
l’Instruction Publique. Paris, 1879.
 9. Dieter Langewiesche and Klaus Schonhoven, ‘Arbeiterbibliotheken und Arbeitlektüre in Wil-
helminischen Deutschland’, Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, 16 (1976), 135–204, statistic from 
140.
10. Guido Pescosolido, Unità nazionale e sviluppo economico, 1750–1913. Bari: Laterza, 1998.
11. Denis Mack Smith, Storia d’Italia dal 1861 al 1997. Bari: Laterza, 1997, 60.
12. Vera Zamagni, ‘Ferrovie e integrazione del mercato nazionale nell’Italia post-unitaria’, Studi in 
onore di Gino Barbieri: problemi e metodi di storia ed economia. Salerno: Ipem Edizioni, 1983, 
1638–41.
13. Giovanni Federico, ‘I fattori della distribuzione’, Storia dell’economia italiana, III: L’età contem-
poranea: un paese nuovo. Turin: Einaudi, 1991, 188.
14. Gian Domenico Romagnosi, La scienza delle costituzioni. Turin: Canfari, 1849, 384.
154 RE-MAPPInG CEnTRE AnD PERIPHERY
15. Romagnosi, Scienza, 400–1.
16. Carlo Cattaneo, Opere edite ed inedite, vol. V. Firenze: Le Monnier, 1881–92, 103. An excellent 
commentary on Cattaneo’s political thought is available in Filippo Sabetti, Civilization and 
Self-Government: The Political Thought of Carlo Cattaneo. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2010.
17. Felice Momigliano, Carlo Cattaneo e gli stati uniti d’Europa. Milano: Treves, 1919, 54.
18. See Carlo Cattaneo, Dell’insurrezione di Milano nel 1848 e della successiva guerra. Lugano: 
Tipografia della Svizzera Italiana, 30; and Paolo Bagnoli, L’idea dell’Italia, 1816–1861. Reggio 
Emilia: Diabasis, 2007, 142.
19. Giuseppe Ferrari, La Chine et l’Europe: leur histoires et leur traditions comparées. Paris: Didier, 
1867, 597–8.
20. Cesare Balbo, Delle speranze d’Italia. Capolago: Tipografia Elvetica, 1844, 209–42.
21. Terenzio Mamiani, ‘Lettera autobiografica a Giuseppe Zirardini’, Lettere dall’esilio. Roma: 
Dante Alighieri, 1839, 50–1.
22. Alberto Maria Banti, La nazione del Risorgimento. Turin: Einaudi, 2000, 4–5.
23. See also Franco Venturi, L’Italia fuori d’Italia. Turin: Einaudi, 1973.
24. Vincenzo Cuoco, ‘Programma del Giornale Italiano’, Scritti vari. Bari: Laterza, 1924, 3.
25. Antonino De Francesco, The Antiquity of the Italian Nation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013, 46.
26. Vincenzo Cuoco, Saggio storico sulla rivoluzione napoletana del 1799. Bari: Laterza, 1976, 90.
27. Cuoco, Saggio, 39–40.
28. Cuoco, ‘Programma’, 3–4.
29. Vincenzo Cuoco, Pagine giornalistiche. Bari: Laterza, 2011, 652.
30. Vincenzo Cuoco, Platone in Italia. Bari: Laterza, 2006, 101.
31. Cuoco, Platone, 103.
32. Vincenzo Gioberti, Del primato morale e civile degli italiani. Capolago: Tipografia Elvetica, 
1846, 285.
33. Gioberti, Del Primato, 311–15.
34. Giambattista Vico, Principi di scienza nuova, vol. II. Milan: Gaspare Truffi, 1831, 200.
35. Gioberti, Del primato, 31.
36. Gioberti, Del primato, 88.
37. Gioberti, Del primato, 186–8.
38. Gioberti, Del primato, 251.
39. Gioberti, Del primato, 116.
40. Gioberti, Del primato, 117–21, 273–5.
41. Francesco De Sanctis, La giovinezza: frammento autobiografico. Naples: Morano, 1969, 338.
42. Luigi Palmieri, Prolusione alle lezioni di logica e metafisica nella cattedra della R. Università degli 
studi. Naples: Nobile, 1848, 28.
43. See in this context the previous chapter by Jens Späth.
44. De Sanctis, La giovinezza, Bari: Laterza, 31, 319; Francesco Del Giudice, ‘Le piaghe dell’is-
truzione pubblica napoletana’, Atti del Regio Istituto d’Incoraggiamento, X, Naples, 1860, 1–9; 
Vincenzo Flauti, L’unguento e le pezze fatte alla nostra istruzione pubblica da un cattivo barbiere, 
che vuol farla da demiurgo. Naples, 1860, 3–4; Bertrando Spaventa, ‘Lettera al fratello Silvio, 
27.11.1861’, in La filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni colla filosofia europea. Bari: Laterza, 
1902, 285–8.
45. Fernanda Gallo,‘Philosophical Revolution and the Shaping of European Consciousness: Ber-
trando Spaventa’s “La filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni colla filosofia europea”’, Phenome-
nology and Mind, 8 (2015), 212–22; see especially 215.
46. Bertrando Spaventa, La filosofia italiana nelle sue relazioni colla filosofia europea. Bari: Laterza, 
1902, 49.
47. Bertrando Spaventa, Principii di filosofia. Naples: Ghio, 1867, 21.
48. Spaventa, Principii di filosofia, 21.
49. Spaventa, La filosofia italiana, 21.
50. Spaventa, La filosofia italiana, 124.
51. Spaventa, La filosofia italiana, 31.
52. Spaventa, La filosofia italiana, 141.
53. Spaventa, La filosofia italiana, 200–2, 8.
54. Spaventa, La filosofia italiana, 8.
55. Spaventa, La filosofia italiana, 162.
56. Spaventa, La filosofia italiana, 202–3.
155
10
‘The Greatest City the World has 
Ever Seen’ : London’s Imperial and 




The important political, economic and symbolic role of large European 
cities, especially during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, has been 
widely acknowledged and studied. Cities feature prominently in Jürgen 
Osterhammel’s magisterial survey of the nineteenth century, The Trans-
formation of the World, which devotes a substantial section to cities and 
their development during the nineteenth century.1 For the twentieth 
century, surveys such as Global Interdependencies: The World after 1945, 
edited by Akira Iriye, include sections on the development of global cities 
in the second half of the twentieth century.2 It is generally acknowledged 
that while Europe evidently underwent urbanization processes from the 
seventeenth century onwards, the unprecedented growth of cities in the 
nineteenth century on a truly cataclysmic scale heightened their role as 
an agent of social, political and economic change. Peter Clark points out 
that ‘during the 1900s the major cities of Western Europe became excit-
ing laboratories and models for the rest of urban Europe and beyond’.3 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to survey the extensive literature 
which exists on this topic, but it is worth pointing out that historians have 
sought to understand the complex ways in which cities were implicated 
in processes of nation- and empire-building in particular, or focused on 
the city as an organizing principle, in order to understand processes of 
urbanization and globalization more broadly. Notable historians such 
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as Pierre Yves Saunier emphasize the merit of moving from primarily 
descriptive urban studies towards more interactional studies, and to con-
sider cites as types of formation which have operated as ‘stations of trans-
port, trade emporiums, commanding places of the economy, gateways 
and destinations for migrants, cultural capitals or centre of revolutionary 
activities’.4
Saunier and others point to the latter half of the nineteenth cen-
tury as the time when European cities became connected in a more sys-
tematic fashion, when enduring structures and legal and organizational 
frameworks began to take shape, and exchanges of knowledge tied these 
cities closer together.5 Yet Osterhammel strikes a more cautious note and 
maintains that in the absence of empirical studies that actually chart the 
‘manner and frequency of contact amongst the largest world cities’ dur-
ing the nineteenth century, it might be more accurate to look towards the 
twentieth century as the time in which cities became interconnected as 
a truly ‘permanent fabric of interaction and communication’.6 Still, most 
would contend that even if this interconnection was not always explicitly 
acknowledged or foregrounded, European cities of the nineteenth cen-
tury were in contact with each other through trade, diplomatic relations, 
and cultural and intellectual exchanges. These contacts were motivated 
as much by a desire for knowledge and exchange in order to improve 
living conditions in the cities, as by a sense of rivalry and competition 
for prestige and influence, which functioned much like a mirror of the 
nation-state rivalries of the time.
This notion is also put forward by the urban/historical geogra-
phers David Gilbert and Felix Driver, who have written extensively on 
London and its function as an imperial metropolis within the British 
Empire. In line with other scholars they have pointed to the connection 
between the idea of empire and the imperial city and have contended 
that ‘if the imperial city was at the centre of the world, the empire was 
now at the heart of urban experience’.7 Moreover, they suggest, the late 
 nineteenth-century discourse on London as an ‘imperial city’ did not exist 
in isolation. Rather, they note that ‘in what was evidently a pan-Euro-
pean discourse on the imperial city between the mid-nineteenth century 
and the mid-twentieth, national models were defined in relation to other 
national models, in a spirit of competition as much as emulation’.8 They 
thus posit that debates about London as an imperial city did not take 
place solely in relation to national debates over imperial urbanism, but 
implicated a European dimension as well. Indeed, they stress that it is 
‘important to acknowledge the distinctively European dimension to the 
modern imperial city’.9 The growth of these global, imperial cites also 
 ‘THE GREATEsT C ITY THE woRlD HAs EvER sEEn’ 157
affected questions of centre and peripheries. If Britain was the world’s 
greatest empire, its capital London was at the very core of this enterprise. 
But how did other European cities fare in this respect – did they consti-
tute imperial centres in their own right?
This present study aims to shed light on how London as a metropolis 
was referenced in comparison to other European cities in British newspa-
pers of the late nineteenth century. The focus here is on the term ‘metrop-
olis’, and how it underwent wide semantic shifts over the centuries in 
public debates. The aim, therefore, is not to provide an empirical study 
about the precise level or intensity of contact between European cities in 
the late nineteenth century. Rather, it lies in establishing relevant con-
texts and associations which the metropolis assumed in public debates in 
a national context. What was the defining tenor in public debates about 
the metropolis in British newspapers of the time? Further, drawing on 
Gilbert and Driver’s claims, can we find indicators for an alleged pan-Eu-
ropean context in regard to debates about the imperial metropolis in 
these newspapers?
The collections used here in order to identify some initial longitudi-
nal trends in the use of the term ‘metropolis’ in relation to London and to 
other European cities include the nineteenth-century British Newspaper 
Archive (BNA) and also the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Burney 
Collection of British Newspapers (Burney Collection) and the Early 
English Books Online corpus (EEBO).10 This is accompanied by a more 
detailed analysis of one newspaper from the BNA, the London based 
Pall Mall Gazette (PMGZ), through a method called collocation analysis, 
undertaken by the digital tool AntConc.11 AntConc was originally devel-
oped by and for corpus linguists, and offers valuable functionalities for 
historians and humanities scholars who work with large-scale textual 
corpora. Collocation analysis provides context on recurring expressions 
and wordfields that appear in close proximity to a given concept such as 
‘metropolis’, and facilitates a closer understanding of how the term was 
used and how its meaning changed over time.
London as the prime metropolis
The contours of London’s dominance as a major metropolis in the 
nineteenth century are well established: it not only grew into the largest city 
in the world but was also widely considered as the only ‘globally hegemonic’ 
city of its time.12 It served as the undisputed centre of worldwide commercial 
and financial activity from around 1830 onwards, until it was superseded by 
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New York at the beginning of the twentieth century. Britain was at the fore-
front of the industrial revolution, and the effects of rapid urbanization and 
industrialization occurred here earlier, and to greater effect, than in other 
European countries. Its growing overseas empire far surpassed that of all 
other European countries. For these reasons, London became increasingly 
known as ‘the empire’s capital’ or the ‘imperial metropolis of the world’ from 
the early nineteenth century onwards in public usage, even if this did not 
always indicate admiration.13 For example, in 1830 the prominent pamphlet-
eer and journalist William Cobbett commented on the use of the term in his 
pamphlet Rural Rides, in which he espoused his critical views of the devel-
opments affecting the city of London. In regard to the future of the city he 
wrote: ‘But, what is to be the fate of the great wen of all? The monster, called, 
by the silly coxcombs of the press, “the metropolis of the empire”?’14 Despite 
Cobbett’s dismay at the press, the term became more widely used by journal-
ists and writers. An article from the London Standard newspaper in 1882 not 
only describes London as the ‘greatest city the world has ever seen’ but in the 
same sentence also points to its role as ‘imperial metropolis’.15 In the heyday of 
Britain’s imperial age, these forms of boosterism served to cultivate an image 
of the capital as the representative centrepiece of the British Empire, from 
which its various provinces, dependencies and peripheries were ruled and 
administered. They helped not only to highlight London’s reach in political 
terms but also to underscore its role as the unchallenged seat of imperial rule 
and ‘principal site of imperial trade and finance’.16 London was important as a 
showcase of an imperial city, since such cities, as Derek Keene points out, were 
important ‘as symbolic capital and as sites where the material and ideological 
expression of that capital can be accumulated, displayed or obtained’.17
Other examples of boosterism include literary texts, travel accounts 
and tour guides about London, such as one published in 1902, grandly 
entitled The Heart of the Empire: Discussions of Problems of Modern City 
Life in England with an Essay on Imperialism.18 The theme was still present 
after the First World War, in a volume called London of the Future pub-
lished in 1921 by the ‘London Society’, a civic group consisting mainly 
of architects who sought to discuss urban issues and foster the physical 
renewal of the city. The various contributions to the volume provide 
ideas and visions for London’s public spaces, monuments and buildings. 
One chapter suggests that ‘London should be officially recognized by the 
Empire as its capital, so that the whole Empire may take a pride in its 
beautification and development as the centre of the greatest political 
organization the world has ever known’.19 London is integrated neatly 
and unambiguously into the larger context of empire-building, and the 
desired trajectory for its future is expressed unambiguously: it is meant 
 ‘THE GREATEsT C ITY THE woRlD HAs EvER sEEn’ 159
to stand as the representative centrepiece, the ‘symbolic capital’ of impe-
rial pursuits.
In his extensive study of London as an imperial metropolis, 
Jonathan Schneer notes that the impact of empire ‘imparted a certain 
atmosphere to the city’s built environment; a certain ambiance to its cul-
ture; a certain tone to its politics’.20 That tone, it bears pointing out, was 
not always as confident and self-assured as in the examples above, for 
London was ‘often regarded as an inadequate capital city for the British 
Empire’.21 The rivalry between London and Paris is well documented. 
Schneer states that ‘for the greater part of the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries, and despite its self-acclaimed and widely acknowledged 
role as an imperial metropolis and world city, London suffered from … a 
severe inferiority complex – in comparison to other European capitals, 
especially Paris.’22 Doubts about its status were tied to the perceived lack 
of a befitting material expression of its imperial status but also – at least 
in the minds of socialist reformers such as Sydney Webb – to the inade-
quate living conditions in which the majority of the population lived. In 
his influential tract The London Programme Webb noted:
The largest city in the world, the capital of the Empire, cannot, in these 
democratic days, safely be abandoned to the insidious influence of its 
festering centres of social ulceration. We dare not neglect the sullen 
discontent now spreading among its toiling millions … . Metropolitan 
reform has become a national, if not an imperial question.23
The pressing problems of urban discontent and poverty were taken 
up by numerous public figures, among them William Stead, the editor 
of the London-based Pall Mall Gazette which appeared from 1865 until 
1922. The newspaper was initially regarded as one of the so-called‘ club-
land’ newspapers because its target reader was a ‘gentleman relaxing in 
his club (probably in Pall Mall or St James’ Street) between work and the 
night’s social events’.24 Yet in 1883, the PMGZ changed its outlook when 
William Stead assumed the editorship. He aligned the paper with a more 
liberal and progressive agenda, and opened it up to the lower middle 
classes by pursuing a more sensationalist newspaper style. Importantly, 
he also took a personal interest in what he regarded as the corrosive moral 
influence of modern city life on its citizens.25 Stead travelled to the United 
States in the 1880s and wrote books about his impression of American 
cities, especially Chicago. He edited and produced pamphlets in which 
he exposed the living conditions of London’s poor. In 1885, the PMGZ 
published the ‘Maiden Tribute of Modern Babylon’ campaign, a series of 
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articles on the problem of prostitution in London. The campaign was in 
support of a stalled piece of legislation aimed at eradicating under-age 
prostitution, which subsequently passed Parliament. While the ‘Maiden 
Tribute’ campaign is not going to be analysed in detail here, the image of 
London as a ‘modern Babylon’ offers one example of how the view of the 
metropolis was actively channelled by the press.
While London was clearly at the centre of this newspaper’s concern, 
which other major European and indeed American cities did the PMGZ 
refer to and report on? Figure 10.1, below, provides a percentage-based 
overview of how often European and American cities are mentioned in 
the newspaper over a thirty-year period. Certainly, the growing American 
cities that William Stead was interested in are present, but the overall 
focus in the PMGZ during the late nineteenth century remained on estab-
lished European cities. Unsurprisingly, Paris leads consistently by a wide 
margin, followed by Berlin, Rome, Vienna and Amsterdam, while New 
York is prominent ahead of Chicago and Washington.
Paris initially accounts for more than 60 per cent of the total ref-
erences overall. By 1900, its prominence has lessened somewhat but 
it still accounts for half of the references. The position of Berlin, Rome 
and Vienna remains largely consistent over the thirty-year period, but 
lags behind New York, clearly the most prominent American city, before 
Washington, Chicago and San Francisco. Thus Paris emerges as the focal 
Figure 10.1 Percentage-based occurrences of European and American 
cities, excluding London, in the PMGZ during the period 1870–1900. 
Calculated by the author on the full-text archive of PMGZ  with 
frequencies derived from the AntConc tool. 
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point for reporting from the Continent, while New York is the most prom-
inent American city of its age within the PMGZ. If London is included in 
the count by percentages, Figure 10.2 indicates that on average around 
half of the references are to London and the other half to the aforemen-
tioned cities. But to what extent are these cities described as metropoles, 
and how is the term used?
Changing meanings of the metropolis
In its modern, secular meaning, a metropolis can be understood as a 
city that ‘gives widely recognized expression to a certain culture’, that 
emits cultural, political and social impulses beyond its borders which can 
function as a reference culture or an aspirational model for other cities.26 
Originally, however, the Greek word ‘metropolis’ derives from metera – 
mother. Thus the metropolis designates a ‘mother city’, one that was 
meant to sponsor and support other cities in its imperial reach. The word 
metropolis thus already contains the relational element of the central 
metropole and the colonies. Accordingly, the term has traditionally been 
used in the context of a centre and periphery, implying unequal, hierar-
chical constellations between the two entities.27 Yet, during the Middle 
Ages the term metropolis referred primarily to places of ecclesiastical 
power, and designated the extent of a bishop’s reach. The ecclesiastical 
designation has not disappeared altogether, but this religiously inflected 
Figure 10.2 Percentage-based occurrences of selected European 
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meaning of the metropolis began to weaken from about the eighteenth 
century, Richard Rodger claims.28 References to the term in newspapers 
increased from about 1750 as indicated in Figure  10.3 below, roughly 
when British overseas expansion began to take off.
The Early English Books Online corpus provides a useful  additional 
resource – collocation analysis – in order to gain a sense of the contexts 
in which the term ‘metropolis’ was used from the eighteenth  century 
onwards. Throughout the seventeenth century the strongest collocations 
for the metropolis are to the ‘city’ and to the unit of the ‘province’. The fact 
that a metropolis was discursively most closely connected to a ‘province’ 
suggests that this provided the most important unit of administration at 
the time. Prominent also are collocations with places such as ‘Ephesus’ 
and ‘Jerusalem’, suggesting that the religious connotations of the term 
were still present, as well as a collocation with ‘mother’, suggesting that 
the image of the metropolis as a ‘mother city’ is present.
In the eighteenth century, however, references to cities such as 
Jerusalem and Ephesus have disappeared, as has the collocate ‘province’. 
Instead, discursive connections are made to ‘Kingdom’, ‘county’, and the 
‘country’, but also to the ‘Empire’, ahead of ‘England’, and also specifically 
to the city of ‘London’.29
As the following analysis demonstrates, the meaning of the term 
again changed considerably in public usage throughout the nineteenth 
century. Robert Rotenberg has suggested that by the end of this cen-
tury, ‘metropolis’ had become firmly established in its ‘original use in the 
European cultural field, designating the capital city of a colonial system’.30 
Figure 10.3 Number of documents for the search term ‘metropolis’ 
during the period 1700–1800. (Source: Burney Collection).
Frequency: Number of Documents By Year
Click a point to view results or click and drag to zoom
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Specifically London’s growth and elevation in status as a metropolis 
amounted to what architectural historians have termed ‘metropolitan-
ism’: a concerted effort to reshape prominent cities into dominant ‘impe-
rial commercial centres’.31 Metropolitanism, Rotenberg claims, occurred 
through the spatial and architectural restructuring of cities and the emer-
gence of new representational spaces. The example of the London of the 
Future publication illustrates how architectural schemes were developed 
with the aim of conveying a sense of imperial grandeur and power. This 
type of metropolitanism, Rotenberg notes, remained the privilege of the 
dominant European empires and was made possible only through the eco-
nomic exploitation of their colonies. Even so, he notes:
[t]he only cities that could afford such reshaping were those that 
benefited from the colonial economy, the metropoles of London, 
Paris and Vienna. Other colonial capitals, like Amsterdam, Brussels, 
St Petersburg, and Berlin, and industrial ports, like New York, would 
follow along as best they could, but always in the shadow of these 
three metropolises.32
While this account provides a powerful explanatory narrative for the 
changes that took place in London and other European cities, it bears 
pointing out that ‘metropolitanism’ manifested itself not only to different 
degrees, but also on the basis of different cultural contexts and constella-
tions of empire. Paris, for example, did not seek to establish itself as a city 
of international trade as much as London. Its status as an imperial city 
derived less from its ‘relationships with the wider world through trade 
or conquest’ than from its achievements in the arts, and its status as the 
undisputed centre of intellectual thought and as a place for luxurious 
consumption for wealthy visitors, a show capital that was torn between 
‘conflicting expressions of capitalism and self-glorification’.33 Berlin, 
the capital of the ‘belated nation’, without major colonies, experienced 
its heyday as a metropolis only in the early twentieth century.34 Vienna, 
which Rotenberg names as the third of the major imperial cities, was the 
centre of a land rather than a sea empire, and accordingly derived its 
status from its European territories, rather than from overseas ones. It, 
too, depended on displays of spectacle and royal pageantry in order to 
project a sense of a ‘cosmopolitan city of culture, luxurious and fashion-
able elegance’.35 This emphasis on consumption, luxury and fashion, as 
will be borne out in the following analysis, was less prominent in the case 
of London.
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Tracking the term over the course of the nineteenth century via the 
British Newspaper Archive reveals a notable increase in the use of the 
term ‘metropolis’ from the 1820s onwards, a time when the ‘new build-
ings and streets of regency London so impressed observers from home 
and abroad’ that the term metropolis became synonymous with the 
British capital, Richard Rodgers suggests.36 The increase in the use of the 
term also coincides with Britain’s most intense phase of industrialization 
and urbanization, and London’s growth to become the biggest city in the 
world.
Further, Andrew Lees has pointed out that during the 1820s the 
effects of urban growth were beginning to be increasingly discussed in 
books, pamphlets, periodicals and newspapers to a greater extent, which 
goes some way to explaining the increase in the use of the term during 
this time.37 Importantly, during these years and until about 1865, new 
administrative and institutional entities relating to the governance of 
London were established, which further explains the sharp increase 
in the use of the term during those years. In 1829 the ‘Metropolitan 
Police’ was founded, and in 1855 the ‘Metropolis Management Act’, 
passed by the British Parliament, established a London-wide body, 
the ‘Metropolitan Board of Works’, to co-ordinate and administer the 
planning for London’s infrastructure. Additionally, in 1865, the new 
‘Metropolitan Municipalities Association’ further institutionalized the 
governance of the City of London.38 All these new institutions and subse-
quent debates about their influence on the governance of the city proved 
to be crucial in solidifying London’s self-representation as a metropolis. 
From the 1870s onwards, as Figure 10.4 clearly indicates, the use of the 
term fell sharply. Certainly, discussions over the administration and gov-
ernance of London were still taking place throughout these decades, but 
the figures suggest that the quantity of the debates about the metropolis 
decreased considerably from the 1870s onwards. An in-depth analysis of 
the relevant contexts of the term in the PMGZ suggests that the following 
themes are prominent.39
Firstly, there is a high prevalence of terms such as ‘metropo-
lis+water’, ‘metropolis+management’, ‘metropolis+local manage-
ment’, and ‘metropolis+metropolitan police’, indicating that debates 
about management and administration, and discussions about water 
quality and supply were important, as were references to the police, 
which is unsurprising, given that reports on crimes and the work of the 
police constitute a daily staple of newspapers. It is notable that for the 
period 1870–9, the metropolis is initially frequently discussed in rela-
tion to an ‘increase’, the second most common cluster, but its frequency 
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drops in 1880–9, and for the period 1890–9 this cluster does not appear 
at all. Thus, while the metropolis is initially strongly discussed in terms 
of growth and increase, this becomes less pronounced in the following 
two decades. Similarly, the cluster ‘improvement’ appears only in the 
first ten years, but is missing thereafter, which would suggest that dis-
cussions about the immense growth of the city and its improvements 
became less pronounced. Seemingly, while discussions about ‘improv-
ing’ the metropolis in relation to better sewage systems, housing and 
transport did continue, the terminology of ‘improving’ the metropolis, 
which emerged in the early nineteenth century, became less fashion-
able and fell out of use.
The metropolis also appears frequently in connection with ‘rail-
ways’. Again, this is unsurprising, given that it was at this stage of the 
1870s that the development of railways from the outlying suburbs 
and boroughs into London accelerated, enabling workers from afar to 
commute into the city, which had a profound impact on its social com-
position.40 In fact, Osterhammel maintains that the establishment of a 
well-connected railway system throughout the country from the 1850s 
and 60s onwards constituted one of the most important factors in alter-
ing the cityscapes of the nineteenth century cities to a profound degree.41 
Other prominent themes relate to ‘health’ and the ‘water supply’ in the 
metropolis, and to the continual fire hazards: ‘fires in the metropolis’ is a 
recurring cluster, together with other clusters relating to infrastructure, 
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Figure 10.4 Absolute number of documents for the search term 
‘metropolis’ during the period 1800–1900. (Source: British Newspaper 
Archive).
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Other relevant developments over the three decades relate to 
London as a metropolis of entertainment: mentions of ‘clubs in the 
metropolis’ in the 1880s, and in the 1890s to ‘music halls’, but also 
‘visitors to the metropolis’ are also on the increase, indicating that the 
metropolis is increasingly connected to ideas of entertainment and 
tourism. This is further supported by the fact that the terms ‘night’ and 
‘music’ appear for the first time in the list of collocations for 1890–9. The 
connotation of the metropolis as a place of entertainment, music and 
spectacle becomes more pronounced in this last decade of the century, 
which is borne out by the fact that while music halls and places of enter-
tainment obviously existed in London, the city had only thirty-three 
such halls in 1866, which amounted to only 10 per cent of existing halls 
nationwide.42 More elaborate, luxurious theatres and music halls devel-
oped only from the mid-1880s, the years in which the reopening of the 
London Pavilion in 1886 ushered in a period of faster growth of music 
halls, which had been more subdued up until then.43 This goes some 
way to explaining why those collocates that relate to entertainment and 
nightlife enter the terminology of the newspaper to a stronger extent at 
this later stage. Overall, the analysis demonstrates that the metropolis is 
discussed to a large extent in relation to issues of governance and admin-
istration, but also importantly to issues relating to location, transport 
and infrastructure. In addition, terms relating to measurements, espe-
cially to terms indicating the size of the metropolis, appear frequently.
The metropolis is also discussed in the context of ‘money’ and 
‘commerce’, with references to businesses, business rates and rents. 
Interestingly, though, there are hardly any mentions of the metropolis as 
a place of wealth. Instead, it features recurrently in the context of ‘poor’ 
or terms such as ‘pauperism’, ‘vagrants’ and ‘destitution’, which indicate 
that the PMGZ did frequently report on the conditions of the poor and 
destitute in London. Historians such as Andrew Lees have pointed out 
that awareness and investigation of urban poverty received a new impe-
tus during the 1880s and 1890s, in the wake of an economic slump which 
aggravated chronic housing shortages and chronic underemployment in 
certain industries.44 Given William Stead’s aforementioned concern with 
the plight of the urban poor, this concern with poverty in itself is unsur-
prising. Even so, the absence of words such as ‘wealth’ or related syno-
nyms – even just to draw a contrast between London’s poor and the rich 
– is striking. By way of possible explanation for this absence, one might 
put forward that the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Board of Works, and 
that of several other metropolitan bodies, excluded the City of London, 
where the main source of the city’s wealth was generated.
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While we find increasing evidence of associations with leisure 
activities such as music halls and nightlife, direct references to consump-
tion such as ‘buying’ or ‘shopping’, or to specific shops, do not appear 
at all, although the nature and extent of shops and consumption habits 
changed immensely in nineteenth-century London from small, directly 
owned shops at the start of the century, to different forms of retail estab-
lishments, including shopping arcades (1817) and the first department 
stores (1850s). While these had a noticeable impact on consumption 
patterns by creating a growing mass urban market, and in ‘encouraging 
ever more people to visit London primarily for the purpose of shopping’, 
London remains chiefly described as a place of commerce and finance 
rather than a luxurious shopping destination for the discerning nine-
teenth-century traveller, on a par with Paris or Vienna.45 Evidently, a 
different corpus composed of travel books and tour guides would pro-
vide very different results. For example, Gilbert’s study of guidebook 
representations of imperial London suggests that within the literature of 
various travel guides, ‘London’s major shops, and particularly the great 
department stores, had long sold themselves as spectacles with a global 
reach’.46 Even so, the connotation of the metropolis as a place of conspic-
uous consumption does not yet feature strongly in the newspapers.
Having fleshed out the broad semantic terrain which the metrop-
olis covers, the absences or omissions are revealing. With regard to the 
question of the imperial dimension of the metropolis it is noticeable that 
neither the cluster nor the collocation analysis has provided any recur-
ring mentions of explicit references to other European metropoles such 
as Berlin and Vienna, or to American cities. None of the major cities 
such as Berlin, Rome or Vienna, or related adjectives such as ‘German’, 
‘Austrian’ or ‘Italian’, are present as frequent collocates for the metrop-
olis. The only exception is ‘French’, which appears as a fairly infrequent 
collocate with the metropolis during the period 1870–9. References to 
a ‘German’, ‘Dutch’ or ‘Austrian’ metropolis are completely marginal. As 
a way of cross-checking, a separate collocation analysis for the terms 
‘Berlin’, ‘Paris’ and ‘Vienna’ confirms that these cities do not appear 
together with ‘metropolis’ or terms such as ‘metropolitan’ as relevant 
collocates. Given that references to relevant British commercial and 
financial centres such as Leeds, Manchester or Glasgow are also miss-
ing, this seems to suggest that the assignation of a ‘metropolis’ remains 
the preserve of the British capital city in the PMGZ, but is also applied 
to a very limited degree to Paris. This tendency is confirmed on a larger 
scale in the BNA corpus. Figure 10.5 indicates that the expression ‘French 
metropolis’ far outstrips mentions of a German, Dutch, Austrian, or even 
168 RE-MAPPInG CEnTRE AnD PERIPHERY
a more general ‘European’ metropolis. The ‘American metropolis’ is, how-
ever, more noticeable. Given that, as established previously, references 
to the size and to ‘growth’ or ‘increases’ appear to be important mark-
ers by which a metropolis is measured, one might suggest that since the 
newly emerging American cities were growing at a much faster rate than 
European cities in the late nineteenth century, they are designated more 
often as metropoles than the less dynamic European counterparts, with 
the exception of Paris.
The imperial metropolis
Are cities other than London referred to as a distinctly ‘imperial metrop-
olis’? Again, the BNA corpus indicates that the term is used very infre-
quently within the period in question here. Most often, this term refers to 
London, but other cities, such as Rome and Nice, are referred to in their 
capacity as ‘imperial metropoles’ in ancient times. References to contem-
porary imperial cities other than London include St Petersburg, Vienna 
as the seat of the Habsburg Empire, and Berlin the self-proclaimed kai-
serliche Reichshauptstadt, ‘imperial metropolis’.
Present-day Vienna is described as a beautiful example of a European 
imperial city, with a suitably representative centre, but lacking in dyna-



































































Figure 10.5 Absolute number of documents containing the search 
terms ‘French’, ‘German’, ‘Austrian’, ‘Dutch’, ‘Belgian’, ‘European’, 
‘American’ metropolis during the period 1800–99. Calculated by the 
author from data derived from the British Newspaper Archive. 
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Ring and beautiful open parks, is indeed an imperial city; but nobody can 
walk through it without being oppressed by the idea that it is too large 
for its inhabitants and has had its day. The people do not seem to be able 
to fill the streets, and the theatres are often half-empty’.47 The article con-
cludes that Vienna is outranked by other, more vibrant European cities 
such as Naples, Stockholm, Budapest and Constantinople.
Berlin, however, is credited as a newly emerging ‘imperial metropo-
lis’ and a city of the future. The newspaper articles discuss the city’s lack 
of affordable housing and the subsequent threat of disease that affects 
the poorer inhabitants of the ‘imperial metropolis’.48 A later article from 
1874 provides an extensive portrait of the emerging city and commends 
the recent steps that the city administration has undertaken to alleviate 
the housing crisis and to build suitably representative imperial buildings. 
Thus the newspaper reports that ‘when the war of 1870–1 was over and 
Berlin was proclaimed Weltstadt by its enthusiastic citizens, the inhab-
itants of the Prussian provinces emigrated in shoals to the new impe-
rial metropolis, eager to profit by the era of boundless prosperity which 
the newspapers announced was dawning for it’.49 Having overcome the 
initial housing crisis, the article continues, ‘thousands of houses, built 
[in] the Parisian style, are rising in every direction, and today there is 
accommodation for all’. With Berlin’s elevation in status, however, came 
a corrosion of moral propriety: ‘Moralists are fond of railing against 
Paris, designating it as the Babylon of the nineteenth century, but in this 
respect Berlin and Vienna undoubtedly carry off the palm, and might 
fairly be called the modern Sodom and Gomorrah.’ The article sets Berlin 
within the recurring themes affecting European cities of the time: hous-
ing, architecture and matters of public health, as well as the perceived 
threat of moral decay.
The theme of Berlin’s growing stature as a ‘capital of the empire’ 
is reprised in an article from 1896 in the PMGZ. The correspondent 
notes that Berlin’s ‘greatest growth has doubtless been in the character 
of the capital of an empire, of the head-centre of an expanding national 
life. There is the most obvious proof of this in the handsomely built 
streets, the shops, hotels, cafes, restaurants, all of which have been 
modelled, in their brightness and grace, on the Paris rather than on 
the London model’.50 Again, it is the representative quality of its centre 
and the presence of modern entertainment venues in the all-important 
‘Parisian style’ which, in the view of the author, elevate Berlin to the 
rank of a European metropolis. Arguably, we might read these as exam-
ples of Gilbert and Driver’s aforementioned ‘pan-European discourse’ 
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on the imperial city, in which cities are compared and ranked against 
each other on the basis of a shared understanding of what constitutes 
a modern metropolis. But is this a relevant context where London as 
an imperial metropolis is usually referenced? With regard to British 
newspapers, the following contexts appear dominant:
a)  In a political context related to discussions about the British 
Empire (internationally);
b)  In discussions concerning the United Kingdom, and rela-
tions between Ireland and England or Scotland and England 
(nationally);
c)  In a historical context, comparing London to examples of ancient 
‘imperial cities’, such as Babylon, Rome and Sparta;
d)  In relation to infrastructure and architecture (locally).
One such example of an explicit reference to the city and its place within 
the project of empire occurs in an article published in the London Daily 
News from 1899, which reports on the ‘Greater Britain Exhibition’, an 
exhibition that was meant to showcase British imperial achievements. 
For the event, about 200 Zulus were brought from South Africa and 
housed in a small purpose-built village to form part of the exhibition. 
This crass display of ‘natives’ or ‘imperial subjects’ aroused indignation in 
the newspapers, but for altogether different reasons than a reader might 
think of today:
The natives themselves will scarcely have profited by their visit to 
the imperial metropolis. They have received far too much notice: 
and children are always spoilt by that process. They will scarcely 
carry back, we fear, to the neighbourhoods whence they came 
very favourable reports as to the dignity and wisdom of the British 
public.51
An article from the Western Daily Press on the same topic, however, 
urges cooler heads to prevail in the face of this perceived indignation. 
The paper notes, ‘it does not appear reasonable to offer indignant pro-
test against their presence in the imperial metropolis. It is, indeed, not 
all complimentary [to] the people of the British metropolis to insinuate 
that by mere stay amongst them of a few months the representatives of 
the natives will be hopelessly demoralised.’52 Both articles explicitly con-
textualize London’s role here as the prime metropolis around which its 
colonies revolve.
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Of course, London was not only the metropolis in relation to its 
overseas colonies, but also vis-à-vis other parts of the United Kingdom, 
including Scotland and Ireland. This point is highlighted in a speech by 
Prime Minister Gladstone in 1893 in Edinburgh regarding the controver-
sial Second Irish Home Rule Bill, which was picked up in several local and 
regional newspapers. Gladstone’s speech touches on issues of legislation 
in response to demands for more autonomy for Scotland and Wales, and 
states that ‘there is a legislative famine in the land. In connection with 
the claims of Scotland comes the case of Wales. Behind these stand the 
demands of England in the first instance, and the great imperial metropo-
lis of London, with its four millions of people’.53 Other articles frequently 
highlight London as the oppressive, domineering imperial metropolis in 
relation to Ireland and Scotland, and provide a glimpse of the highly neg-
ative connotations which the term assumed in different contexts.54
Political contexts aside, the term is also used in the context of com-
paring and ranking London with the imperial cities of antiquity. An arti-
cle from the London Standard, for example, describes London as follows:
The greatest city the world has ever seen is not only the centre 
of national beneficence, but is also an imperial metropolis. By all 
means let those give out of their abundance remember the poor; 
but let them not forget that there are other opportunities for the 
display of their munificence. The plutocrats of our modern Babylon 
have yet to recognise that London is the Sparta, which, as the 
Lacedemonian legislators impressed upon their people, it is their 
duty to adorn.55
London is compared here to the classical cities of antiquity and their 
evocative historical legacy: Babylon as a dysphemism for the large and 
ungovernable city, and Sparta as a positive model of social purity, disci-
pline and purposeful conduct.
Finally, the ‘imperial metropolis’ is framed in relation to architec-
tural ambition and achievement. An article from the PMGZ devoted to ‘the 
great problem of the housing of the working classes in London’ discusses 
the merits and drawbacks of different forms of housing schemes, which 
apply to those ‘who are still dwelling in Central London, but whose poor 
tenements are gradually being swept away in the rebuilding of an Imperial 
Metropolis’.56 While taking the side of the poorer residents, it implies that 
an imperial metropolis invariably consists of a suitably representative cen-
tre, rather than one in which tenement buildings are located – bringing to 
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mind Rotenberg’s classification of the imperial metropolis as a project of 
spatial reorganization of European cities.
In summary, London as imperial metropolis is relevant in differ-
ent contexts: firstly, in relation to the British Empire, for it is through 
London’s description as a global metropolis that the British press con-
structs a notion of centre and periphery on a global scale. These asym-
metries are also relevant on a national level, especially in the context 
of centre–periphery relations between England, Ireland and Scotland. 
Other relevant contexts refer to the spatial reorganization of the city and 
the imperial cities of antiquity. As the collocation analysis of the EEBO 
corpus for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries indicates, the use of 
the term metropolis in relation to ancient and historical cities has a long 
tradition. Throughout the nineteenth century, the term became increas-
ingly common in general usage and its meaning broadened. As the 
study of the PMGZ has shown, the metropolis became used in relation 
to a wide field of topical debates about the city: its administration and 
police, its infrastructure, the quality of its water supply, the risk of fire 
and London as a place of musical and theatrical entertainment. On rare 
occasions, London is compared even in the late nineteenth century to 
the imperial cities of antiquity, suggesting that this remains a reference 
point as a way of channelling an image of the modern-day metropolis. 
Importantly, however, the use of the term ‘metropolis’ is reserved chiefly 
for London and, to a lesser degree, Paris, reifying the perception that 
London and Paris were the only ‘real’ imperial metropoles in a league of 
their own.
In regard to the departure point for this study about the distinctly 
European dimension of the metropolis, this suggests that such a context 
was not a consistent theme in British newspapers at the time, and was 
more likely prominent in more specialist books – arguably elite or niche 
publications – rather than in everyday, ‘mundane’ newspaper reports. 
Certainly, the PMGZ did report widely on events from other European 
and North American cities; while it was a London-based newspaper, its 
outlook was far from provincial. Even so, the metropolis was firmly set 
within British national preoccupations of the time such as the British 
Empire, or in relation to Ireland and Scotland. In the high imperial phase 
of the late nineteenth century – a time also of increasing nationalist sen-
timent in the popular press – imperial London was therefore presented to 
its readers as a metropolis quite unique, rather than in conversation with 
its European counterparts.
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Despite its local nature, consumption is an important activity for estab-
lishing an individual’s sense of the global. Looking into the twentieth cen-
tury allows us to chart a new relationship of the global and peripheral. 
Indeed, consumption is an activity that took on even more intensity in the 
twentieth century, while global supply chains affected ever more people. 
Because the subject of this chapter – multi-national companies – became 
particularly powerful in the  twentieth century, and because consumers in 
the peripheries eventually gained financial clout – and thus a new kind 
of influence – this chapter focuses on the later century. In this it comple-
ments the earlier focus of the other chapters because it lets us see clearly 
relationships that were less visible in earlier periods when branding was 
not aimed at the individual consumer.
As companies that sold goods in different national contexts in the 
late twentieth century, multi-nationals, were particularly significant in 
establishing individual views of the global because through their adver-
tisements they combined local understandings of consumption with 
visions of the global. Multi-nationals were important mediators between 
the local and the global; they spread peculiar things that do not fit neatly 
into the categories of transnational history: hybrid images, or locally 
 tailored impressions of the global.
There have always been more people in the periphery than the 
centre and so we need to take seriously the ways in which they exerted 
influence on the centre. Consumption was a key way in which periph-
eries could influence centres – at least when their consumption became 
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more global. The timeframe that this chapter will focus on, the 1950s and 
1960s, makes it fitting to talk about asymmetries and their ramifications 
rather than periphery and centre: asymmetries of power, of size and of 
wealth. This chapter will focus particularly on asymmetrical encounters 
in the realm of consumption between providers and consumers.
Consumption is particularly interesting in this regard. It is uniquely 
placed to reverse asymmetries of power, due to the fact that providers 
are influenced by consumers. At the same time, smaller countries have 
reversed asymmetries by creating multi-nationals, thereby influencing 
world markets beyond what their size might lead scholars to expect. Of 
particular interest here are two types of asymmetry: firstly, that between 
consumer and supplier; and secondly, that between small countries, with 
few consumers but multi-nationals, and large countries, with many con-
sumers and few multi-nationals.
Thus this chapter is not focused on how objects move between 
places, but rather how influence, through consumption, can travel against 
asymmetries – particularly from ‘weaker’ consumers to ‘stronger’ con-
sumers through multi-national companies. Like so many things, this is 
fundamentally a question of how the global and the local interact. In the 
two examples of Dutch multi-national companies studied here, Heineken 
and Unilever, two different types of interaction between global and local 
are evident. Both underline asymmetries: after the Second World War, 
Heineken chose to advertise a single product around the world, using 
local visions of the global to sell its single product, while Unilever focused 
on catering to national markets, using the local to give the global legit-
imacy. Although Heineken’s strategy is that most frequently connected 
with the idea of homogenization through globalization, this is perhaps 
too simple an analysis. Unilever caters to the local, but uses it to sell prod-
ucts of global concern. At the same time, however, the company offers a 
powerful channel for the local to influence the global because it oper-
ates across markets around the world. Heineken, meanwhile, uses local 
semantic codes to craft its supposedly hegemonic image of the global for 
each market.
Whether companies generate desires among consumers or respond 
to them is a point of contention in the literature about consumption. One 
recent suggestion by A. A. A. de la Bruhezé is to consider these processes 
as intertwined. Companies can be seen in this view as ‘mediators’ between 
consumers and producers.1 Any action ‘creating’ desire among consum-
ers reinforces the asymmetry of producers and consumers because the 
company is stronger, whereas ‘following’ reverses it because the stronger 
party (the company) fulfils the wishes of the weaker party (consumers). 
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Most importantly, mediation suggests a two-way flow between groups 
with different (but not necessarily independent) interests. Multi-
nationals, too, can usefully be understood as mediators of global images.
Visions of the global were always mediated. Even when this appar-
ently started to end – around the time of the first world’s fair, held in 
1851 in the Crystal Palace in London, the ‘Great Exhibition of the Works 
of Industry of All Nations’– it was changing rather than disappearing. 
World’s fairs functioned as a form of local re-enactment of the global, 
where foreign places were represented in familiar terms to local people. 
In so far as states or nations created pavilions at world fairs dedicated 
to their industrial or cultural output, the fairs served to link consumers 
and producers, but the message was still mediated in a way that became 
unnecessary once the rise of tourism and television enabled people to 
make images of ‘the global’ for themselves (and test received images). 
Yet along with reading (mediated by the author), images (mediated by 
artists), or gossip (mediated by travellers and non-travellers), world’s 
fairs (or ‘Expos’ from 1967), and what came after them, were just dif-
ferently mediated visions of the global – and were treated that way by 
consumers. Despite being open to exotic goods from abroad, people 
always consumed renditions of the global within a local context. The 
global began as a mix of images of foreign places before morphing into a 
broader concept; the changing nature of trade, including the rise of mul-
ti-national business enterprises, was an important contributor to this 
shift. The authors, if not the power, of these mediated images changed 
over time.
The transnational nature of consumption raises many questions 
about its importance in creating the categories of the global and the local. 
Consumption has been transnational for a long time; as a consequence, 
although the nature of consumption has changed, openness towards 
the global through consumption has remained. Trade has always been 
important to shaping individuals’ views of the global. In times when the 
only contact between places came through diplomacy and trade, the first 
image that other countries had of the global, of foreign places – in every 
meaning of the word – were images borne by goods. Kristin Hoganson has 
argued that in the nineteenth century consumption created ‘imagined 
communities’ that transcended political boundaries.2 Frank Trentmann 
pushes the date of the first consumer society much further back.3 Several 
historians have argued that many of the earliest examples of transnation-
ality come from trading networks. And more importantly, knowledge 
(both formal and informal) of foreign cultures and social mores fre-
quently followed trade.4 It was the naturally transnational ties of trade 
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that were interrupted by the rise of nationalism, which caused some 
countries to sever such ties for ideological reasons or to retreat into the 
trade networks of empire. The late twentieth century saw the reinstate-
ment of these ties, however, with the subjugation of nationalism to eco-
nomics and the victory of the ideology of free trade.5 Politics has always 
been able to shape consumption.6
The idea of consumer activism – the achieving of social rather than 
political ends through consumption – is a recent (i.e. late twentieth-cen-
tury) idea7 because it rests on an awareness of the global nature of sup-
ply chains and the power of consumers that only evolved recently. It is 
important to distinguish this from the notion of the consumer as a polit-
ical actor, which has a longer history.8 Indeed, the importance of con-
sumers as a political identity, the notion of the ‘consumer citizen’, has 
successfully been applied to the past.9 Yet the idea that ‘the most common 
way we participate in social activism is by buying something’10 depends 
on a couple of mental changes that took time to come about. The most 
important is an awareness of the global interconnectedness of supply 
chains, which was gradually constructed in the second half of the twen-
tieth century. This particular notion of the global is one in which individ-
uals (can) take much more responsibility for what goes on in far-away 
places. So, as Roland Robertson has cautioned, we should not equate the 
global interconnectedness that has always been around with globaliza-
tion as understood today, which brings with it a different consciousness 
of the relation between the local and the global.11
It is saying nothing new to assert the importance of the local for 
consumption. Despite contributing to consumers’ understandings of the 
global, consumption is a fundamentally local activity. Ilja van Damme 
has argued that consumers in the early modern period in Antwerp relied 
mostly on trusted sellers; the seller, rather than any notion of early-mod-
ern branding, was relied on for information about different products.12 
This mediation of the global by the local made it fairly irrelevant to con-
sumers where a product came from. Trust was a matter between a sales-
man and his customer in a local transaction that took place in person.
In addition, there have been many studies of how local meanings 
were used to understand foreign objects, and of agendas that were 
transported via transnational links (though generally not of trade). An 
anthropological study of the airport in Bangkok, for example, has looked 
at how local meanings were overlain on an object that served an inter-
national elite.13 While the highly modern Suvarnabhumi Airport, which 
opened for international travel in 2006, connects Thailand to a global 
infrastructure of travel, like most airports it draws its workers from the 
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local population. These workers bring local lore to the airport. Because 
according to local lore the Suvarnabhumi Airport is haunted by bad spir-
its, sacrifices are made to the god responsible for safe travel, to ensure 
successful flights.14 For the travellers passing through the airport, how-
ever, the global-ness of international travel is interrupted by the airport’s 
attempt to use local uniqueness to combat international uniformity by 
calling on elements of local culture and folklore. For those travellers 
for whom Thailand is a waypoint, part of their image of the global will 
remain mediated by the creators of the airport. Similarly, farmers in 
French Sudan used imported French machines, not to produce an idea 
of the global, but to reinforce local systems of worth: farmers who could 
use French tractors were deemed more masculine than those who did not 
have them.15 In this way, foreign objects can be foils for the local as much 
as reflections of the global.
Yet the meanings or uses of specific objects are less important here 
than the empirical evidence of how multi-national companies, under-
stood as mediators, used images of the global and the local to further 
their business interests. This study is interested in the shaping of images 
before consumption – i.e. images that influenced the act of acquisition, 
and whether or not they influenced the meaning of consumption itself. 
Multi-nationals are heavily implicated as mediators responsible for con-
structing meanings of the global, because for locals they are often the 
primary representatives of it. Through their global reach, too, mul-
ti-nationals allow local customs to influence the behaviour of people in 
other places, because multi-nationals are holders and communicators of 
knowledge built up in many separate markets. The focus here will be less 
on the meanings attached to specific goods than on more general con-
cepts and their use to reverse typical asymmetries.
Heineken and Unilever are two multi-nationals based (at least 
partly) in the Netherlands. They represent ideal cases for the purpose 
of this study, because they demonstrate how multi-nationals have 
worked against asymmetries in order to forward their business inter-
ests. Asymmetries, while imperative for historians to be aware of, need 
therefore to be treated with some caution. This chapter focuses on the 
contrast between the post-war advertising strategies chosen by Heineken 
and Unilever, and their significance for shaping meanings of the global. 
The two companies sell very different products, which was important for 
the two companies’ ultimate decision regarding the place of the global in 
their respective business strategies. Heineken ended up selling a global 
product using local images of the global, while Unilever used the local in 
order to render the global more familiar to its local customers.
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Heineken
After the Second World War, Heineken, a brewer based in the Nether-
lands, set out to boost its fortunes by selling a single product to con-
sumers around the world. In its appeal to the global, Heineken was not 
alone. Western-style barley beer was already popular around the world. 
Although there were other contenders as well, ‘across the colonized 
or post-colonial world beer came to be seen as the water of moder-
nity’.16 This meant that foreign conquerors set up new factories to serve 
themselves. But their work also served to associate beer drinking with 
success and a sense of superiority. This was something that Heineken 
could take advantage of and reinforce after the war: the notion of a 
recipe for success was desirable. Part of the attraction of beer, which 
then was already a global product insofar as it was drunk around the 
world, was that consumers could show a sophisticated knowledge of 
foreign tastes through their consumption patterns. A national brand of 
beer became a symbol of and vehicle for nation-building.17 Heineken 
could take advantage of these associations: the taste for Western-style 
beer, the desire for success and cosmopolitanism, and local industrial 
frameworks established to make beer. In this way, Heineken used a 
beverage that had been an early winner of globalization to drive glo-
balization forward.
Heineken’s advertising strategy was naturally focused on associa-
tions with its beer, and here the global was a key element. To be of use for 
Heineken, the global had to be desirable, and associated with success and 
modernity. Thus the notion of the global that was promoted by Heineken 
was a very particular one. Ironically, these messages stressed the beer’s 
global appeal, but at the same time they were tailored to local consum-
ers and thus reflected local associations and tastes. Although Heineken’s 
strategy could be accused of promoting homogenization, in so far as its 
global product was everywhere the same, its success depended on a close 
understanding of the local. Thus the decision to appeal to global consum-
ers meant that the company had to appeal to consumers on all parts of an 
asymmetrical spectrum at the same time.
The company’s earliest approach to internationalization was taken 
under the leadership of Alfred Henry ‘Freddy’ Heineken, the grandson 
of the founder of the Heineken brewery, who started working for the 
company in 1940. Freddy rebuilt the company into a global brand after 
the Second World War. As part of this strategy, he decided to focus on 
a single product. This decision reinforced the pre-existing global tropes 
that Heineken’s advertising strategy had previously exploited. (The only 
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exception was the United Kingdom, where at that time lager beer was not 
yet established.18) For some, the global was aspirational; for others it was 
familiar. The innovative concept behind Heineken’s advertising strategy 
was that it could address both groups. If Heineken was everywhere the 
same, it could be relied upon to give the taste of home for global travel-
lers; ironically then, a global reach offered access to the familiarity of the 
local everywhere. For others, drinking Heineken meant joining a refined, 
global community.
Meanwhile, immediately after the war, Heineken was not yet a 
globally recognized brand. In 1953, the company commissioned seven 
international artists to create advertisements for the company to promote 
local consumption on a global scale.19 As part of this campaign it asked 
the Dutch public to pass a vote on the best images produced.20 The exam-
ple shows that for the Dutch market the company chose to emphasize the 
brand’s global appeal, which at this point was more an aspiration than 
a reality. Heineken constructed an image of global homogeneity – the 
(same) beer drunk around the world – based on a local peculiarity (that 
would be attractive to the Dutch market). Meanwhile, the campaign used 
readily recognizable icons of foreign cultures – global differences – in 
order to sell a single homogeneous product across the globe. The cam-
paign underlined that the beer fit seamlessly into any lifestyle; and that 
the global was far from anodyne, easily fitting into any local setting.
If one examines illustrations from this campaign, it seems striking 
how relatively inaccurate some of the drawings were (the more foreign 
the culture, the less accurate, one might generalize). It is important that 
these were images drawn by foreign artists but judged by and sold to 
Dutch people: they are therefore original representations of what Dutch 
people in the 1950s thought of foreign countries. The inaccuracies of 
some of the images would have made little impact on a Dutch audience. 
For instance, in the Japanese example, the image has been reversed 
(probably for purely aesthetic reasons), rendering the Japanese type 
unreadable; and it includes geishas, who would not have consumed alco-
hol, were a readily recognized image of Japan.21
The fact that these images are a local vision of the global – Dutch 
advertisements aimed at Dutch consumers – demonstrates another layer 
of relating the global to the local. Is it possible to have a vision of the 
global that is not on some level connected to a location? Or does being a 
global citizen mean forming an image of ‘the global’ from multiple local 
images? At the same time as creating a global brand in the Netherlands, 
Heineken marketed its beer abroad as a particular item of Dutch culture.22 
In Australia, for example, advertisements made clear that the beer was a 
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specifically ‘imported’ or foreign product. Whereas for Dutch consumers, 
the company chose to advertise the beer’s international credentials, for 
Australian consumers, it advertised its Dutch credentials. In both cases, 
however, the iconography used at the start of Heineken’s campaign relied 
on a vision of the global and its relationship to Dutch beer.
A newspaper advertisement prepared by Heineken for Dutch con-
sumers in 1959, when the company was more established on a global 
scale, likewise serves to illustrate the firm’s strategy to appeal to global 
consumers. The text of the advertisement, published on 19 June 1959, 
reads: ‘Why do people drink Heineken’s beer? … Because Americans, 
Italians and Irish and Frenchmen and Liberians and Icelanders drink it? 
Not for that reason! … People drink Heineken’s beer because they know 
for sure that there’s no tastier beer in the world than that from Heineken! 
Heineken: the most tapped, anywhere!’23 The logo, ‘the most tapped, 
anywhere’, would stay with the company for at least two decades, based 
on the fact that advertising the beer’s global appeal was a successful 
approach to boost sales. Thus what was important was not Heineken’s 
view of the global, but that of Heineken’s consumers in local markets. 
The fact that Heineken’s beer was not associated with any specific group 
of consumers or nationality was crucial to the decision for global appeal. 
Exceptional references to the beer’s Dutch background only reflected the 
company’s origins and the nation’s trading history.
How the company chose to structure its global market – by conti-
nents, for example – reflects ideas of the global but also different land-
scapes of production.24 It is important to remember that the company’s 
advertising, which invoked familiar stereotypes of foreign cultures, was 
largely divorced from its production supply chains, which continued 
to be local. At the same time, the company imbued its product with a 
global character of its own. In the 1950s, the company already owned 
breweries in other countries, producing the same Heineken products, 
to be sold locally under the multi-national’s name.25 By means of a local 
infrastructure, a global product was made available to consumers in 
new places.
The global provision of its beer, made possible by the local infra-
structure bought up and operated by a multi-national company, was 
separated from the cultural hybrid created by Heineken’s marketing 
department, which used cultural differences in order to argue that its 
global product could be amalgamated into any and every local culture. In 
the service of the global, the local was caricatured; and those caricatures 
were reinforced through further exposure and through association with 
a global product.
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Unilever
Unilever adopted a different strategy, being a multi-national from the 
start, co-headquartered in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. It 
was formed by the merger of a British and a Dutch company in 1929. Like 
Heineken’s, the firm’s marketing strategy was independent of its manu-
facturing, because Unilever had factories around the world.26 At first the 
company sold food, before branching into soaps and other cleaning prod-
ucts – all with an emphasis on use in the home.
Despite these different origins, Unilever’s strategy was similarly 
dependent on its global reach. The company’s role of mediating between 
producers (global) and consumers (local) forced it to come to grips 
with local peculiarities. Meanwhile, unlike Heineken, Unilever ended 
up establishing local branches that produced ‘different, nation-specific 
products’ and even products for smaller markets known as ‘segmented 
national markets’.27 Reasons for its different marketing strategy can be 
found in the fact that its products were best served by trust in the prox-
imity of the home, rather than by images of power and success. The com-
pany learned to appreciate the specific characteristics of local markets 
after its original marketing strategy failed.
Following the Second World War, Western Europe represented for 
Unilever a land of opportunity, and at first the company approached it as a 
single market. To this end, in the 1960s, it established a single ‘European’ 
research and development lab. However, the new potato snacks produced 
by its research lab, despite great initial promise, were largely rejected by 
the Dutch market.28 This experience contrasted with the successful intro-
duction by Calvé (a subsidiary of Unilever) of a new peanut snack, the bor-
relnoot, in the 1970s. The failure of Unilever’s potato snack, juxtaposed 
with Calvé’s success, convinced the company of the benefits of establishing 
nation-specific research facilities to respond to local culinary customs.29 Yet 
this local specialization relied on Unilever’s global outreach. In a kind of 
‘reverse globalization’, the multi-national used its economic power to cater 
for specific national tastes and cultures, thereby shaping and reinforcing 
local distinctions with the help of its products. Despite its initial strategy of 
trying to impose products on local customers – which might have seemed 
more profitable for a multi-national business – Unilever ultimately settled 
on the strategy of catering to the local.
Unilever’s change of strategy meant that its global reach would 
empower consumers in very specific ways. The company’s global reach 
meant that lessons learned in one market, such as the importance of local 
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research facilities, could be transferred to other markets. In the context 
of this book’s debates, this strategy is of particular interest, because the 
company’s marketing strategy stands for a flow against the asymmetry of 
power: solutions initially developed for less powerful consumers came 
to influence patterns of consumption of the more powerful consumers. 
Multi-national companies, in providing a link between different national 
markets, make the local dependent on the global in yet another way.
Unilever’s approach to global expansion was also facilitated by the 
growing importance of consumer research in the mid-twentieth century. 
Management experts convinced companies of the benefits of under-
standing locally specific patterns of consumption; science and technol-
ogy provided the means to do this. This field of marketing research has 
changed dramatically over the past fifty years, allowing corporations to 
study consumers in local markets and to transfer their insights globally.30 
Research on consumption meant that multi-nationals were forced to take 
the local seriously in a way that they could not before. The capitalist 
desire of boosting sales thus reversed power asymmetries by forcing pro-
ducers to cater to consumers in peripheral countries.
The local dimension of consumption, however, was and is particu-
larly important to Unilever, for it was the local that created consumers’ 
trust. Unilever thus developed a global marketing strategy based on local 
trademarks that responded to local concerns. At the same time, Unilever 
was in a position to blend the local brands with the company’s global 
reach. A good example is Unilever’s ice cream strategy. The world’s larg-
est producer of ice cream in the 2010s, the company created logos for its 
products that combined local names with a globally identifiable image. 
Each icon is instantly recognizable.31 Unilever seamlessly combined the 
trust and familiarity of a local brand with the trust derived from the qual-
ity standards of a multi-national.
Conclusion
In the mid-twentieth century, as targeted advertising became more ubiq-
uitous, multi-national companies became crucial mediators between 
the global and the local as a strategy to increase their sales. Companies 
promoted local visions of the global, while also amalgamating the global 
to reflect insights from local markets. The two companies studied here, 
Heineken and Unilever, reached an impact beyond the size of their home 
countries by successfully creating a hybrid of global and local meanings 
that, backed by the authority of a powerful company, they spread to many 
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different countries. Their example shows how multi-national companies 
reversed asymmetries intrinsic in global markets, affecting in particular 
concepts of national power. In this case the Netherlands offers a par-
ticularly striking example of a ‘small’ country assuming global economic 
power. Both companies were compelled to look abroad to find larger mar-
kets than those accessible at home. They show how smaller nation states 
might take a greater interest in global markets, especially because their 
home markets are relatively small. This context answers the additional 
question why small countries might be over-represented in the field of 
multi-nationals. Their companies work hard to gain global influence; but 
their power can only be wielded as long as local consumers respond to it.
Moving to a more abstract level of debate, the case study shows 
that globalization can reverse spatial asymmetries. Asymmetries in one 
field may not correspond to asymmetries in another. Some agents gain 
from certain aspects of globalization, regardless of wider implications 
that might be judged negatively. Overall, this chapter shows how in 
the  twentieth century consumers (rather than nation states) have been 
empowered by consumption. Their voice also left an impact on consum-
ers in other places. Consumption in the mid-twentieth century gave the 
local the power to influence the global.
The effects of globalization on trade and consumption are not eas-
ily predictable and do not follow a single model. There are many differ-
ent avenues where the local fuses with the global, offering ramifications 
for individual understandings of the global. Despite the local consum-
er’s impact on marketing strategies, exemplified in the two case studies, 
companies are not innocent bystanders in the creation of images of the 
global. They actively create meanings, shaping as much as following mar-
kets. The global, a contested rather than obvious category, is ultimately 
built on hybrids of local meanings and is itself a local concept.
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Re-Mapping Centre and Periphery : 
Concluding Thoughts
Ulrich Tiedau
It has been more than two years since that momentous day on which 
the British electorate narrowly decided to extract itself from (political) 
Europe, by happenstance coinciding with the long-planned symposium 
on which the papers that form the basis of this volume’s contributions 
were presented. Naturally, the discussions of historic and current affairs 
blended into each other and provided ample room for reflection on the 
relevance of the concepts at the core of this volume for the present.
Ever since, the prospects of the UK crashing out of the European 
Union by default have increased on a daily basis. Whether one regrets 
or greets that prospect at this point in time depends on one’s political 
convictions, obviously, and this is not the place to offer a political value 
judgement. ‘Europe and its offshore islands’, as the late Ralf Dahrendorf, 
the former director of the London School of Economics (LSE) and only 
person who ever was a member of both the German and British parlia-
ments, used to describe this asymmetrical relationship,1 have long been 
likely to come to a different arrangement, if few had foreseen the dra-
matic, and some would say tragic, way in which the process would play 
out. In Sir Ralf’s modern version of Vincenzo Gioberti’s characterization 
of England as the ‘Sicily of Europe’ (1851), as referenced by Axel Körner 
in the introduction to this volume, the UK is pointedly assigned to the 
periphery of the continent, and its relationship to Europe described as 
one of subordination. As the old pun about fog over the English Channel 
(‘Continent cut off’) suggests, the relationship naturally looks more com-
plex from a British perspective, with several historical (Commonwealth), 
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cultural (‘Anglosphere’) and economic (‘global economy’) layers overlap-
ping with geographical, or geography-defying, ones.
When I use this example from current affairs, without the benefit 
of hindsight that usually distinguishes a historian’s work from political 
commentary, it is to show that on the traditional British collective ‘men-
tal map’, the English Channel seems to lie between the US and the British 
Isles, whereas the ocean separates the UK from Europe. Mental maps like 
this, or ‘collective mentalities’, as Joris van Eijnatten calls them in his con-
tribution to this volume, provide a particularly interesting way to analyse 
hierarchical and asymmetrical relationships, and they are of course not 
one-dimensional but multi-layered entities. The illustration chosen for 
the cover of this volume is thus no coincidence. Unfamiliar representa-
tions like inverted charts of the world can be unsettling, and have been 
used, more often than not with political intentions, to challenge estab-
lished hierarchies (e.g. between the developed and the developing world; 
see the controversies about the Peters projection and its variants versus 
the traditional Mercator projection since the 1970s). 
The contributions to this volume are examples of attempts at 
re-mapping spatial hierarchies from a scholarly perspective, and explore 
the value of moving beyond the traditional historical model of ‘cen-
tres’ and ‘periphery’, as introduced by Gunder Frank and Immanuel 
Wallerstein in the 1970s and 1980s. Using examples of historical mech-
anisms of cultural and intellectual exchange from both European and 
global contexts and from different historical periods, they argue for a 
reconceptualization of the multi-layered relationships between global, 
regional and sub-regional (political) entities. When questioning existing 
hierarchies and focusing in particular on perspectives from the allegedly 
‘lesser’ states and cultures, they do so without claiming to fully rewrite 
European and global history from the perspectives of the peripheries 
(which would be a desirable undertaking), but in the hope and expec-
tation of providing a historical corrective that rebalances common and 
frequently unquestioned perceptions.
Note
1. In his opening address to the 1992 convention of the German Historians’ Association (Deutscher 
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